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This is a study of press-party parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, which refers to the 
degree to which the newspaper system parallels the party system. The study first provides 
a descriptive account of the history of press-party parallelism in the two countries. In the 
Turkish case, there was no discernible overall trend, from higher to lower parallelism or 
otherwise, but a number of ups and downs. In the British case, an overall decline is 
observed over time, but this conclusion is qualified by the differences in the behavior of 
the different segments of the British press.  
 
The study then provides an evaluation of the modernization, commercialization and party 
system explanations. We do not see, contrary to the prediction based upon modernization 
approach, a smooth decline in parallelism over time, nor do we observe lower levels of 
parallelism in the commercialized periods in the two cases. Ideological polarization and 
cleavage voting, on the other hand, do seem to contribute to higher levels of political 
parallelism in the press. 
 
In the last part of the study, newspapers coverages prior to 2007 elections in Turkey, and 
2001, 2005, and 2010 elections in the UK were analyzed using a word-count based 
methodology. Contrary to our expectations, the level of parallelism was higher in the 
Turkish press than in the British press, and biased content in newspapers was not limited 
to opinion pages only, with news articles being just as biased as, and in some cases even 
more biased than, the opinion articles. 
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Bu çalıĢmada, gazete sisteminin parti sistemi ile ne kadar paralellik gösterdiğini anlatan 
basın-parti paralelliği kavramı Türkiye ve Ġngiltere örnekleri üzerinden incelenmektedir. 
Ġlk olarak basın-parti paralelliğinin bu iki ülkedeki tarihi geliĢimi incelenmiĢtir. Türkiye 
örneğinde, zaman içinde daha fazla paralellikten daha az paralelliğe doğru veya bunun 
dıĢında bir tek yönlü süreç değil, değiĢik dalgalanmalar gözlenmiĢtir. Ġngiltere örneğinde 
ise basının tamamı dikkate alındığında zamanla daha az paralellik gözlenmiĢ, ancak 
Ġngiliz basınındaki farklı piyasa segmentlerinin davranıĢları birbirinden farklı olmuĢtur. 
 
ÇalıĢmada ayrıca basın-parti paralelliği ile ilgili modernleĢme, ticarileĢme ve parti sistemi 
açıklamaları da incelenen iki örnekten yola çıkılarak değerlendirilmiĢtir. ModernleĢme 
açıklamasının öngörüsünden farklı olarak, paralellikte zaman içinde sürekli bir azalma 
gözlenmemiĢ, ayrıca ticarileĢmenin daha fazla olduğu dönemlerde paralelliğin daha az 
olacağı beklentisi de karĢılanmamıĢtır. Ġdeolojik kutuplaĢmanın ve grup aidiyetine bağlı 
oylamanın güçlü olduğu dönemlerde ise, hipotezlere uygun olarak, paralelliğin daha 
yüksek olduğu gözlenmiĢtir. 
 
ÇalıĢmanın son bölümünde Türkiye‟deki 2007 seçimleri ile Ġngiltere‟deki 2001, 2005 ve 
2010 seçimleri öncesindeki gazete içerikleri kelime sayımına dayanan bir yöntem 
kullanılarak incelenmiĢtir. Beklentilerimizin aksine, Türk basınındaki paralelliğin Ġngiliz 
basınındaki paralellikten daha yüksek olduğu ve her iki örnekte de sadece köĢe yazılarının 
değil, tarafsız olması beklenen haber yazılarının da yanlı bir tutum sergilediği, hatta çoğu 
zaman gazetelerdeki haber içeriğinin yorum içeriğinden daha yanlı olduğu gözlenmiĢtir. 
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PART I 
 
Chapters in this study are grouped in three parts to make it easy to follow, and to guide 
readers to specific issues of interest for there are multiple aims pursued in the study. Part I 
consists of the introduction, literature review, and methodology chapters, laying the 
groundwork for the empirical Parts II and III, which deal, respectively, with the history of 
political parallelism in Turkey and the UK, and with contemporary press-party parallelism 
in these two countries. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Press-party parallelism is a term coined by Colin Seymour-Ure in his 1974 book 
The Political Impact of Mass Media to describe the degree to which the newspaper 
system parallels the party system. In the extreme case, every political party has a 
newspaper and each newspaper is owned by a political party, the closest approximation to 
which was probably recorded “in Denmark in early twentieth century, when each town 
had four newspapers, representing the four major political parties” (Hallin & Mancini, p. 
27). Of course, organizational ties –here in the form of ownership- are not the only 
indicator of parallelism: parallelism is also reflected in readership patterns –when readers 
of a particular newspaper are also members or supporters of a particular party-, and in 
what Seymour-Ure calls “loyalty to party goals” (p. 163) as expressed in newspaper 
content. 
Although this is a study of press-party parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, it 
would probably be best to make it clear at the outset that this is not a “comparison” of two 
cases in the strict sense of the term, but more of a “parallel reading” whereby the same 
phenomenon is examined in two separate cases. Also, the author‟s main interest lies in 
political parallelism in Turkey, and the UK mainly served as a country to compare with 
Turkey. The UK was an ideal choice to serve in a parallel reading, because it was in the 
UK that the term press-party parallelism was invented, and the public awareness about the 
issue is unusually high in the UK. The UK is also considered to be an outlier among the 
countries of the liberal model because of its high levels of political parallelism,
1
 which 
                                                 
1
 Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that the high level of political parallelism observed in 
the UK makes it different from other countries of the liberal model, which also include 
the US, Canada, and Australia. In terms of the development of a mass press, 
professionalism, and the role of the state in the media, the UK is similar to other liberal 
model countries, but in terms of its political parallelism characteristics, the UK is closer 
to the Mediterranean or polarized pluralist countries. 
 3 
warrants more explanation. A parallel reading together with Turkey could help explain 
this outlier position better.  
1.1. Aims of the Study 
This study has three partially overlapping aims, one descriptive, one theoretical, and 
one methodological.  
Following a review of the literature in Chapter 2 and the presentation of the 
methodology used in the study in Chapter 3, Chapters 4 and 5 serve to accomplish the 
descriptive aim of the study, which is to provide a historical overview of the development 
of political parallelism in the Turkish and the British press. Chapter 4, on the history of 
political parallelism in the Turkish press, covers the period from the publication of the 
first Turkish newspapers in 1830s to the 2002 elections, and is more ambitious than 
Chapter 5, which covers post-war political parallelism in British press. The contribution 
made by Chapter 4 to the literature stems from collecting and re-classifying information 
already contained in the secondary literature on Turkish press history, and not from 
original research into the archives. This effort, however, has brought two benefits: First, it 
allowed a first time attempt to produce system-wide measures of parallelism in clearly 
defined historical periods, using a detailed methodology uniformly applied throughout the 
chapter so that we can compare levels of parallelism in different historical periods. We 
can now answer questions like whether press is more politicized today compared to, say, 
the 1950s, or how the Ottoman periods compare with the early Republican periods in 
terms of the political positions taken by newspapers. Secondly, the chapter on the history 
of political parallelism in the Turkish press can be used as a reference to look up 
information on the political positions of individual newspapers in different historical 
periods, with detailed notes about content (did Akşam publish the Aga Khan letter 
defending the Caliphate in early 1920s?), author evaluations (did the authors of the 
various books on Turkish press history consider Hürriyet in 1950s to be a pro-DP paper 
or an anti-DP one?), organizational connections (what sort of an organizational 
connection did Vakit have with the CHP in 1930s?), and legal actions faced by papers 
(was Sabah among the papers sued by RP‟s Minister of Justice ġevket Kazan in 1997 for 
inciting a coup d‟état?). Descriptive aims of Chapter 5 are more modest, presenting a 
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table of endorsements made by national dailies in elections 1945 to 2010, combining and 
updating previous similar tables by various authors. Chapter 5 also provides the necessary 
background for Chapters 6 and 7, by two brief sections on post-war British political 
history and the segmented nature of the British national press. 
The main theoretical aim of the study, accomplished in Chapter 6, is to evaluate 
three explanations of political parallelism (modernization, commercialization, and party 
system characteristics), based upon historical data from Turkey and the UK. The 
following hypotheses, which arise from the review of the theoretical literature in Chapter 
2 and are laid out in more detail there, will be tested using data from the Turkish and the 
British cases: Hypothesis I: As we move from the earlier to the more recent periods, level 
of parallelism in Turkey and in the UK will decrease because of the modernization effect, 
which, among other things, means increasing differentiation between spheres of life, and 
in our case, between the functions of communication and politics. Hypothesis II: In 
periods when the press can be said to be more commercialized, political parallelism will 
be lower compared to non-commercialized periods, because in a commercialized 
environment, papers try to reach the widest audience possible, and avoid alienating large 
chunks of their potential readership by presenting politically biased content. Hypothesis 
III: a) Periods with a higher number of parties in the system will also have higher levels of 
political parallelism. b) Periods with higher levels of ideological polarization will also 
have higher levels of political parallelism. c) Periods with minority or coalition 
governments will have higher levels of political parallelism, and periods with single party 
governments will have lower levels of political parallelism. d) Periods with higher levels 
of cleavage voting will also have higher levels of political parallelism. 
The methodological aim of the study, no less important than the first two and 
accomplished in Chapters 3 and 7, is to seek an answer to the following question: Is it 
possible, using a content analysis method that does not require human coding, to answer 
some substantial questions concerning party-political positions of newspapers in different 
countries? Chapter 3 seeks to answer this question by reviewing the different content 
analytical strategies employed by researchers to study political parallelism so far, and by 
presenting another methodology, based upon the work of others (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 
2003; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2007), that employs word counts to identify party-political 
positions. This method first identifies the „most distinguishing phrases‟ that differentiate 
Party A‟s manifesto from Party B‟s, and then measures the frequency of these phrases in 
the coverage of individual newspapers. Thus, it becomes possible not only to assign 
 5 
partisanship scores to individual newspapers, but also to calculate a system-wide measure 
of parallelism in the press. Newspaper coverages prior to 2007 parliamentary elections in 
Turkey, and 2001, 2005, and 2010 elections in the UK will be analyzed using this 
method, and the party-political positions taken by Turkish and British national dailies in 
these elections will be identified, which will then be used to calculate system-wide levels 
of parallelism. The method used, which produces results with high face validity despite 
the fact that it does not involve human coding, is easily applicable in multi-country 
contexts as well, because it does not require assembling teams of experts who know the 
languages spoken in the countries to be studied. 
Chapter 7 also contributes to the descriptive and theoretical aims of the study. With 
regards to description, it will be possible, for the first time in the literature, to directly 
compare levels of political parallelism in the content of Turkish and British newspapers, 
calculated using the same measure. The chapter‟s contribution to the theoretical aims of 
the study, on the other hand, is two-fold: First, we will be able to evaluate levels of 
parallelism in the Turkish and British press, now that we have comparative figures. We 
expect the level of parallelism in the UK to be higher than the level of parallelism in 
Turkey, which will serve as Hypothesis IV, because there is a tradition of declaring 
political positions on election eves in the British press, in the form of endorsements, and 
Turkish newspapers avoid such open position taking, instead situating themselves as 
neutral actors. Chapter 7 will present us with data to test this hypothesis. 
The second contribution of Chapter 7 to the theoretical aims of the study arises from 
the fact that it allows measuring parallelism in news and opinion contents of the 
newspapers separately, and thus makes it possible to evaluate how much the Turkish and 
British newspapers conform to the normative criterion of limiting bias to opinion 
contents, keeping the news supply, in the words of C. P. Scott (1921), “untainted”. If 
parallelism in news contents turns out to be lower than parallelism in opinion contents, 
then we will be able to say that Scott‟s (1921) advice, on the whole, is followed. 
Moreover, because we assign parallelism scores to individual newspapers, we will also be 
able classify papers as those that do follow Scott‟s (1921) advice, and those that do not. In 
this classification, there are four possible categories in which we can place individual 
dailies: I- Balanced in both news and opinion, II- Biased in both news and opinion, III- 
Balanced in news, biased in opinion, and IV- Balanced in opinion, biased in news. We 
will be able to fit the Turkish and British newspapers, based upon their coverage prior to 
the elections under study, into this classification, and be able to answer questions like the 
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following: Which type is the most common in which system? Are Type I newspapers 
more numerous in the Turkish press or in the British press? Are all categories populated 
or do some remain as hypothetical categories? More specifically, are there any actual 
papers that fit into the Type IV category, presenting a balanced opinion diet and a biased 
news coverage? And if so, what does this mean? Which motivations may lead papers to 
follow this strategy? 
Chapter 2 provides the literature review to put these and other questions in context, 
by examining the normative, the empirical, and the theoretical issues involved in turns. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Press-party parallelism is studied in the literature under various names like press 
partisanship (Curtice, 1997; Brynin & Newton, 2003; Donsbach, 1997; Coe et al., 2008; 
Kuhn, 2005; Mughan and Gunther, 2000), party-media alliance (Sampedro & Pérez, 
2008), pillarization in the media (Semetko, 1998), party affiliation of media (Mancini 
2000), fragmentation of the media (van der Eijk, 2000) and “congruity between the 
editorial bias […] and newspaper readers‟ political leanings” (Luchessi 2008), but none of 
these formulations match the level of specification at which Seymour-Ure defined the 
concept. Bias (D‟alessio & Allen, 2000; Gunther, Montero & Wert, 2000; Luchessi, 2008; 
Dalton et al., 1998; Coe et al., 2008; Kuhn, 2005; Weatherly et al. 2007), advocacy 
(Janowitz, 1975/2000; Jakubowicz, 1995/2000), selective criticism (Semetko & 
Schoenbach, 2003), balance (Coe et al., 2008), objectivity (Tuchman, 1972/2000), 
impartiality (Mughan & Gunther, 2000), and fairness (Lichter, 2001) are some of the 
other concepts that are used to refer to the political positioning of specific media outlets or 
journalists, with implications for parallelism. Two of these terms, press partisanship and 
media bias, need to be distinguished from press-party parallelism in more detail because 
they feature prominently in the literature and usually convey different meanings. 
The term “media bias” is generally used to refer to overall bias in the system, as in 
“there is a liberal bias in the US media”, and is extensively studied in the US context. In 
their meta-analysis of media bias studies on the US, Dave D‟alessio and Mike Allen 
(2000) find 59 individual articles studying bias in the elections between 1948-1996, all 
using quantitative methods. Although they fail to confirm that there is an overall 
conservative or liberal bias in the US media, they note that this is not because every media 
outlet is un-biased, but because the liberal bias in some is canceled out by the 
conservative bias in others. This is exactly the distinction that is captured by the notion of 
 8 
press-party parallelism, which enables us to differentiate cases where there is no overall 
media bias towards one side because the differently aligned media cancel each other out, 
from cases where there is no overall media bias because each media outlet is neutral. The 
former situation would be one characterized by high press-party parallelism, whereas the 
latter would be characterized by low press-party parallelism. 
Press-party parallelism is also different from the notion of “press partisanship”. A 
media system may be characterized by high partisanship and strong positions taken on 
issues, but unless the partisanship in the media somehow fails to replicate the system of 
antagonisms and alliances that is present in the party-political arena, it is difficult to speak 
of a parallelism. Two analytical cases in which there would be high partisanship but low 
parallelism are the following: 1. All the media are supporters of a specific party, although 
there are other parties competing in the system. In this case, the pluralism of the party 
system would fail to be reflected in the media system, which would be highly skewed 
towards one side. 2. Specific media outlets take sharply divergent positions, but support 
different parties on different issues. This would be the case when “the positions in the 
media system develop […] regardless of party allegiances” (Eilders 2002). In a two-party 
system where one of the parties stands for liberal economic policies and hawkish foreign 
policy, and the other party stands for welfare policies and a dovish foreign policy; the 
media system should also follow the same alignment of political positions for parallelism 
to be the case. If the media consists of players that are liberal and dovish, or welfarist and 
hawkish, we cannot say media system parallels the party system, even when it is highly 
partisan. 
In a significant contribution to the notion of press-party parallelism, Hallin and 
Mancini (2004) introduce the term “political parallelism”, noting that press-party 
parallelism in the strict sense is in decline, but political parallelism is still common in the 
form of media organizations being associated “not with particular parties, but with general 
political tendencies” (p. 27). As an example, they mention the Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
which is “a paper of the right-center, not narrowly of the Christian Democratic Party” (p. 
27) The difference between the notions of press-party parallelism -as defined by 
Seymour-Ure (1974)- and political parallelism -as defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004)- 
can also be thought of as one of degree: Press-party parallelism would be the extreme 
case of political parallelism. Parallelism, political parallelism and press-party parallelism 
will be used interchangeably (unless otherwise noted) in this study. 
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2.1. Normative Considerations 
The first question to be answered before proceeding to a review of the empirical 
literature on political parallelism is, why study at all? Some of the normative concerns 
offered in the literature include the following: 
- Independence of the media is compromised when there is parallelism. This is a 
concern raised by Víctor Sampedro and Francisco Seoane Pérez (2008) in their study of 
the media in 2008 Spanish general elections. They note that the mainstream media 
“played along” the strategies of the two main parties, the PSOE and the PP, and helped 
them push the smaller nationalist parties and the post-communist left to the margins. The 
synchronization of media coverage with party strategies was so obvious that “hook 
phrases” produced by candidates to gain publicity would be “repeated or questioned in the 
media, depending on whether the particular news outlet was supportive or hostile to the 
candidate” (p. 341). 
- Parallelism results in deceptive reporting. This concern is also raised by Sampedro 
and Pérez (2008). They note that some outlets “initiated rumors and smearing campaigns” 
(p. 341) designed to help the candidate they support, even spreading conspiracy theories.  
- Parallelism reinforces audiences‟ pre-conceptions. This concern is raised by 
Jonathan S. Morris (2005) in his study of the CNN‟s and Fox News Channel‟s respective 
audiences. Watching channels that provide information which fits one‟s pre-conceived 
beliefs and notions only strengthens those pre-conceptions.  
- Parallelism breeds further polarization. Morris‟s (2005) another concern is that by 
reinforcing audiences‟ pre-conceptions, parallelism “contribute[s] to further polarization 
of the public and constrain[s] future attempts at an open dialogue” (p. 73). 
- Combined with commercialization, parallelism results in political sensationalism. 
This is a concern raised by Paolo Mancini (2000) in his article on commercialization and 
party affiliation in the Italian media. In his own words, “political sensationalism means 
dramatization and intensification of political conflict. To attract viewers and readers, 
events must be produced that, like in the ancient Roman circuses, pit political rivals 
against each other in dramatic, exciting, and involving confrontations” (p. 322). Political 
sensationalism, in turn, escalates conflicts and makes their peaceful solution more 
difficult. 
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- Parallelism leads to “a substantial lack of criticism” when there is a consensus on 
an issue between the political rivals. This concern is raised by Christiane Eilders (2000) in 
her study of the German quality papers‟ response to Germany‟s participation in the 
Kosovo War, the first of its kind since the World War II. Eilders notes that there was very 
little criticism of the Germany‟s involvement in the war, and whatever criticism that 
existed was of a procedural nature, not touching upon the fundamentals, reflecting the 
near consensus between the political parties in the Bundestag concerning the issue. 
- When there is parallelism, there is no longer a single electorate. This concern is 
raised by Cees van der Eijk (2000) in his study of the media environment in Netherlands. 
Eijk argues that political parallelism in the form fragmentation of the media and of the 
audiences “undermines the notion of a single electorate (or, in more archaic terms, a 
polity) whose members are exposed to the same information and debates and make 
choices on the basis of their different values or priorities” (p. 339). 
- Parallelism might foster instability. This is a concern raised by Vicky Randall 
(1998) in his conclusion to the edited volume Democratization and the Media, based on 
the case studies of Poland (Millard, 1998) and Mali (Myers, 1998). In Randall‟s words, 
“the possibility is raised that allowing different parties or religious or ethnic communities 
freedom of expression through their own media outlets could foster political division and 
instability (p. 247). 
Although the normative concerns raised in the literature cover a wide range from 
the independence of the media to negative effects on the audiences, they are all connected 
with the meta-concern of quality of democracy in a modern society and the media‟s role 
in it. Few of the studies on political parallelism make the connection between their 
normative concerns and the theory of democracy explicit.
2
 In the following sections, I 
review the literature on media and democracy and analyze the implications of political 
parallelism for the quality of democracy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 For notable exceptions, see Eilders (2002), Donsbach (1997) and Hallin and Mancini 
(2004).  
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2.1.1. Early Literature and Social Responsibility Theory of the Press 
“In modern societies, […] public deliberation is (and probably must be) largely mediated, 
with professional communicators rather than ordinary citizens talking to the each other 
and to the public through mass media of communication.” (Page, 1996, p.1, emphasis in 
the original) 
“If one were to ask the seemingly ludicrous question „Is democracy imaginable without 
any mass media?‟, the answer is „Yes, of course, and it would look remarkably like 
ancient Athens‟.” (Scammell, 2000, xl) 
The argument about the crucial role that the mass media play in a modern 
democracy parallels in some ways the argument for representative democracy. The issue 
of scale, with which Robert A. Dahl was “fascinated” (2007, p. 130) and wishes to have 
studied in more extensive detail, is what connects the idea of representation and role of 
media. Just as it is impossible, at a scale larger than city states, to have democracy without 
representation, it is practically impossible to have meaningful communication about 
public matters without the mass media. In Benjamin I. Page‟s (1996) words, “Even if we 
were, as AT&T puts it “all connected”, we could not all converse simultaneously” (p.4), 
which is why public deliberation is “mediated” in modern societies and professional 
communicators are necessary. Democracy in the absence of “professional 
communicators” is possible, but as Margaret Scammel puts it, only in ancient Athens. 
If the mass media have an essential role to play for the functioning of a modern 
representative democracy, what exactly is this role to be? Although much has been 
written on mass media and democracy from early on, the first explicit statements about 
the role of the media “in prescriptive form” appeared in the aftermath of the World War 
II, later to be named “the social responsibility theory of the press”. (Bucy & D‟Angelo, 
1998). The most prominent statements of the social responsibility approach to press are to 
be found in two reports, one written by the American Commission on the Freedom of the 
Press in 1947, and the other by British Royal Commission on the Press in 1949.  
One of the five requirements that the American Commission enumerates is that the 
press should be “a forum for the exchange of comment and criticism” (Hutchins 
Commission, 1947/2004, p.219). For the press to serve as a forum, in turn, it has to be 
open to all the viewpoints in the society: “all the important viewpoints and the interests in 
the society should be represented in its agencies of mass communication”. (p. 220) A 
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similar point is also made in the British Commission‟s report, which argues that “The 
number and variety of papers should be such that the press as a whole gives an 
opportunity for all important points of view to be effectively presented in terms of the 
varying standards of taste, political opinion and education among the principal groups of 
the population.” (1949, p. 101, as cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 158), for the press to be 
able to serve as “a means whereby individuals and groups can express a point of view or 
advocate a cause” (1949, p. 106, as cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 157-8). Although the 
specific functions talked about are somewhat different in the two reports (a forum and a 
means of advocacy), the prescription is the same: pluralism in media. 
2.1.2. Media in Studies of Democracy 
Pluralism in the media environment is also what is prescribed in the theoretical 
literature on democracy, more specifically in Robert A. Dahl‟s writings. A prominent 
theorist of modern democracy, Dahl is probably best known for his explication of what a 
democratic process would entail, and what the necessary institutions for this process 
would be in a modern day state. 
In laying out the necessary components of a democratic process, Dahl (1989) 
defines “enlightened understanding”, one of the five components, 3 as having “equal 
opportunities for discovering and validating […] the choice that would best serve the 
citizen‟s best interests” (p. 112). Interest, in turn, is defined as the choice that would have 
resulted when a person has “the fullest attainable understanding” (p. 180) of the 
alternatives to and consequences of a certain course of action. Enlightened understanding 
then requires – among other things like education- a plurality of views on the virtues and 
vices of different courses of action to be taken, and “makes it hard to justify procedures 
that would cut off or suppress information which, were it available, might well cause 
citizens to arrive at a different decision.” (p.112) 
One of the ways in which information is cut-off or suppressed is when there is a 
monopoly over sources of information. This is why Dahl includes “alternative sources of 
information that are not monopolized by the government or any other single group” 
                                                 
3
 The other four components are “effective participation”, “voting equality at the decisive 
stage”, “control of the agenda”, and “inclusion”. See Dahl, 1989, pp. 108-119. 
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among his widely circulated list of “institutions necessary for polyarchy” (1989, p. 233), 
polyarchy being the word for actually existing democracy. In a modern society, the most 
important source of information about public matters is the mass media. Hence, pluralism 
in the media environment –as an operationalization of Dahl‟s formulation of “alternative 
sources of information”- has become one of the most important yardsticks in evaluating 
the quality of democracy in a country. For example, the first item in the Freedom House's 
survey of civil liberties, titled Freedom of Expression and Belief, starts out with a 
question about the presence or absence of pluralism in the media. Freedom House‟s 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties ratings of countries are probably the most widely cited 
and generally accepted operationalization of democracy. The Civil Liberties section of the 
survey, which can be treated as a quality of democracy measure, consists of four items, 
“freedom of expression and belief”, “associational and organizational rights”, “rule of 
law”, and “personal autonomy and individual rights”, each measured by several separate 
questions. The first question of the item “freedom of expression and belief”, is as follows: 
“Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in 
cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey 
gives the system credit.)” (Freedom House, 2005) As is clear from the note, pluralism is 
the main concern behind the question about freedom and independence of the media. 
In a collection of essays specifically on Defining and Measuring Democracy 
(Beetham, 1994), three out of the four articles with indices of democracy include 
pluralism in the media environment among their criteria for democracy. Sponsored by the 
European Consortium for Political Research, the edited volume Defining and Measuring 
Democracy (Beetham, 1994) is a collection of essays specifically on the 
operationalization of democracy and fills an important void. Of the four articles with 
indices of democracy (Saward, 1994; Beetham, 1994; Elklit, 1994; Weir 1994), the last 
three make some reference to pluralism in the media environment in their indices. One of 
Beetham‟s (1994) seven question regarding “the quality and vitality of democracy” is the 
following: “How open are the media to access from all sections of opinion and social 
groups, and how effectively do they operate as a balanced forum for informed political 
debate?” (p. 39) Elklit (1994) takes Robert Dahl‟s list of seven institutions for polyarchy 
as his starting point and defines fourteen operational elements, one of which is “the 
degree to which political parties have equal access to the mass media” (p. 93, 101). Weir 
(1994) compares six nations over 16 groups of indicators, one of which is parties‟ “access 
to the broadcast media” under the heading “equalizing electoral opportunities” (p. 132). 
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As we can see, media is given a prominent place in studies of democracy, both in 
theoretically oriented writings like Dahl‟s and in efforts of operationalization with an 
empirical aim, like the collection of essays in the edited volume mentioned above. The 
emphasis seems to be over pluralism in the media in the form of parties, individuals or 
groups having access to the mass media to make their views known. Similarly, democracy 
is a major concern of media and communication scholars, although their concerns are not 
only or primarily about pluralism. 
2.1.3. Democracy in Media Studies 
Lists of functions the mass media are supposed to perform for democracy are 
offered in a number of studies. Two studies containing such lists, the reports by the 
British Royal Commission on the Press (1949, as cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974), and the 
Hutchins Commission (1947/2004) were mentioned in the section on early literature. The 
more recent literature on media and democracy also offers such lists, the most prominent 
of which is probably Jay G. Blumler and Michael Gurevitch‟s (1990/1995). Another 
relatively recent list is the one prepared by Michael Schudson (1995, as cited in Bucy & 
D‟angelo, 1998). In Table 1, a stylized comparison of these normative lists is presented. 
As we can see in Table 1, two of these functions, those of providing information 
and serving as a forum, are present in all the lists. Two other functions, those of advocacy 
and watchdog, are present in two lists. The remaining ten functions are mentioned only 
once. If this list has any representative capacity for the wider literature on media and 
democracy, we can treat the four shared functions as prominent ones and focus upon them 
in the remainder of this inquiry. 
We have reason to believe that these four functions –which emerged from a comparison 
of normative lists- are prominent in the wider literature, for they also feature, almost in 
exact shape, in a major survey of empirical studies on media and democracy. In their 
introduction to a collection of major articles on Media, Journalism and Democracy, 
Margaret Scammell and Holli Semetko (2000) observe that “the literature is concentrated 
around investigation of media‟s adequate and inadequate performance of duties in relation 
to the classic liberal assumptions of democracy” (p. xii). Accordingly,  
   media inquiry [is] clustered around these three questions: 
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- Media and the state. What in reality is the relationship – that of watchdog or 
lapdog? How is the „watchdog‟ ideal enhanced or deformed by state interference 
and regulation of media ownership and content, by censorship, by the growth of 
state public relations, and so on? 
- Information. What kind of information do the media serve us? What is news? 
How is it selected, constructed, biased, and so on? 
- Representation. Are the media truly representative of society? Which people and 
groups are super-served and which neglected in media representation of public 
opinion? Why? (p. xiii) 
 
The watchdog and information functions re-appear in this survey in almost exact 
shape, and what Semetko and Scammell (2000) call „representation‟ corresponds 
simultaneously to advocacy and forum functions in the normative lists. 
2.1.4. Implications of Political Parallelism for Democracy 
Now that we have reviewed the normative literature on media and democracy both 
from the angle of democracy studies and from the angle of media studies, and come up 
with specific evaluative criteria (pluralism from democracy studies; information, forum, 
advocacy and watchdog functions from media studies), we can move on to considering 
the implications of political parallelism for the role the mass media are expected to play in 
a democracy. Before that, however, a few words on the connection between pluralism and 
the four functions are in order.  
One of these criteria, pluralism, is not a function but a state of affairs. It is possible 
to treat it as a normative criterion alongside the four functions, but also as a criterion at 
another level, one that needs to be considered for its implications for the functions in 
question. This is what Christiane Eilders (2002) does in her discussion of the connection 
between pluralism and the functions the media are supposed to play. Her list of functions 
consists of three items; two of them are information and watchdog functions, and one is 
what she calls “orientation”. Eilders (2002) argues that for all three functions, pluralism in 
media is a must: 
   Only if the media is open towards the variety of societal voices, can it disseminate 
unbiased, comprehensive and complete information. Only if the media is 
independent of state, party or economic influence, is it able to act as a watchdog 
supervising the political process. And only if it represents a variety of opinions, can 
it provide sufficient orientation for the audience and support the audience‟s opinion 
formation. Thus, pluralism may be regarded as the normative basis for a well-
functioning democratic media system. (p. 28) 
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What is lacking in Eilder‟s discussion of pluralism is the distinction between 
internal pluralism and external pluralism, which is a key analytical tool in understanding 
the implications of political parallelism for democracy. In the absence of this distinction, 
references to pluralism in the media are necessarily vague. From the second sentence in 
the quote above, the one about the media being “independent of state, party or economic 
influence”, we get the feeling that what Eilders is referring to is internal pluralism, in the 
sense of individual media outlets being independent of such influences. In the third 
sentence, however, the one about “represent[ing] a variety of opinions” and thus 
“providing orientation”, the reference seems to be to external pluralism, in the sense of 
pluralism achieved at the system level with individual media outlets being associated with 
specific political stands; how would they be able to provide orientation if they did not 
have one? 
Eilder‟s suggestion that “pluralism may be regarded as the normative basis for a 
well functioning democratic media system” would arise few, if any, controversies. Most 
would agree, and there are even more enthusiastic defenses of pluralism in the media, like 
the following by Ben H. Bagdikian (1985/2000): “Diversity and richness in the media are 
not ornaments of a democracy but essential elements for its survival” (p. 97). However, 
the question of what sort of pluralism a media system ought to have (internal vs. external) 
gives rise to a strong controversy, in the form of two directly opposing views with 
passionate advocates. The view that external pluralism is enough for the media to perform 
its democratic functions is defended by Benjamin I. Page (1996). He argues that in 
evaluating media performance, “we should look at what all the media have to say […] We 
need to pay attention to the totality of political information that is made available” (p. 7). 
This is because  
   even ideological bias in the media may not badly distort public deliberation. The 
crucial factors […] are competition and diversity. Let opposing views content 
vigorously in the marketplace of ideas. […] The average citizen has a good chance 
of arriving at sound opinions […] so long as there is vigorous competition among 
different ideas and interpretations, even if the media are full of bias or contaminated 
by untruths. 
 
As long as there is competition between the differently aligned media, according to 
Page, the specific biases of media outlets do not matter.4 The view directly opposing this 
                                                 
4
 Although Page (1996) goes on to criticize the New York Times op-ed pages for failing 
to display internal pluralism, he makes it clear that he makes this criticism because the 
New York Times, along with Washington Post, is an authoritative voice in many policy 
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is that pluralism at the level of individual media outlets is required if the media are to 
perform their democratic functions. This view is expressed by Wolfgang Donsbach 
(1997), who discusses the issue in terms of different ways of achieving plurality, and 
arrives at the conclusion that internal pluralism is what is needed. After examining the 
media coverage of the 1994 Bundestag elections, which showed the partisan alignment of 
the German national press, Donsbach makes the following evaluation: 
we can call this pattern a virtual plurality: It does not exist at the point of the 
individuals‟ information intake, where they make up their minds about parties and 
candidates. Instead, plurality exists only on the system level. However, people read 
papers and not newsstands or news systems. Thus, while this partisan model 
achieves an overall plurality in public communication, it does little to convey to 
individuals a fair and neutral presentation of the alternatives in an election. (p. 166, 
emphasis by author) 
 
Although the two authors have directly opposing viewpoints on the necessity of 
internal pluralism, the function that they talk about is the same: information. Page (1996) 
thinks individual citizens have the ability to reach the necessary information, as long as it 
is placed “somewhere in the system” (p. 7);5 and Donsbach (1997) thinks most citizens do 
not have this ability, because “people read newspapers not newsstands or news systems” 
(p. 166). A middle position in the controversy about internal pluralism vs. external 
pluralism was offered years ago, in the report of the Commission on the Freedom of the 
Press (Hutchins Commission, 1947/2004), which argued for an ideal combination of 
“advocates” and “common carriers” in the press (p. 220). Although the Commission‟s 
(1947/2004) main concern was with advocacy not with information, their argument about 
an “ideal combination” applies equally well when considering the function of 
information. Their argument for an ideal combination rests on the idea that common 
carriers are the more important channel for making a point of view known, that they have 
their own prejudices which deny access to some viewpoints, and that smaller advocate 
outlets act as important checks on the excesses of common carriers: 
                                                                                                                                               
issues and have considerable impact upon the rest of the media. (p. 117) In other words, 
Page somewhat moderates his stance on the issue of internal pluralism: In this modified 
version, internal pluralism is required of major individual outlets, especially if they are 
practically unchallenged with regards to the coverage of certain issues, as was the case 
with New York Times on foreign policy issues. 
5
 “If extensive political information is available somewhere in the system, […] a lot of 
information, and reasonable conclusions from it, will trickle out through opinion leaders 
and cue givers to ordinary citizens” (p. 7). 
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   An ideal combination would include general media, inevitably solicitous to 
present their own views, but setting forth other views fairly. As checks on their 
fairness, and partial safeguards against ignoring important matters, more specialized 
media of advocacy have a vital place. In the absence of such a combination partially 
insulated groups in society will continue to be insulated. (p.220) 
 
This would be the ideal balance between internal pluralism and external pluralism, both 
having a role to play. To couch it in political parallelism terms -which is inherent in the 
definition of external pluralism-, some parts of the media system should parallel the party 
system, some not. Two questions arise regarding the Commission‟s formulation: First, do 
the advocates and common carriers have to be of the same sort, or would it be okay if, for 
example, the television played the role of a common carrier, and the newspapers served as 
advocates? Second, what are the implications of this ideal combination for other functions 
besides advocacy? Would a combination of advocates and common carriers serve other 
functions equally well? 
To these questions I now turn. The short answer to the first question would be that 
the advocates and common carriers need not be of the same type. Neither do they have to 
be all privately owned: public TV can serve as a common carrier, and private channels 
can serve as advocates; or the opposite may be the case, with commercial channels acting 
as common carriers and public channels as advocates. Common carriers and advocates 
need not be limited by popularity criteria either: it is possible to imagine large-circulation 
newspapers acting as common carriers and small newspapers as advocates, just as it is 
possible to imagine small-circulation quality newspapers acting as common carriers and 
mass circulation tabloids as advocates. The type (TV or print or internet), ownership 
(public or private) or circulation/rating of the media are not relevant when considering the 
characteristics that advocate outlets and common carriers ought to have. At a systemic 
level, the mere presence of advocates and common carriers is enough, whatever their 
similarities and differences are. From the point of view of the individual citizen, however, 
different considerations come into play. 
For the individual citizen to directly benefit from the existence of both advocates 
and common carriers, he or she ought to be exposed to both. If most citizens are exposed 
to only one outlet, then the presence of both common carriers and advocates will not 
benefit most citizens, the argument about opinion leaders and cue-givers notwithstanding. 
For example, most observers agree that parallelism is stronger in print press, and 
relatively weak in TV (Seymour-Ure, 1974; van Kempen, 2007; Donsbach, 1997). In a 
system with internal pluralism in TV and external parallelism in print press, a citizen 
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getting all his/her political information and opinion from television will most probably be 
exposed only to common carriers. Another citizen, using only newspapers to receive 
political opinion and information would be exposed only to advocates. Since newspaper 
readership is generally lower than television viewership, being exposed only to common 
carriers is the more probable of the two scenarios for most citizens of the countries with 
pluralist media structures, although evaluations must be made on a case by case basis, 
looking into media use habits of the populations, as well as the nature and degree of 
pluralism present. Where pluralist media structures are not present, the discussion about 
internal vs. external pluralism is naturally not relevant. 
Turning to the second question, whether this idea of “ideal combination”, as a 
normative prescription, applies to other functions besides advocacy, the following is in 
order. To the information function, as I have argued above, the ideal combination of the 
Hutchins Commission applies equally well. It is better if all relevant information appeared 
in general carriers, but in case it did not, it is a good idea to have some specialized 
advocate outlets, which parallel the party system and which have comparative advantage 
in information gathering if only by virtue of their alignment with political parties. It is not 
difficult to imagine cases where parties and party supporters would be more willing to 
provide information to outlets that they think are sympathetic to their own position, 
instead of talking to the common carriers, which may be perceived as part of the “hostile 
media”. “Hostile media phenomenon”, which refers to the audience‟s perception of 
“neutral messages to be biased against their own position” (Coe et al., 2008) is an 
important area of study, with some studies finding absolute, others relative hostile media 
phenomena. When perceptions of hostile media are common, advocate outlets and their 
reporters would have a natural advantage over their competitors among the common 
carriers, at least in some areas of investigation. They would also be better prepared to give 
space to information deemed unimportant or too trivial to be published in the general 
carriers, like the nitty gritty details of an election campaign or a candidate‟s personal 
history, which may later turn out to be crucial. These details, in turn, would have 
remained as trivia so long as they failed to appear at all in the common carriers‟ coverage, 
who have a natural advantage in providing information to the non-partisan or independent 
or moderate voters, who make all the difference especially in close races. If there were no 
partisan outlets, this crucial information would be denied to the voters; if there were no 
common carriers, somebody‟s breaking news would be trivia to others, and voters would 
again be denied sufficient access to possibly crucial information. 
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Much of what has been said about political parallelism and information function 
directly applies to the watchdog function as well, which in a sense is provision of 
information about the wrongdoings of the government. It is the opposition papers that are 
most eager to find out about and expose scandals or bad performance on the part of the 
government officials, the reason being that they want the party that they support to be the 
government, not the other way around. Their success, in turn, depends in part upon their 
stories getting picked up by the outlets which serve as common carriers.  
The last remaining function, that of forum, is probably the most difficult among the 
four to be fitted into the “ideal combination” framework of the Commission on the 
Freedom of the Press (1947/2004). This is because forum, by definition, requires a shared 
platform, one which the common carriers seem better equipped to provide. However, as I 
have argued before, what goes into the common carriers is, to some extent, a function of 
what the advocate outlets publish. Certain information and opinion would never have 
made it to the nationally significant common carriers had they not been picked up by the 
advocate press in the first place. The metaphor of forum as a high platform, over which 
only sufficiently prepared –cooked in the advocate press- ideas can climb would probably 
help fit the forum function into the ideal combination framework. Admittedly, though, the 
common carriers‟ role in the function of forum is more essential, making the “ideal 
combination” somewhat lopsided, and hence, less ideal. However, since forum is only 
one among four of our functions, unless we assign this function a theoretically more 
prominent place, the argument of ideal combination would not be hurt much. 
To sum up so far, political parallelism means external pluralism in the media –when 
there is pluralism-, and there are two opposing views concerning internal and external 
pluralism in the media environment. One of the views is that as long as there is rigorous 
competition between outlets, political parallelism is not a problem and external pluralism 
is enough for the media to perform its democratic functions. The other view is that since 
external pluralism is only pluralism at the system level, and the individual does not really 
experience it because most people follow single or at most a few outlets, political 
parallelism does create a problem from the point of view of pluralism.  Bridging these two 
approaches, a middle position was offered years ago in the report of the Hutchins 
Commission on the Freedom of the Press (1947/2004), which argued for an “ideal 
combination” of “advocates” and “common carriers”, which means moderate levels of 
political parallelism in the form of some outlets paralleling the party system, and others 
serving as common platforms.  
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After presenting the controversy over internal vs. external parallelism, I applied the 
“ideal combination” formulation of the Commission to the four democratic functions of 
the press, which emerges from a review of the normative literature on media and 
democracy, namely the functions of advocacy, information, watchdog, and forum. I have 
argued that, although the ideal combination was initially formulated with the advocacy 
function in mind, it applied equally well to the functions of information and watchdog, 
and to some degree to the function of forum. To conclude, the Commission‟s formulation, 
which came out after the World War II, stands the test of time and change of contexts, as 
well as having applicability to other significant functions, and can serve as an important 
yardstick in evaluating differences in levels and types of political parallelism from a 
normative point of view. 
2.2. Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature on political parallelism will be reviewed in this section with 
special emphasis on geographical distribution, trends over time, and causes and 
consequences of parallelism in the media.  
2.2.1. Geographical Distribution 
Single-country studies containing some information about parallelism in the media 
abound. There are studies detecting or failing to detect some political parallelism in the 
media systems of the US (Weatherly et al., 2007; Morris, 2005; Lichter, 2001; Endersby 
& Ognianova, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998; Coe et al., 2008; Patterson, 1993/2000; Page, 
1996), Germany (Semetko & Schoenbach, 2003; Donsbach, 1997; Eilders, 2000; Eilders, 
2002; Kaase, 2000), the UK (Curtice, 1997; Brynin & Newton, 2003; Semetko, 2000; 
Wring, 1998), France (Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn, 1998), Italy (Mancini, 2000; Marletti & 
Roncarolo, 2000), Spain (Sampedro & Pérez, 2008; Semetko & Canel, 1997; Gunther, 
Montero & Wert, 2000), Netherlands (Semetko, 1998; van der Eijk, 2000), Argentina 
(Luchessi, 2008), Chile (Tironi & Sunkel, 2000), Japan (Krauss, 2000), Poland (Millard, 
1998), and Mali (Myers, 1998). 
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Besides single country studies, there are also studies that make inter-regional and 
inter-country comparisons. To the first group belong a number of studies that compare 
Europe and America in terms of political parallelism (Janowitz, 1975; Donsbach & Klett, 
1993; Mughan & Gunther, 2000), each arguing that journalism in Europe is much more 
politicized in Europe than in the US and parallelism higher. Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
also make inter-regional comparisons, by comparing and contrasting three groups of 
countries in terms of their levels of political parallelism. They argue that parallelism is 
low in the North Atlantic region, and high in North/Central European and Mediterranean 
regions, groupings of countries defined both by geographical proximity and similarity in 
political systems. Although Hallin and Mancini (2004) also make some intra-regional 
comparisons (like that between the US and the UK in the North Atlantic group), their 
analysis mostly remains at the regional level. 
To the best of my knowledge, there are three studies of political parallelism that 
make inter-country comparisons: Seymour-Ure‟s (1974) book The Political Impact of 
Mass Media, which places close to twenty countries along five levels of press-party 
parallelism, ranging from no parallelism in Japan to complete parallelism in the USSR 
(see Table 2.1); Patterson and Donsbach‟s (1993, as cited in Hallin & Mancini, 2004) 
article based upon a survey of journalists, which places Britain, Sweden, Germany, and 
Italy to the high parallelism category and the US to the low parallelism category; and van 
Kempen‟s (2007) article based upon European Election Study (1999, cited in van 
Kempen), placing the 15 countries that were members of the EU in 1999 into a scale of 
parallelism ranging from 0 to 100, with the lowest score being that of Germany with 1.0 
and the highest score belonging to Greece, with 19.9.  
Table 2.2- Level of Political Parallelism 
Janowitz 
(1975); 
Donsbach & 
Klett (1993); 
Mughan & 
Gunther (2000). 
High Low 
Europe The US 
Patterson & 
Donsbach 
(1993) 
High Low 
Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Italy The US 
Hallin & Mancini 
(2004) 
High Medium Low 
Mediterranean North/Central Europe North Atlantic 
Seymour-Ure 
(1974) 
Complete High Medium Low No 
USSR Scandinavian 
countries, 
Benelux, 
Austria, Israel, 
France, Canada, 
West Germany 
United 
States 
Japan 
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South Africa, 
Chile, 
Colombia 
Van Kempen 
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2.2.2. Trends over Time 
A number of single-country studies, in addition to Hallin and Mancini‟s (2004) 
broad study spanning three regions, observe trends in political parallelism over time. 
Some of them also match these trends with other changes going on in the societies under 
consideration. In much of these studies, the trend observed is toward less political 
parallelism, although there are cases where increasing parallelism is also observed, as 
well as no change. Observations of decreasing parallelism exist for Italy (Marletti & 
Roncarolo, 2000), Netherlands (van der Eijk, 2000), Sweden (van Kempen, 2006), the 
UK (Seymour-Ure, 2001), the US (Patterson, 1993/2000; Donsbach & Klett, 1993/2000) 
and North/Central European countries (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Observations of 
increasing parallelism exist for Italy (Mancini, 2000) and the US (Morris, 2005), and an 
observation of no change exists for Eastern Europe where parallelism is still high 
(Jakubowicz, 1995/2000). 
Matching trends mentioned include modernization and secularization in Italy 
(Marletti & Roncarolo, 2000), de-pillarization in Netherlands (van der Eijk, 2000), 
democratization in Eastern Europe (Jakubowicz, 1995/2000), decline of cleavage politics 
in Sweden (van Kempen, 2006), commercialization in the US (Patterson, 1993/2000; 
Donsbach & Klett, 1993/2000), and structural differentiation in North/Central Europe 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The matching of these different trends with decline in 
parallelism results from different explanatory frameworks concerning parallelism in the 
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media. In what follows, I offer a review and a classification of the different frameworks 
used in explaining parallelism. 
2.3. Explaining Parallelism  
The explanations offered can be grouped under three main headings: economical 
(game theory approaches), sociological (the modernization explanation), and political 
(party system characteristics). 
 
2.3.1. Game theory approaches 
In the studies that make a Europe vs. America comparison (Janowitz, 1975/2000; 
Donsbach & Klett, 1993/2000; Mughan & Gunther, 2000), a common assertion, couched 
in game theoretical language, is the following: The reason European newspapers are 
partisan and American newspapers are not is that press in the US is commercialized 
whereas the European press is not commercialized. In Europe, “the commercialization of 
the press and hence the necessity to reach the widest audience by non-partisan content 
came about much later than in the US” (Donsbach & Klett, 1993/2000, p. 57); whereas in 
the US, since they were commercialized from early on, newspapers had “to build and to 
retain mass audiences” and were “stimulated to produce output that will be viewed by 
such heterogeneous audiences as relatively objective” (Janowitz, 1975/2000, p. 626). 
Otherwise, “These audiences respond with sharp criticism to content which distorts that 
part of the environment with which they are directly familiar; and persistent distortion 
runs the risk of the loss of specific audience segments” (Janowitz, 1975/2000, p. 626). 
In other words, when press is commercialized, “distortion” is not profitable, hence 
not persistent. This claim is taken up in a number of recent game theoretical articles 
(Baron, 2006; Anand, Di Tella, & Galetovic, 2007; Xiang & Sarvary, 2007), all trying to 
explain persistent bias in a market environment with different models. Although I am not 
in a position to offer any comments on the mathematical proofs of these models, their 
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mere existence shows that the earlier maxim, that commercialization means a non-
partisan press, cannot be taken for granted.  
David P. Baron (2006) explains persistent media bias based on the proposition that 
biased news is low quality news. Because it is low-quality, the demand for biased news is 
low, and papers with biased news are sold for a lower price. Reporters who write biased 
news also work for lower salaries. In the end, outlets that sell biased news exist alongside 
those who sell higher quality, unbiased news, and there could be situations where former 
could even be more profitable than the latter. 
Bharat Anand, Rafael Di Tella and Alexander Galetovic (2007) explain persistent 
media bias as product differentiation. Because news media also sell opinion, not only 
information, and people have different tastes for opinion, “the [media] market resembles 
any differentiated product market” (p. 635). More extreme voices will be part of the 
media environment “as fixed costs fall (or as demand rises)” (p. 666), making it profitable 
to target smaller niches. Important empirical support for this argument is provided in a 
recent paper by Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro (2007), who find that US local 
newspapers‟ partisanship parallel closely the local strength of the Democratic and 
Republican candidates. On average, the level and direction of bias in US local newspapers 
is very close to what would have resulted if the papers followed only a profit 
maximization strategy. 
In a counter-intuitive account of media bias, Yi Xiang and Miklos Sarvary (2007) 
argue that besides “biased consumers” who “want to read (watch) news that is consistent 
with their tastes or prior beliefs”, there are “„conscientious‟ consumers whose sole interest 
is in discovering the truth” (p. 611). Presence of media outlets with differing biases, 
besides satisfying the demand of biased consumers, also benefits conscientious consumers 
who can thus gather more information by reading different accounts of a reported event.  
2.3.2. Modernization  
The sociological approach to explaining political parallelism is laid out in Hallin & 
Mancini‟s (2004) excellent discussion of the theory of differentiation in modern societies, 
as well as in an earlier article by Jakubowicz‟s (1975/2000). The following is based upon 
Hallin and Mancini (2004).  
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Going back to Durkheim‟s idea of division of labor in modern societies, the theory 
of differentiation finds its most explicit statement in Talcott Parsons‟ writings, who define 
differentiation, in evolutionary terms, as “a process of social change from primitive to 
modern societies […] in which social functions initially fused are separated: politics, for 
example, is differentiated from religion and from economics” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 
77). What this implies for media is that the function of communication also comes to be 
differentiated from other functions, most importantly for our purposes, from politics. 
Once differentiated from politics, media no longer parallel the party system. 
Critiques of Parsons, who nevertheless continue to play with the idea of 
differentiation, drop the evolutionary content and make the empirical claim that what is 
going on in recent times is not differentiation but de-differentiation. More specifically, 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) refer to the works of Habermas and Bourdieu, whose ideas 
find widespread application in media studies. De-differentiation can be put, in Habermas‟ 
terminology, as the process by which the public sphere –where rational public 
deliberation took place- is colonized by economic and political interests, by 
commercialized press and by power-seeking political parties. In Bourdieu‟s terminology, 
de-differentiation entails a “field” losing its autonomy, whereas it ought to have its own 
rules of game. When it parallels the party system, the field of journalism obviously loses 
it autonomy to the field of politics.  
2.3.3. Co-variation with party system characteristics 
In his book introducing the concept of press-party parallelism to the literature, 
Seymour-Ure (1974) also offers some hypotheses associating certain party system 
characteristics with parallelism. Although his analysis is based upon Jean Blondel‟s 
(1970, cited in Seymour-Ure, 1974) somewhat dated terminology for the analysis of party 
systems –offered  in An Introduction to Comparative Government-, and the nature of his 
data does not allow him to explore most of the hypotheses in detail, his propositions are 
most valuable if only because little has been written on the subject since then. 
Following Blondel‟s typology, Seymour-Ure (1974) explores the relationship 
between the level and types of press-party parallelism and the following five party system 
characteristics: a) “Number and relative strength of parties”, b) “Party goals and 
ideology”, c) “Social bases of support for parties”, d) “Party structure”, and e) “Functions 
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and weight of party in the political system” (pp. 184-201). Some of the major hypotheses, 
or as he calls them “tentative generalizations” (p. 191), that Seymour-Ure offers are as 
follows:  
- “Parallelism with the press is stronger in multi-party systems than in two or two-
and-a-half party systems; but less strong than in one-party systems.” (p. 191)  
- “Parallelism with the press is stronger in ‘stable’ than in ‘unstable’ party systems. 
In other words, newspapers and parties are found to have closer links in systems 
where the relative strength of parties changed little in the 20 years after 1945 than 
where changes did take place.” (p.192) 
- “The deeper the cleavages between competing party ideologies, the greater is the 
probability of press parallelism.” (p. 194) 
- “Press/party parallelism on the dimensions of organization and goals tends to be 
more common in imposed than in naturally developing parties. (p. 197) [i.e. parties 
that “emerge from a parent group whose goals are already accepted at least by a 
large section of the polity. The parent groups are likely to have been originally 
ethnic, religious, tribal/clientele or, in industrial societies only, class based.” (p. 
196)] The dimension of reader support is more conjectural. While the role of a 
newspaper under an imposed party seems likely to attract readers who support it, 
there seems no reason to suppose reader loyalty to a naturally developed party need 
be any less.” (p. 197) 
- “Party/press parallelism on the dimensions of press organization and goal loyalty 
will be higher in centralized than in decentralized parties. […] The more a party 
relies on charismatic leadership, the more likely will a newspaper parallel it.” (p. 
198-9) 
 
The reason that Seymour-Ure‟s conclusions were only tentative generalizations 
stemmed from “the difficulty of finding reliable data about the press […] specially for the 
tricky dimension of goal-loyalty” (p.189) which refers to the support papers give to party 
goals as reflected in their content. Studying the dimension of party supporters was also 
difficult, because “Published data under this heading are [were] extremely skimpy or 
inaccessible”6 (p. 172). Of the three dimensions, the only one on which there was 
relatively abundant information was the organizational dimension, and Seymour-Ure 
made heavy use of that dimension. 
Hallin and Mancini‟s (2004) widely acclaimed work on media systems is another 
source where we can find hypotheses concerning the relationship between political 
parallelism and party-system characteristics. However, their framework of reference in 
                                                 
6
 Data about newspaper reading habits of party supporters are no longer “skimpy or 
inaccessible”. Many studies routinely cite overlap between the readers of specific 
newspapers and voters of specific parties as evidence of parallelism, thanks to the 
widespread use of survey methodology. Thus, Hallin and Mancini (2004) cite three 
separate surveys to demonstrate the existence of parallelism in readership in Italy, Spain 
and Britain.  
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terms of political system characteristics is both more complicated, and works at a more 
general level. Rather than relating political parallelism to party-system characteristics, 
they relate a bundle of media system characteristics,
7
 among them political parallelism, to 
a bundle of political system characteristics, including, but not limited to, party-system 
characteristics. For example, one of the items in their political system characteristics list is 
whether the system in question has a consensus democracy or a majoritarian democracy, 
referring to the classification developed by Arend Lijphart (1999). Lijphart‟s model, in 
turn, is partially based upon party system characteristics, with majoritarian democracies 
usually having two-party systems and consensus democracies usually having multi-party 
systems. Another item in their political system characteristics list is whether the system in 
question has polarized pluralism or moderate pluralism, terminology developed by 
Giovanni Sartori (1976/2005) to classify party systems based upon the number of parties 
and level of ideological polarization in the system. One last item containing party system 
related information is individual vs. organized pluralism; organized pluralism referring to 
the cases where “the different subcommunities […] develop […] their own educational, 
cultural, social and political institutions – ranging from sports clubs to trade unions and 
political parties” (p. 53), the classic example being Netherlands with its Protestant, 
Catholic, Socialist and Liberal pillars.
8
 These three hypotheses relating political 
parallelism to party system characteristics are stated by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as 
follows: 
- “Polarized pluralism tends to be associated with a high degree of political 
parallelism: newspapers are typically identified with ideological tendencies, and 
traditions of advocacy and commentary-oriented journalism are often strong. […] 
Moderate pluralism, on the other hand, is more conducive to the development of 
commercialized and/or professionalized media with less political parallelism and 
instrumentalization.” (p. 61) 
- “Majoritarianism […] tends to be associated with the notion of the journalist as a 
neutral servant of the public as a whole, rather than as a spokesperson of a particular 
political tendency or social group, and with internal rather than external pluralism 
[…] Consensus systems, on the other hand, are typically multiparty systems, and 
external pluralism […] is more likely in the system of multiparty polities, along 
with other characteristics of political parallelism.” (p. 51) 
                                                 
7
 To be more specific, there are four media system characteristics that Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) use: 1- Development of newspaper industry, 2-Political parallelism, 3- 
Professionalization, and 4- Role of the state in media system. (p. 67) 
8 The remaining two items in Hallin and Mancini‟s (2004) list, namely the role of the 
state, and development of rational/legal authority, do not contain explicit references to 
party system characteristics.  
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- “Organized pluralism is […] associated with external pluralism and political 
parallelism: media tied to political parties, trade unions, and churches, and the 
notion of journalism as a vehicle for the representation of groups and ideologies 
develops most strongly in societies characterized by organized pluralism.” (p.54) 
 
The first and second hypotheses of Hallin and Mancini (2004) are shared by 
Seymour-Ure (1974), who also expected parallelism to be high in multi-party systems, 
and in systems where cleavages between party ideologies are high (see the first and third 
hypotheses cited from Seymour-Ure above). The third hypothesis, about organized 
pluralism, corresponds to Seymour-Ure‟s hypothesis about imposed vs. naturally 
developing parties (fourth item in his list)
9
, but the two works have differing expectations 
about „segmented‟ societies where parties „naturally develop‟: Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
expects them to have higher parallelism, whereas Seymour-Ure (1974) expects them to 
have lower parallelism in two of his three dimensions (organizational ties and goal 
loyalty), and does not expect a differentiation in the last dimension (readership).  
In two articles on press-party parallelism van Kempen (2006; 2007) also explores 
the relationship of political parallelism to a similar party-system characteristic, what she 
calls cleavage voting. Cleavage voting refers to the “strength of socio-political cleavages” 
(p. 414) as reflected in the voting patterns. The way van Kempen (2006) operationalizes 
it, borrowed from Mark N. Franklin (1992, cited in van Kempen, 2006), cleavage voting 
measures the contribution of such variables as class identity, union membership, urban 
dwelling and income level to explaining the variance in party preferences. Van Kempen 
(2006) finds that in Sweden, in the period between 1982-2002, press-party parallelism and 
cleavage voting moved together: their sizes and direction of movement were almost 
identical, both moving down from about 14 points (in a scale of 0 to 100) in 1982 to about 
6 points in 2002. Pearson‟s r was 0.96, indicating strong co-variation. Van Kempen 
(2006), however, is cautious not to make a causal argument out of this correlation; she 
discusses two possible explanations for the common movement of the variables, one of 
them being that both are manifestations of a third phenomenon, the other being that press-
party parallelism is just a proxy for cleavage voting. Based upon cross-sectional data from 
another article (van Kempen, 2007), where the correlation between press-party 
                                                 
9
 Although Seymour-Ure‟s (1974) hypothesis is couched at the level of political parties 
not systems, it is possible to transfer this hypothesis -about naturally developing parties- 
to the system level without damaging the integrity of his argument. Societies in which 
most of the political parties are naturally developed rather than imposed would 
correspond to Hallin and Mancini‟s (2004) segmented societies. 
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parallelism and cleavage voting is a mere 0.02, she dismisses the latter and accepts the 
former explanation.  
To sum up this section on party-system characteristics, we have seen that different 
studies linked political parallelism to different party system characteristics. Of these, 
Seymour-Ure‟s (1974) was the one that contained the largest number of hypotheses, 
although his data allowed him to draw only sketchy conclusions. Hallin and Mancini‟s 
(2004) work drew upon much more improved and contemporary data, but they were 
mainly interested in inter-regional comparisons, not inter-country ones; and their 
hypotheses tended to focus upon larger conceptual constructs (like consensus vs. 
majoritarian democracies) of which party system characteristics were a minor part. Still, it 
was possible to spot shared hypotheses between the two works, like those about the 
number of parties in a system and the level of polarization; and a shared variable on 
which they had differing expectations, what Hallin and Mancini (2004) called organized 
pluralism and Seymour-Ure (1974) called naturally developing parties. This variable was 
also taken up in van Kempen‟s (2006) study, in the form of cleavage voting, who used 
survey data to explore the relationship between press-party parallelism and cleavage 
voting.  
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first reviewed how the term press-party parallelism was conceived 
by Seymour-Ure (1974), and later re-defined as political parallelism by Hallin and 
Mancini (2004), who focused on parallels between media and broad political currents, not 
individual parties. Then I reviewed the literature on media and democracy, starting with 
the social responsibility theory of the press, and proceeding with media in studies of 
democracy, and democracy in studies on media. Information, forum, advocacy, and 
watchdog functions emerged as shared points in these normative writings, and pluralism 
emerged as a criterion with implications for all. From the social responsibility theory of 
the press, I borrowed the idea of a balance between “common carriers” and “advocates”, 
which implies moderate levels of external pluralism in the media, and which will be used 
in the following chapters in evaluating observed levels of political parallelism. 
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The second part of this chapter was dedicated to reviewing the empirical literature, 
and the third part to the theoretical explanations offered to account for variation in levels 
of political parallelism. With regards to geographical distribution, I have noted a lack of 
comparative studies on the subject, despite the abundance of single country studies 
examining political parallelism under different names. With regards to historical trends, 
most scholars observe a decline over time in different contexts, although observations of 
increase and no change are also made. I have examined the explanations offered for the 
variation in levels of political parallelism under the three headings of modernization (the 
sociological approach), commercialization (the economic approach), and party system 
characteristics (the political approach).  
I return to these explanations in Chapter 6, after presenting the historical data for the 
Turkish and British cases in Chapters 4 and 5, and make a partial evaluation of the 
explanations based upon the data from these two cases. In Chapter 3, however, I first need 
to lay out the different methodologies I have employed in collecting and analyzing the 
data, and explain why, among many others, I have chosen to make use of these particular 
methods. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, I present the methodology I use in three sections. First, I elaborate 
upon political parallelism and its components from a methodological perspective. Second, 
I review the different strategies employed by researchers for empirical study of political 
parallelism, with a specific focus on content analytical strategies. Lastly, I present the 
different methodologies employed in collecting and evaluating the data presented in 
Chapters 4, 5 and 7 of this study. 
3.1. Political Parallelism and Its Components 
As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, press-party parallelism has three 
aspects: a) organizational ties, in the form of organic links between parties and 
newspapers; b) readership, in the sense of parties receiving disproportionate support from 
the readers of certain newspapers; and c) goal unity, as reflected in newspaper content 
(Seymour-Ure, 1974). 
There are two different approaches to the relationship between the three aspects of 
parallelism. One of these approaches is to treat them as indicators of the same underlying 
phenomenon, with the implication that when we have knowledge about one, we know 
about others too. This is the position implicitly taken by Van Kempen (2006) when she 
claims that her readership survey based study of press-party parallelism in Sweden is also 
an exercise in content analysis. She argues that “the use of […] survey data allowed me to 
study partisanship in the media – something that would normally be done by using labour-
intensive content analyses” (p. 417). 
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Van Kempen‟s (2006) claim seems to be based upon the assumption that when a 
political party receives disproportionate support from the readers of a certain newspaper, 
it is solely or mainly because this newspaper‟s coverage is supportive of that party10, and 
consequently, in systems with high readership parallelism goal unity between parties and 
newspapers is also high. The other possibility, which Van Kempen fails to consider, is 
that factors other than goal unity may be responsible for making the voters of a certain 
political party buy a certain newspaper. One such factor could be the relative price of 
newspapers. In a hypothetical political system where there are only two political parties, 
the Party of the Rich and the Party of the Poor, Poor voters could be buying the cheaper 
Rich Times instead of the more expensive Poor Times, and still voting Poor. 
Other such factors can also be at play, or goal unity may actually be the reason 
voters buy a certain newspaper. The point is, we cannot assume this relationship: whether 
content parallelism co-exists with readership parallelism in a political system is an 
empirical question to be answered on a case-by-case basis. 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) also employ the “indicators” approach in their otherwise 
magnificent study of media systems. They cite different sorts of evidence for different 
countries, and treat these data as indicators of the same underlying phenomenon. For 
example, in their chapter on the Mediterranean or the “polarized pluralist” model, they 
report organizational data for Portugal (p. 103) and content analysis data for France (p. 
98-100) to make the case that “political parallelism is relatively high” (p. 98) in both 
cases. For Greece, they report both organizational and content analysis data (p. 98). For 
Italy and Spain, they report readership data (p. 102, 105) in addition to organizational and 
content analysis data (p. 100-103, 103-106). Although this is in part a necessary choice in 
the absence of comparative data, using different sorts of evidence to pass comparative 
judgment about political systems requires more caution. 
The indicators approach creates problems when reaching conclusions about a single 
political system too. This happens when the researcher encounters apparently conflicting 
data about the different “indicators”. For example, Van Kempen (2007) finds that 
Germany, which Hallin and Mancini (2004) classify among the countries that have high 
                                                 
10
 Van Kepmen‟s (2006) argument is also based upon case studies. She argues that 
“newspaper readership will express partisan bias in media contents. This is supported 
by Dutch, British and Swedish studies that show that there is a strong relationship 
between the political preferences of readers and those of their newspapers” (p. 411). 
The problem with this argument is that the “strong relationship” could be specific to the 
three countries mentioned; we do not know whether it is present in other countries too. 
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political parallelism, has the lowest level of parallelism among the countries she studies, 
describing the results for Germany as “unexpected”. This apparent conflict results 
because Hallin and Mancini (2004) use organizational (p. 155-6) and content analysis (p. 
181) data in their analysis of parallelism in Germany, whereas Van Kempen (2007) uses 
readership data. From the point of view of the indicators approach, this is a contradiction 
because we have two results about a single phenomenon that are at variance with each 
other. One would try to resolve this conflict by, for example, choosing one of the sources 
over the other because it has better quality, or by the different time frames -if that is the 
case- the two sources use, etc. From the point of view of the components approach, on the 
other hand, there is no contradiction to be solved. For unlike indicators, components may 
behave differently and even move in opposite directions. If newspapers give differential 
support to parties in their coverage, but readers are not differentiated, this is not 
contradictory data but richer data about Germany. Van Kempen (2007) drops the 
indicators approach and makes use of the components approach when explaining the 
German case: “the German newspaper Bild is known for its clear politically rightist 
contents, but its readers are not significantly different from the other respondents in the 
sample. Evidently, German media audiences are relatively amorphous groups in party-
political terms” (p. 310). It looks as if studying partisanship in the media still needs to be 
done by “labour-intensive content analyses”. 
The components approach is also the position taken in the original formulation of 
press-party parallelism by Seymour-Ure (1974). He does not assume that all of the 
components will jointly be present or absent in a country, and examines all possible 
combinations of the three components in an elaborate scheme with comments about 
corresponding cases in the real world. He argues that some of the combinations are more 
likely than others: “In practice, one would not expect some of the combinations in this 
[medium] category to exist: It seems improbable, for instance, that parallelism would be 
high in organization but low in goal loyalty […] The most probable combinations would 
seem high goal loyalty […] with low organization and readers‟ partisanship […]; and 
„high‟ organization and goal loyalty with „low‟ readers‟ partisanship” (1974, p. 176). The 
last combination, “„high‟ organization and goal loyalty with „low‟ readers‟ partisanship” 
is a description that perfectly fits the German case. It is curious that later researchers 
chose to overlook these fine points about the relationship between the three components 
of parallelism and employed the indicators approach that treats them all alike. In the 
remaining chapters, I treat these three aspects as different components to the extent 
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possible, although in the Turkish case, due to the nature of the available historical data, 
use of the indicators approach was a necessary choice. The following is a review of the 
different methods used by researchers for empirical study of political parallelism. 
3.2. Empirical Study of Press-Party Parallelism 
Press-party parallelism can be studied using organizational data, readership data, 
expert surveys, or content analysis, or a combination of them. 
3.2.1. Via Organizational Data 
Making use of organizational data to study parallelism in press is a favorite strategy 
among scholars. Seymour-Ure (1974), Hallin and Mancini (2004), Mancini (2000), and 
Semetko (1998) use organizational data to demonstrate political parallelism in the press. 
Organizational data in these studies come in different shapes and qualities. Data 
about the most outright form of organic link between parties and papers, ownership, 
which is usually public knowledge and can be traced in official records, is the one used 
most often. Seymour-Ure (1974) uses ownership data for Britain (p. 161), Russia, France, 
Austria, and South Africa (p. 170) to demonstrate parallelism. Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
report ownership data for Spain (p. 103), Italy (p. 100), Netherlands (p. 152), and Austria 
(p. 156). Mancini (2000) reports ownership data for Italy (p. 320), and Semetko for 
Netherlands (1998, p. 140). 
 Researchers use data about other forms of organizational links between parties and 
papers too. Ownership by affiliated organizations like trade unions and foundations 
(Seymour-Ure, 1974, p.170-171), ownership by people following party political careers 
(Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 171; Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 155-156, 210), direct subsidies 
to papers (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 103; Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 171), and other forms 
of support like regular donations by party members (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 154) 
and help with distribution of copies (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 38) are among the 
many forms of organizational links that researchers employ to demonstrate parallelism. 
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The reason organizational data are used so often is two-fold: First, especially in its 
ownership form, organizational links between parties and papers occupy a major if not the 
central place among the three components of parallelism. When parallelism in 
organization is present, parallelism in other components is likely to follow, as Seymour-
Ure argues (1974, p. 172), for party management will try to make sure that the paper 
follows the party‟s line and that the voters read the paper. The second reason 
organizational data are used so often is that they are usually public knowledge and 
require, even for casual observers of press and politics in a country, little extra research. 
However, there are limits to the use of organizational data in studying parallelism, 
the most important of which is that outright ownership, the major form of organizational 
link, has come to be seen only rarely. Even during the time Seymour-Ure (1974) wrote his 
treatment, in 1970s, proper party press was in decline both in Britain and in general. 
“British national newspapers”, Seymour-Ure (1974) observed, “are mostly independent 
[…] on the dimension of organization” (p. 169). In general, “ownership and management 
of a newspaper by a party […] was the rule” in the nineteenth century, but “It has become 
uncommon since the growth of the advertising industry” (p.160).  
Even in Scandinavian countries, which have a strong tradition of party press, proper 
party press is in decline both in number and in importance. The few titles still owned by 
parties have become marginal players in the press environment. Hallin and Mancini 
(2004) cite data on Finland and Denmark from Salokangas (1999) and Søllinge (1999), 
which show a sharp decrease in the number of party-affiliated newspapers in these 
countries. In Denmark, only 8 papers out of 88 were independent in 1960. In 2002, 14 of 
the 32 titles were independent (Søllinge, 1999, cited in Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
Because they are becoming very rare, examining organizational links between 
parties and papers is thus not very useful any more as a strategy of studying political 
parallelism. This is despite the theoretically major place accorded to the organizational 
component, and despite the fact that organizational links are relatively easy to observe. 
In historical studies of political parallelism, however, organizational data are still a 
major and sometimes the only form of data we can use, for historical data about 
parallelism in readership and content are usually not available. Readership survey, indeed 
the survey methodology itself has a very recent history, making it close to impossible to 
inquire about readership parallelism in the past. (Except via aggregate data. More on this 
in the following section.) Raw data for studying parallelism in content are available for 
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earlier periods in the form of collections of newspaper issues, but they are very costly to 
analyze and thus not very useful beyond providing demonstrative examples. 
3.2.2. Via Readership Data 
Readership data come in two forms: aggregate data and individual data. 
3.2.2.1. Aggregate readership data 
Aggregate data are used in earlier studies to demonstrate the presence or absence of 
press-party parallelism. The main question asked is “whether the vote share of socialist 
parties more or less equals the circulation share of socialist parties”. If the vote share of 
socialist parties is higher than the circulation share of socialist papers, then the conclusion 
is that there is “ „under-representation‟ in the circulation of the left-wing papers” 
(Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 173). 
Seymour-Ure (1974) cites aggregate readership and vote share data for Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, and Belgium, all of which have under-representation of 
the left-wing press, and reaches the conclusion that “Many Labour or Communist voters 
read non-left-wing papers” (p. 173). 
This conclusion has two main problems: First, circulation levels, based upon sales 
figures, are not necessarily a good indicator of exposure levels. It may be the case that the 
smaller circulation left-wing papers reach a wider audience then the larger circulation 
non-left-wing papers, if their individual copies tend to be read by more people. With 
circulation data we can reach conclusions about total sales, but not about actual readership 
or exposure levels. 
At a more basic level, however, -and even if we were to assume that left-wing and 
non-left-wing papers have a more less equal sales to exposure ratios- the conclusion, 
based upon aggregate data, that “many Labour or Communist voters read non-left-wing 
papers” (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 173) is not valid because two different populations, 
voters and readers, are treated as one to make this argument. If we had data showing that 
the population of readers is also a representative sample of the population of voters –
which, in many cases, is not very likely- then conclusions based upon aggregate statistics 
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for these two populations could be valid. Because we do not have knowledge about how 
representative the population of “readers” is as a sample of “voters”, the proposition that 
“Labour or Communist voters do not read any newspapers” is just as likely to be true as 
the proposition that “Many Labour or Communist voters read non-left-wing papers” (p. 
173) if all we have is aggregate data. 
3.2.2.2. Individual level (survey) data 
More sophisticated analyses of the relationship between readership and vote choice 
are possible with individual level data. 
At its simplest form, cross-tabulations of readership and vote choice are sufficient 
to give a good idea about the level of political parallelism in a system. Seymour-Ure uses 
such cross-tabulations for Britain (p. 168); Hallin and Mancini for Italy (p. 102), Spain (p. 
105), and the UK (p. 213); and Brynin and Newton (2003) for the UK (p. 62).  
It is possible to generate a single index from these cross-tabulations for purposes of 
comparison, similar to the Alford index of class voting mentioned in the previous chapter, 
in the form of “percent left voters who read left papers minus percent left voters who read 
non-left papers”. To the best of my knowledge, no one made such use of readership data. 
Of course, this method would encounter the same kind of problems the index of class 
voting does. To calculate the index of class voting, it is first necessary to classify political 
parties as “parties of the working class” and “others”. In an index of readership voting, 
one would have to classify papers in a similar way, which is even more problematic than 
classifying parties.
11
 However, the problem can easily be solved by dropping the general 
categories of left and right, and by using party names instead. In this case, we would not 
have a single measure of the overlap between working class and left parties, but multiple 
measures of the overlap between working class and Party A, working class and Party B, 
etc. Then, we could take the average of these overlaps to generate an overall measure of 
cleavage voting or readership parallelism. 
                                                 
11
 It needs to be noted that use of aggregate readership data, examined in the previous 
section, also requires this pre-analysis classification. To find the circulation share of 
left-wing papers, one first needs to classify papers as “left-wing” and “others”. 
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More sophisticated uses of individual level exposure data is made by Morris (2005) 
and Coe et al. (2008), who use, respectively, probit and logit modeling
12
 to study the 
determinants of TV show exposure, among them party identification. They both find that 
party identification is a significant factor in explaining differential TV exposure, even 
when other factors like age, income, education, etc. are controlled. The improvement this 
method (multivariate regression) brings over cross-tabulations is that it becomes possible 
to isolate the relationship between vote choice and media exposure with control variables 
introduced.  
Another sophisticated use of individual level readership data is made in Van 
Kempen‟s studies of parallelism in Sweden (2006) and in EU countries (2007). She 
develops a measure of press-party parallelism inspired by Franklin‟s (1992) measure of 
cleavage voting. Franklin‟s index is based upon total explained variance in multivariate 
regressions where attitudes towards individual parties is the dependent variable and 
cleavage variables like class, religion, gender and the like are independent variables. The 
average total explained variance, weighted by the vote shares of the parties and varying 
between 0 and 100, is interpreted as a measure of the strength of social cleavages in 
determining vote choice.  
Similarly, Van Kempen (2006; 2007) uses attitudes towards individual parties as 
her dependent variable, but takes “exposure to media” variables as her independent 
variables. “Exposure to newspaper X”, “exposure to TV show Y”, “exposure to internet 
site Z” –measured by questions like “How often do you read/watch newspaper/TV show 
X?”- are entered as separate independent variables in separate regressions for individual 
parties, and the average total variance explained, weighted by the percent shares of the 
parties in the parliament, is taken as the measure of media-party parallelism in the system. 
One problem with Van Kempen‟s (2006, 2007) method concerns its applicability, 
for we would need to have a continuous or at least an interval level measure of attitudes 
towards parties, an information that we do not always have. This is required because the 
R
2
 statistic, used as the measure of total explained variance, can only be calculated in 
ordinary linear regression; in logit and probit analyses, more appropriate for categorical 
dependent variables, a pseudo R
2
 is calculated, which cannot be used as a measure of total 
                                                 
12
 Probit and logit are maximum likelihood estimations, designed to handle categorical 
dependent variables. 
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explained variance.
13
 Thus, in the absence of an interval level measure of attitudes 
towards parties, creating parallelism indexes out of cross-tabulations is the only viable 
alternative. 
3.2.3. Via Expert Surveys 
Expert survey is a frequently used methodology in political science. Expert surveys 
are used in measuring left-right positions of political parties,
14
 to assess presidential 
performance (Schlesinger Sr., 1948, cited in Song and Simonton, 2007), to rank political 
science journals (Mc Lean et. al., 2008), and even to forecast election results (Randall, 
Armstrong, and Cuzan, 2007). They are especially useful as a way of gathering 
information when direct measurement is not possible –for example due to the highly 
abstract nature of the concept measured- or when other methods are too costly. 
There are many choices to be made when designing an expert survey, starting with 
the choice of experts. Academicians and practitioners of the professions involved are the 
likely candidates expected to have detailed knowledge about the phenomenon studied. 
In studying parallelism, journalists are the natural experts who are likely to have 
intimate knowledge about the political positioning of newspapers. Their observations are 
thus a valuable source of information about political parallelism in a system. Patterson 
and Donsbach (1993, cited in Hallin and Mancini, 2004), in an effort to measure 
parallelism across systems, ask journalists in Britain, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the US 
to place parties and newspapers in their countries on a single left-right scale. Journalists in 
the US place newspapers in the middle of the two parties, contrary to the journalists in 
other countries who place newspapers closer to parties on the left-right ideological scale, 
indicating a higher level of political parallelism. 
Researchers also make use of other survey questions directed at journalists to study 
parallelism. Hallin and Mancini (2004) cite studies that find “in the late 1990s 40 to 50 
percent of Spanish journalists still considered it an important part of the journalist‟s role 
                                                 
13
 See UCLA Academic Technology Services (n.d.) on the pitfalls of interpreting pseudo 
R
2
 as total explained variance. 
14
 See the special issue of Electoral Studies (March 2007, Volume 26, Issue 1) on 
“Comparing Measures of Party Positioning: Expert, Manifesto, and Survey Data”  for a 
number of articles on using expert surveys to measure party positions. 
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to „promote certain values and ideas‟ and to „influence the public‟” (p. 204) to make the 
case that parallelism in Spain is high. Similar survey data about the advocacy orientations 
of journalists are used by Hallin and Mancini (2004) in the German case too (p. 180). For 
Italy, they cite a survey that asks journalists how often they think information and opinion 
are mixed in news reports (p. 106). 
Besides systematic surveys, individual journalists‟ opinions regarding varying 
aspects of their profession are also cited by researchers to demonstrate parallelism. Hallin 
and Mancini (2004) cite journalists defending their right to take a political stand in Italy 
(p. 101), Portugal (p. 103) and Spain (p. 105), and an Italian journalist talking about his 
disappointment when he found out that “journalism was [not] before all else information, 
fact, news…” (Forcella, 1959, cited in Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.101) in discussing 
parallelism in Southern Europe. 
3.2.4. Via Content Analysis 
Studying political parallelism via content analysis means looking for 
disproportionate support in newspaper content for a specific party or parties. 
Disproportionate support to a political party can be given in one of the following ways: 1) 
Endorsement, 2) More coverage, 3) Positive (less negative) coverage, 4) Shared agenda, 
5) Shared framing, and 6) Shared vocabulary. 
3.2.4.1. Endorsement 
Endorsements are declarations of open support for a specific party or parties by 
newspaper managements, expressed, usually on election eves, in the editorial or the leader 
columns. Endorsement is the most direct form of support a newspaper can give to a 
political party. Hence, where they exist, they are a good source of information about 
political parallelism. Brandenburg (2006) uses endorsement data in his study of 
newspaper coverage before the 2005 UK elections, where he finds that 6 of the 7 papers 
he examines give partial or weak endorsements. 
Two factors limit the use of endorsement data as a source of information on 
parallelism: First, not all countries have a tradition of newspapers endorsing parties. In 
 43 
some countries, newspapers collectively avoid declaring open support for political parties 
or candidates in their editorials, although they may well be giving tacit support in other 
ways. Naturally, for these countries endorsement data do not exist. 
The second factor that limits use of endorsement data is that they give only partial 
information about the support given to political parties. Whether a newspaper supports a 
political party in its news reports and other commentary besides the editorial article is a 
question endorsement data fail to answer. To find out whether support is confined to the 
editorial page or spread to other pages, additional content analysis strategies need to be 
employed. 
3.2.4.2. More coverage 
Another way of giving support to political parties, especially in news articles, is 
giving them more coverage relative to other parties. More coverage means more visibility 
on the part of the party concerned, which is usually a good thing. Balkır and her 
colleagues (2008), in their study of newspaper coverage prior to the 2007 parliamentary 
elections in Turkey, and Brandenburg (2006), in his study of newspaper coverage prior to 
the 2005 parliamentary elections in the UK, use more coverage as one of their coding 
items. They both find that the party in government –AKP in Turkey and the Labour Party 
in the UK- benefits from “incumbency bonus”,15 that is, they receive more coverage 
across the papers. 
Although it is very successful in identifying main political actors as perceived by 
newspapers, coding more coverage is a blunt tool for studying parallelism, for the type of 
coverage also matters, which is taken up in the next section. 
3.2.4.3. Positive (less negative) coverage 
It is positive coverage that parties seek, not just more coverage. Positive coverage is 
like free advertisement for the party concerned –if not better-, and matters more than the 
amount of coverage. Balkır and her colleagues (2008) find that although AKP was the 
                                                 
15
 For a discussion of incumbency bonus, see Hopmann (2009). 
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party that got the most coverage across the papers they analyzed, the type of coverage it 
received was not always positive.  
A tendency noted in American (Farnsworth & Lichter, 2006) and British 
(Brandenburg, 2006) media is overall negativity towards political parties. In such cases, 
less negative, instead of more positive, coverage indicates differential support. 
Brandenburg (2006) finds that before 2005 elections in the UK, the general attitude of 
newspapers towards parties was negative, and newspaper support –in line with their 
editorial stances- was reflected in the smaller amount of negativity displayed towards the 
endorsed party.  
3.2.4.4. Shared agenda 
Up to this point, strategies that analyze only newspaper content were examined. 
Shared agenda, shared framing and shared vocabulary strategies require, as their names 
indicate, comparative analysis of two types of content: newspaper content and content 
produced by political parties. 
Just as there is a choice to be made when analyzing newspaper content –whether to 
look at editorials, other commentary articles or news articles- there is also a choice to be 
made when analyzing the content produced by parties. Party election manifestos are the 
most likely candidates as representative texts of parties‟ political stands, being official 
documents addressed directly at voters. Their ability to serve as party texts in a 
comparison with newspaper content, however, is limited by two factors: First, manifestos 
are mainly about general principles and party policies, not day to day events or recent 
developments, on which news reports are prepared. That is to say, manifestos and 
newspaper articles have different subjects, making a comparison between the two 
difficult. 
Second, manifestos and newspapers have different publication periods. Manifestos 
are published once usually in the beginning of the election campaigns. Even if they were 
to contain comments and statements about recent developments, they would soon become 
dated compared to newspaper content, which is published daily. 
Press statements issued by parties do not have these problems: They talk about day 
to day events, and they are issued much more frequently than manifestos are, at a rate, 
especially on election eves, close to the publication period of newspapers. Thus, 
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theoretically, their ability to serve as party texts in a comparison with newspaper coverage 
is higher. They too, however, have a major problem limiting their use: Almost all political 
parties in democracies publish election manifestos or similar texts that are widely 
available, but not all parties have a habit of issuing official press statements, using, 
instead, party leaders‟ speeches or casual comments to respond to recent developments. 
Parties also have wildly differing practices with regards to archiving press statements and 
other frequently produced content, and making these available to the public via their 
internet sites. Hence, there is a major practical hurdle before using press statements as 
party texts in a comparison, especially when more than one countries are involved. 
In many cases, using manifestos as party texts in the comparison is a necessary 
choice because manifestos are usually the only party texts collectively available. 
Moreover, manifestos are not totally out of touch with recent developments: the general 
principles and party policies laid out in manifestos are likely to be employed by party 
spokesmen and women (or in press statements) when interpreting new events. In turn, 
newspapers do no consist totally of reports about recent events. Especially in commentary 
sections, party policies and political philosophies are discussed, from time to time, from a 
longer term perspective. Party manifestos thus have a significant capacity to serve as 
party texts in a comparison with newspaper content. 
Brandenburg (2006) uses press statements as party texts in his analysis of shared 
agenda between parties and newspapers before the 2005 UK elections. The rationale 
behind looking for shared agenda is as follows: Parties have different issues on which 
they feel strong. They want to keep these issues on the agenda as much as possible, and 
play down certain other issues that they think will harm their standing. For example, an 
incumbent government would probably like to avoid economic issues in a financial crisis, 
and talk, instead, about foreign relations on which it feels strong. The opposition parties, 
on the other hand, would like to keep the economy high on the agenda. Newspapers can 
give tacit support to parties by playing certain issues down and other issues up, in line 
with parties‟ preferences. 
Parties‟ preferences, in turn, can be extracted from the texts they produce. If a party 
devotes ten pages to economy in its manifesto and one to foreign relations, while another 
makes five press statements on foreign relations for every statement on economy, we can 
have a clear idea of their relative preferences for the issues on the agenda. 
Brandenburg (2006) measures parties‟ relative preferences for issues on the agenda 
on the basis of total space, measured in standardized text lines, devoted to different issues 
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in party press statements. These percentages are then compared with newspapers‟ 
preferred issues, measured again by total space devoted in standardized text lines, to find 
the level of similarity between party texts and newspaper content. He finds that 
“endorsements […] translate into agenda bias” (2006, p. 172), in the form of papers 
promoting the preferred issues of the parties they endorse. 
3.2.4.5. Shared framing 
Shared agenda is a blunt tool compared to shared framing, like more coverage is 
compared to positive coverage. What matters is not only which issues are covered, but 
also how these issues are framed. A war, for example, can be framed in terms of human 
suffering or national security, or even its effect on the budget and the unemployment rate. 
Parties may have an equal preference for the issue of war, but differing preferences for 
how it is framed. Newspapers can give support to parties by using their preferred frames 
when reporting about the war. 
Eilders and Lüter, (2000), in their study of the German newspapers‟ coverage of the 
Kosovo war, find that the framing strategies of the German newspapers reflected the 
make-up of opinion in the Parliament: none “question[ed] the legitimacy of the war”, but 
there was “a distinct pattern of preferred interpretations between liberal and conservative 
newspapers. […] conservative editorials tended to frame the war in terms of a necessary 
and unavoidable reaction to human rights violations by Serbia” whereas “Liberal 
editorials […] pointed to the humanitarian consequences and the need for a political 
solution incorporating the relevant international organizations” (p. 424). Eilders and 
Lüter‟s (2000) assertions about Geman parties‟ preferred frames, however, are not based 
upon a systematic content analysis of party texts, but on their own observations. To the 
best of my knowledge, no study has examined the framing of an issue both in party texts 
and newspaper coverage.  
3.2.4.6. Shared vocabulary 
Shared vocabulary is better presented as a research strategy than a way of giving 
support. It is based upon comparing word frequencies in party texts and newspaper 
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coverage. A high percentage of shared words between the newspaper and the party texts 
may be a reflection of more coverage, shared agenda, shared framing, or all of them 
together. 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007) look for shared vocabulary in their study of 
newspaper content in the US, using a version of the k-nearest neighbor methodology, 
which is based upon differences in word frequencies between texts. (More on this in the 
following section.) They find that local papers parallel the party that is stronger in their 
area.   
In this section, I have reviewed content analysis strategies specific to capturing 
parallelism in content. None of these strategies, to the best of my knowledge, have been 
used in a comparative, multi-country setting. In the following section, the specific 
methodologies used in Chapters 4 (history, Turkey), 5 (history, the UK), and 7 (content 
analysis, Turkey and the UK) will be presented. 
3.3. Methodology Used in This Study 
The methodology used in this study is best presented following the Chapter 
numbers. Chapters 4, 5, and 7 employ different strategies to examine political parallelism 
in the Turkey and in the UK. 
3.3.1. Turkey - Coding Historical Information (Chapter 4) 
The method used in Chapter 4 to study history of political parallelism in the Turkish 
press is based upon coding historical data contained in books on press history.
16
 These 
                                                 
16
 For the period until 1960, I use, as my sources, only book length treatments on the 
general history of the Turkish press. (See the section on „Selecting Major Papers‟ for 
this decision.) For the more recent post-60 period, I also use additional sources. To the 
best of my knowledge, there are eleven book length treatments on the general history of 
the Turkish press, all in Turkish: Selim Nüzhet Gerçek, Türk Gazeteciliği, Ġstanbul 
Matbuat Cemiyeti, Ġstanbul, 1931; Hasan Refik Ertuğ, Basın ve Yayın Hareketleri 
Tarihi-1, Ġstanbul Matbuat Cemiyeti, Ġstanbul, 1931; Fuat Süreyya Oral, Türk Basın 
Tarihi, 1919-1965 Cumhuriyet Dönemi, DoğuĢ Matbaacılık, 1968 (Ġkinci Kitap); Enver 
Behnan ġapolyo, Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi ve Her Yönü İle Basın, Güven Matbaası, 
Ankara, 1971; A. D. Jeltyakov, Türkiye’nin Sosyo-Politik ve Kültürel Hayatında Basın 
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books, however, do not contain information on all aspects of political parallelism. For 
example, readership surveys in Turkey have a recent history, making it close to 
impossible to inquire about the readership aspect of press-party parallelism from a 
historical perspective.
17
 On organizational and goal unity (content) aspects, however, we 
do have ample information, scattered around in books on press history. I have ordered this 
information –organizational connections of newspapers, and their sympathies for political 
parties as reflected in their content- together with two other sorts of evidence –author 
evaluations and legal actions- that give information not on specific aspects of political 
parallelism, but on the political positions of newspapers in general, and presented it in 
separate tables for each period. All in all, four different sorts of evidence were coded. 
3.3.1.1. Types of evidence 
1- Authors‟ evaluations: Authors‟ evaluations are observations by the author of a 
book on press history concerning the political position of the daily newspaper in question, 
like “this paper supported that party”, “the paper was a platform for the expression of 
such and such political views”, or “this paper was close to that party”, all of which were 
coded under this heading. Coding authors‟ evaluations is like doing an expert survey, 
                                                                                                                                               
(1729-1908 Yılları), Basın-Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1979; Hülya Baykal, Türk Basın 
Tarihi 1831-1923, Ġstanbul, 1990; M. Nuri Ġnuğur, Basın ve Yayın Tarihi, Der 
Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1993; Orhan Koloğlu, Türk Basını Kuvayi Milliye’den Günümüze, 
Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1993; Nuri Ġnuğur, Türk Basın Tarihi, Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, 
Ġstanbul, 1992; Alpay Kabacalı, Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye’de Matbaa, Basın 
ve Yayın, Literatür Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 2000; Hıfzı Topuz, II.Mahmut’tan Holdinglere 
Türk Basın Tarihi, Remzi Kitabevi, Ġstanbul, 2003. This list excludes works on specific 
aspects of the press, like Server Ġskit‟s work on press laws (Server Ġskit, Türkiyede 
Matbuat Rejimleri, Ülkü Matbaası, Ġstanbul, 1939); biographical works like Münir 
Süleyman Çapanoğlu‟s Basın Tarihine Dair Bilgiler ve Hatıralar (Hür Türkiye Dergisi, 
Ġstanbul, 1962); and periodical works like Ömer Sami CoĢar‟s Milli Mücadele Basını 
(Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1961), O. Murat Güvenir‟s 2. Dünya Savaşı’nda Türk 
Basını (Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, Ġstanbul, 1991), and Nilgün Gürkan‟s Türkiye'de 
Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın (1945-1950) (ĠletiĢim Yayınları, Ġstanbul, 1998). Although 
these are general treatments, the periods they cover somewhat vary based upon different 
publication dates and authors‟ scholarly interests. In general, there are more works on 
the Ottoman and early Republican periods, whereas the more recent periods are thinly 
covered. 
17
 See Çarkoğlu and Yavuz (2010) for a study on readership parallelism in 2002 and 2007 
elections in Turkey. 
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except that we do not have formal questions and answers, but extract authors‟ responses 
from their texts. It should also be kept in mind that authors‟ evaluations do not give 
information about any specific aspect of political parallelism –we do not know in what 
sense was the paper close to the party. For example, ġapolyo (1971, p. 248) and Ġnuğur 
(1993, p. 240) describe the daily Zafer as a pro-DP paper in 1950s. This evaluation may 
have been based upon the content of the newspaper, its organizational ties, readership, or 
all or some of these aspects together; but what matters is that this observation is made. 
Although it is general information that does not allow distinguishing between different 
aspects of political parallelism, it still is useful information.  
2- Legal action / violence: Sometimes papers are sued by party leaders, suspended 
or closed down by government agencies, their editors or owners are jailed or exiled or 
otherwise punished. This information, when used with caution, may convey useful 
information about the political positions of newspapers. During one-party periods, all 
punishments and fines –monetary fines, temporary suspensions, closures, warnings, and 
the like- can be read as signs of an anti-government position, and in multi-party periods, 
legal action taken by parties or their leaders against press outlets and their writers or 
owners can be taken as evidence that the paper in question somehow bothers that party.  
In addition to legal action, physical violence against newspapers and/or their 
editors/writers/owners –like assassinations, lootings, and lynches- can also be used as 
indicators of the political position of the newspaper in question, if the perpetrators are 
associated with certain political groups/views. For example, during the Second 
Constitutional Period, several journalists were assassinated by pro-CUP gunmen (See 
notes for Table 4.3) because they had anti-CUP positions. Like authors‟ evaluations, this 
type of evidence tells us something about the political position of the paper in question in 
general, but not about the specific aspects of readership, content, or organization. 
3- Content: Although systematic content analyses of past newspapers are rare, 
books on the history of the Turkish press frequently cite material from the content of the 
papers they cover, as evidence of a certain political position taken. These generally take 
the form of general observations –like “the paper criticized the government‟s actions”- 
and demonstrative examples –short excerpts from the editorial or op-ed pages on 
important days. In addition, we have event-specific examples from the news coverage of 
papers –like which papers published the Aga Khan letter defending the Caliphate in early 
1920s (see notes for Table 4.5) and which papers published Pulliam‟s articles criticizing 
Menderes government in late 50s (see notes for Table 4.8). In the absence of systematic 
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content analysis, this is the closest approximation to a measure of parallelism in content, 
and when critical dates are selected, even cursory observations on content can be very 
informative: the divide between the papers that published the Ağa Han letter and those 
that did not roughly corresponded, respectively, to anti- and pro-government positions; 
and the different behaviors of the papers in 1950s concerning the Pulliam article reflected 
different positions towards the Menders government. 
4- Organizational connections: Organizational connections between parties and 
newspapers, like direct ownership, ownership or management by affiliated persons –i.e. 
MPs, party leaders, prominent public figures associated with certain political stands who 
may or may not have formal ties to parties-, funding, and provision of content via 
affiliated persons are coded under this heading. Although outright ownership of a 
newspaper by a political party or a trade union is rare in the Turkish case (the only 
examples are Ulus, officially owned by the CHP until 1970s, and Akşam in 1970s, which 
was briefly owned by the trade union Türk-ĠĢ. See notes for Table 4.9), other forms of 
organizational connections have been frequently observed. 
Once evidence was thus coded, it was now time to make better use of this 
information, by first selecting major papers, and then classifying papers by political 
position. 
3.3.1.2. Selecting major papers 
Tables presented in Chapter 4 consist of two parts. The upper part lists the „major‟ 
papers and evidence on their political positions, and the lower half of the tables list the 
minor papers and evidence on their political positions. This was done for two reasons: 
First, we do not have as much information about the minor papers as we do about the 
major papers, not just concerning their political positions, but concerning other paper 
characteristics as well. So, instead of mixing cases on which we have more information 
with cases on which we have less information, I decided to present evidence for these two 
categories separately. Secondly, some sort of a homogenization was also necessary 
because each paper contributes to the calculation of period parallelism equally, without 
regard for their relative circulations. Including the minor papers on which we do have 
information in the calculations of parallelism would exaggerate their importance. 
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Major papers, in turn, were selected as follows: Because we do not have reliable 
circulation figures prior to 1960s, and because different authors have different lists of 
“major papers in this period”, I used, as a criterion of importance, number of mentions in 
book length treatments on the history of the Turkish press. For example, of the 6 histories 
of press that cover the period 1946-50 (see notes for Table 4.2), papers that were 
mentioned in six or five were considered to be major papers of the period. The period 
prior to the proclamation of the First Constitution is covered by 8 books, and those papers 
mentioned by all 8 or 7 of them were considered to be the major papers of this period. 
Although this method has its drawbacks, like possibly favoring interesting papers over 
others, it is the wiser choice –in the absence of circulation figures- compared to using 
single authors‟ lists of “important papers”, because it draws upon the collective judgment 
of the scholars. If six authors find Paper A worth covering in their books, whereas only 
two mention Paper B, then Paper A was most probably a more important paper than Paper 
B.  
Beginning with 1960s, circulation figures become available, with the founding, in 
1961, of Basın Ġlan Kurumu (BĠK, Press Advertising Institute), which collected, among 
other things, information on circulation figures of newspapers to provide a fair 
distribution of official ads.
18
 This has three effects on the way information in tables are 
organized in Chapter 4: 1- We no longer have to rely on the number of author mentions to 
determine the major papers, we can instead use circulation figures. Starting with the 
1970s, this indeed is going to be the only criterion in deciding which papers to include in 
the upper part of the tables, and which to leave at the bottom: only papers with a 
circulation share above 1 percent (period average) according to BĠK data will be counted 
as major papers and included in the upper part of the tables. For 1960s, however, number 
of author mentions and circulation figures were used together, for the circulation figures 
start with 1965, not with 1960: all papers that were mentioned by all or four of the five 
histories of press were counted as major papers, as well as papers with 1 percent or above 
circulation share. 2- Similarly, we no longer have to rely upon the number of titles in 
calculating how much of the press paralleled the party system. Instead, we can directly 
calculate the circulation share of parallel papers. 3- Also, because we no longer have to 
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 BĠK‟s figures are the only historically available and systematic statistics on the 
circulation of Turkish national dailies. BIK Istanbul Branch has in its archives monthly 
circulation data going back to 1965, which, to the best of my knowledge, have not been 
published elsewhere. 
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use the number of author mentions as an indicator of being a major paper (and 
consequently no longer have to limit our author universe), we can now include among our 
sources other studies as well, in addition to book-length treatments on the history of the 
Turkish press. This also becomes a necessary choice as we approach the present time, for 
the number of press histories that cover the most recent periods are very few, whereas 
scholarly articles and other sources on recent history are more numerous. 
Another use of classifying papers into major and minor parts was that it allowed 
making a more efficient use of the existing evidence. If scholars mention nothing about 
the political position of a major newspaper, this probably means that the paper did not 
have a clear or visible or dominant political position. If, on the other hand, scholars 
mention nothing about the political position of a minor newspaper, this must be 
interpreted differently: There could be other reasons, -besides the paper not having a clear 
position- that may explain why no political position is assigned, like lack of information, 
lack of authors‟ interest in the issue, or simply lack of space. This distinction will be 
helpful when we classify papers in terms of their political positions.  
3.3.1.3. Assigning papers to pro-, anti-, and mixed categories 
On the right-hand side of the tables in Chapter 4, papers are classified as pro-
government, anti-government, and “mixed” (or „pro-DP, anti-DP, mixed‟, „left, right, 
mixed‟, etc.), based upon an overall evaluation of the evidence. The pro-government 
category consists of papers that display one or more of the following characteristics: a) 
The paper is assigned a pro-government position by one or more of the authors. b) The 
paper publishes pro-government content. c) The paper has an organizational link with the 
government (including, but not limited to, financial aid, staff support, owners‟ or 
journalists‟ ties to the government, etc.) d)The paper or its journalists are looted, lynched, 
assassinated, or otherwise subjected to physical violence by political groups in the 
opposition. 
The anti-government category consists of papers that show one or more of the 
following characteristics: a) The paper is assigned an anti-government position by one or 
more of the authors. b) The paper publishes anti-government content (including all sorts 
of criticism of government actions). c) The paper has an organizational link with 
oppositional groups (owners‟ ties to such groups, financial backing, help with 
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distribution, etc.). d) The paper is closed, temporarily suspended, barred from publication 
or distribution, or its owners and journalists jailed, exiled, tried, etc. 
The “mixed” category consists of papers that display one of the following 
characteristics: a) The paper is deemed to be impartial by one or more of the authors. b) 
We have conflicting information about the paper, in the sense that different authors assign 
different positions to the paper, or report conflicting information about its content, 
organizational ties, and the legal actions it faced. c) No political position information is 
given about the paper. This applies only to the major papers, which are placed at the 
upper half of the table. Minor papers on which we do not have political position 
information are left out of the classification. 
3.3.1.4. Limitations 
This method, of course, is limited by what is already contained in the secondary 
literature, and is only successful to the degree the literature on the history of the Turkish 
press is successful in analyzing its subject. If the literature misses whole points, contains 
repeated mistakes, or has other shortcomings, these would all be reflected in the quality of 
the data presented in Chapter 4. What is more, for most of the periods under study (until 
1960s), only part of this literature is used: book length treatments on the general history of 
the Turkish press. There are, however, studies with a periodical focus that could 
potentially affect the make-up of the tables if they were included, with the data they 
contained, but we had to limit the number of studies included somehow, not only for 
practical reasons (it is close to impossible seeing and reading all studies on the history of 
the Turkish press), but also for methodological reasons (we want to have a limited set of 
books so that we can make analyses of major vs. minor papers).  
Another shortcoming of the method used in Chapter 4 is that we cannot distinguish 
between components of parallelism, being content with only overall measures, making us 
somewhat closer to the indicators approach. Evidence on content and organization 
aspects, for example, were added up in classifying papers by political position, which I 
argued in the beginning of this chapter is akin to adding up apples and oranges.  
Finally, there are period-related differences in the data presented, which 
complicates the analysis of overall trends and inter-period comparisons. Data for the pre-
1960 periods are based only upon book-length general  histories of press, whereas post-
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1960 periods make use of other literature as well. Post-1960 periods also use circulation 
figures, which were not available for the pre-1960 periods. In the most recent period, 
1990s, detailed content analyses of newspaper coverage are available, making the data 
presented for this period evidence of a different nature. 
3.3.2. The UK – Endorsements (Chapter 5) 
Chapter 5 (history, UK) is different from Chapter 4 (history, Turkey) not only in 
terms of the time periods covered, but also in the methodology used. It covers only the 
post-war period (1945-2010), and is not based upon coding information contained in 
books on the history of the British press. The reasons are two-fold: First, history of British 
press is more heavily studied and goes back further in time, making it difficult to cover all 
the relevant sources. If we were to make a selection of sources, this would create even 
more problems than it solves, because the results would be dependent upon the sources 
selected, and the contribution to the literature would, at best, be minimal. Second, not 
only is there an abundance of books on the general history of the British press, but the 
specific subject of history of political parallelism in British press has already been taken 
up in a number of studies
19
, with a two-volume study dedicated to the issue.
20
 The third 
reason the methodology is different is that there is a tradition of endorsements on election 
eves in the British press, which is not seen in the Turkish case and which makes assigning 
political positions to individual newspapers easier. As a result, only endorsement data 
accompany the brief literature review in Chapter 5, compiled from similar tables by 
various authors. 
Because newspapers in the UK have a tradition of endorsing the party/parties they 
support in upcoming elections, it is a relatively straightforward matter to prepare tables 
showing which daily supported which party in which election, and a number of such 
tables have already been prepared. Despite the seemingly straightforward nature of the 
task, however, there are differences between tables of endorsement prepared by different 
sources. For example, the endorsement of The Times in 1964 elections was coded as 
Conservative by Seymour-Ure (1991), and as Conservative/Liberal by Butler and Butler 
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 See Chapter 5 for a review of this literature concerning the post-war period. 
20 
See Koss (1981, 1984). 
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(2000). The discrepancy occurs because the newspapers do not declare their positions by 
waving blue or red flags, or even in single sentences, but in (sometimes lengthy) articles 
that explain the details and the rationale behind their position, which, at times, may be 
difficult to simplify in Labor vs. Conservative (vs. Liberal/Liberal Democrat) terms, and 
open to different interpretations when coding.  
In Chapter 5, I have combined endorsement data from different sources (see Table 
5.5), with the following rule: If there was a discrepancy in the positions assigned by the 
researchers (as is the case for the position of the Times in 1964 elections), I chose the one 
that assigned a more complex position over the other. In the example above, I selected 
Butler and Butler‟s (2000) coding over Seymour-Ure‟s (1991).  
A measure of parallelism was devised for each election using the endorsement data, 
which was the ratio of the number of papers that endorse a single party in that election to 
the number of all titles in publication at the time of the election. This treats papers that do 
have a clear political position, but one that is more complex than being simply in favor of 
a single political party, among the non-parallel part of the press, as opposed to papers that 
endorse a single party, which are considered to form the parallel part of the press.
 21
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 In the section on political parallelism in the Turkish press, data at the level of elections 
was available only for the final period, the 1990s, and papers that supported one or 
more parties in at least one election were considered to make up the parallel part of the 
press. If we were to use the same criteria for the British case (considering all papers that 
supported one or more parties in at least one election as the parallel part of the press), 
we would end up having very little variation in the level of parallelism in the post-war 
period, with almost all papers declaring political positions for each election. The 
important thing to remember, however, is that in the Turkish case, the election-level 
data, which consist of observations by researchers about newspaper content, are not 
functional equivalents of the endorsement data in the British case. The fact there is a 
tradition of endorsements in the British case and the nature of the endorsement data 
make it necessary that we adjust our definitions of the parallel and non-parallel parts of 
the press. In other words, in an environment where everyone declares a political 
position, what defines partisanship is how closely a paper‟s position follows that of a 
single party -not whether the paper declares a political position or not-; whereas in an 
environment where declaring political positions is not a custom, taking a political 
position, no matter how complex, suffices to be counted as part of the press system that 
parallels the politics. Another point that makes direct comparison between the election 
level data in the two systems problematic is that the electoral system in the UK is more 
majoritarian, compared to that of Turkey, with its first-past-the-post design. In the 
Turkish case, where results that require the forming of a coalition are more likely 
despite the ten percent threshold, endorsing or supporting multiple parties has a 
different meaning, with coalition implications, than doing the same in the context of the 
winner-take-all system of the UK, which in most of the cases produces clear winners. 
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3.3.2.1. Limitations 
The most important shortcoming of the endorsement data is that election eve 
endorsement makes up only a small part a newspaper‟s content, and may, at times, be 
contradicted with the news or other editorial content of the paper. It is a one-time 
measurement, on election eve, and only a very small part of the content offered by the 
newspaper, the leading article, is taken into account.  
Another shortcoming of the endorsement data is that even endorsements are not 
always crystal clear. Different authors examining newspaper endorsements sometimes 
have differing interpretations concerning the party endorsed, and consequently come up 
with different tables. 
3.3.3. Content Analysis: Counting Words (Chapter 7) 
Chapter 7 is based upon a systematic comparison of party-generated texts and 
newspaper contents. To be able to make the comparison, however, first, party texts and 
newspaper texts to be compared need to be selected.  
Selection of party texts was already discussed in a previous section in this chapter 
(section 3.2.4.4), with the conclusion that although press statements, at first sight, look 
more comparable to newspaper content in terms of covering recent developments and 
being published more frequently, manifestos also have a significant capacity to serve as 
party texts in a comparison because they tend to get repeated by party spokesmen and 
women throughout the campaign, and because newspaper content does not solely consist 
of reports of recent events and developments, but contains many articles written from a 
longer-term perspective as well, covering policy issues similar to those covered in 
manifestos. It was also argued that manifestos have the added benefits of being widely 
available (even parties who do not have strong press release archives prepare election 
manifestos), which makes them a necessary choice in most comparative settings, and of 
having a more or less standardized format, with policies and promises presented under 
similar sub-headings like economy, security, education, environment, etc., which makes 
                                                                                                                                               
That should change with the coalition formed following the 2010 elections, but was 
valid for most of the period under study. 
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them more comparable. In the following section, the process of selecting and collecting 
newspaper texts is described, followed by a discussion of the way party texts and 
newspaper contents are compared. 
3.3.3.1. Selecting newspaper texts 
Newspapers, like parties, produce and carry many different kinds of content: news, 
opinion articles, ads, cartoons, and death notices are among the most common. Of these, 
aiming to select news and opinion articles, because they are more textual than visual, and 
because the newspaper is not paid to publish them, is an easy first step in identifying 
newspaper content to be used in the comparison. However, the content selected need not 
only be textual and non-paid, but also similar, to the degree possible, to the party texts to 
be used in the comparison, so that we have a high signal to noise ratio, focusing attention 
only on those articles that are most likely to cover issues covered by manifestos.  
Articles presented in the politics section of a newspaper are more likely to contain 
stories relevant to the election campaign and party manifestos, than articles in, say, the 
sports or the celebrity sections. Thus, it looks like a natural choice to focus on the politics 
pages of newspapers in selecting newspaper content. However, there are three 
considerations, two theoretical and one practical, that make this option less than desirable. 
The first consideration is that newspapers have different practices with regards to 
compartmentalizing their content into sections. Although they are almost uniform in 
having a section called politics, what individual papers include under this section varies 
considerably: while some politics sections focus narrowly on national parliamentary 
politics, others may include local, environmental, and legal issues as well, covered in the 
former under separate sections.  In other words, the politics sections of newspapers are 
not always functionally equivalent: if we were to collect newspaper articles based on 
newspapers‟ own classification of their content, we would not be collecting the same 
thing in each case.  
The second theoretical consideration, connected to the first point, is that news or 
opinion articles printed on other pages may have proper political content as well. 
Especially the economics and foreign news sections frequently contain articles that have 
something to do with the elections, and to a lesser degree, art and sports pages as well. If 
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we were to collect only those articles published on politics pages, we would be missing 
many relevant stories. 
Finally, the practical consideration is that in most cases, it is easier to conduct a 
word search to identify relevant articles than to look up the individual sections. Hence, a 
word/phrase search strategy was used in selecting the relevant news and opinion articles 
from newspapers. Party names and abbreviations were selected as phrases most likely to 
identify relevant content, with the strings “AKP”, AK Parti”, “Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi”, “CHP”, “Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi”, “MHP”, and “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi” 
being used as search terms in the Turkish case, and “Conservative(s)”, “Labour”, 
“Libdem(s)”, “Lib Dem(s)”, and “Liberal Democrat(s)” in the British case. All news and 
opinion articles containing one or more of these strings and published in national dailies 
in the one week periods prior to the elections under study (UK 2001, 2005, and 2010 
parliamentary elections; Turkey 2007 parliamentary elections)
22
 were collected.  
For content from UK newspapers, the “UK nationals” category of the Lexis Nexis 
Academic database was used, collecting articles from a total of ten national titles.
23
 To 
separate opinion from news articles the section tag of the database was used, with records 
that had one of the words “editorial”, “comment”, “opinion”, “letter”, “feature”, “leader”, 
or “debate” in its section label being classified as opinion content, and those that did not 
as news content.
24
 The search conducted
25
 returned a total of 1695 news and 654 opinion 
articles for 2001 elections, 1543 news and 616 opinion articles for 2005 elections, and 
1747 news and 820 opinion articles for 2010. The breakdown of these totals into 
individual titles is given in Table 3.1. 
                                                 
22
 The exact dates were as follows: April 29-May 5, 2010; April 28-May4, 2005; and May 
31-June6, 2001 for the UK elections, and July 15-21, 2007 for the Turkish election. 
23
 Articles from the Sunday editions of newspapers were merged with those from the 
main paper. The titles People, Morning Star, and Business, included in Lexis Nexis‟s 
category of “UK nationals”were left out since in most accounts these are not included in 
lists of national dailies, and Financial Times, which is not classified among the national 
dailies by the Lexis Nexis, was added. 
24
 Daily Mail‟s section tags contained none of these words, so the Daily Mail articles had 
to be sorted into news and opinion categories by reading. Same was true for Daily 
Telegraph in 2001. 
25
 A sample search string, for 2010 opinion articles, was as follows: ((labour OR 
conservative OR libdem OR liberal democrat OR lib dem and SECTION (editorial OR 
comment OR opinion OR letter OR feature OR leader OR debate)) and 
Date(geq(04/29/2010) and leq(05/05/2010))) 
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Table 3.1- Number of Articles Mentioning Party Names Published in British National 
Dailies Prior to 2001, 2005 and 2010 Elections 
  2001 2005 2010 
  News Opinion News Opinion News Opinion 
Daily Telegraph 242 121 173 67 225 112 
Times 181 160 210 122 245 155 
Guardian 298 62 220 56 303 137 
Financial Times 258 25 207 41 209 28 
Independent 193 95 171 114 146 13 
Daily Express 109 33 141 43 149 145 
Daily Mail 130 43 131 58 111 63 
Daily Mirror 131 90 155 73 135 75 
Sun 110 20 83 39 168 58 
Daily Star 43 5 52 3 56 34 
Total 1695 654 1543 616 1747 820 
 
Articles from Turkish newspapers were collected with the help of a commercial 
media monitoring service, Interpress, from the print editions of Turkish national dailies. 
The 15 titles included in the analysis consists of 11 of the 13 papers which had average 
daily circulations exceeding 100.000 copies in the week prior to the elections,
26
 3 titles 
with daily sales between 50.00 and 100.000 (Vakit, Cumhuriyet and Dünya), and one title 
(Radikal) with a circulation below 50.000. A total of 1260 news and 641 opinion articles 
were collected. The breakdown of these articles into individual titles is given in Table 3.2, 
with associated circulation figures. 
Table 3.2- Number of Articles Mentioning Party Names Published in Turkish National 
Dailies Prior to 2007 Elections 
Segment Newspaper News Opinion Circulation 
Q
u
al
it
y
 
Hürriyet 74 71 590323 
Zaman 119 38 587039 
Sabah 72 48 484893 
Milliyet 103 49 224591 
Vatan 72 64 197065 
Akşam 75 43 185058 
Türkiye 46 16 154333 
                                                 
26
 Güneş and Bugün, which sold, respectively, 162.239 and 102.084 copies a day on 
average in the week prior to the elections were exluded from the list because they were 
not covered by the Interpress archive a the time. Sports titles Fanatik and Fotomaç were 
also excluded. Sales figures were taken from the media news portal Medyatava, 
“16.07.2007 - 22.07.2007 tarihleri arasında gazete satıĢ raporu”, retrieved November 1st, 
2010 from http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj.asp 
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Segment Newspaper News Opinion Circulation 
Star 77 30 137500 
Yeni Şafak 88 39 121085 
Cumhuriyet 165 90 75834 
Vakit 115 59 67956 
Dünya 40 13 53706 
Radikal 108 37 35517 
T
ab
lo
id
 
Posta 64 24 649127 
Takvim 42 20 258839 
 Total 1260 641  
 
Once the newspaper and party-generated contents to be compared are thus selected, 
it is now time to select phrases that will form the basis of the comparison. 
3.3.3.2. Selecting text features 
Texts can be compared over a number of features. Among others, we can compare 
the length of texts (which text is longer), measured in words or characters; their use of 
punctuation (which text contains more question marks?); or the frequency of certain 
words or phrases that are theoretically significant (which text uses the word “AKP” more 
frequently, as opposed to the phrase “AK Parti”, the official abbreviation preferred by 
party managers?). Depending upon the purpose of the task at hand, any one of these 
features can be appropriate. 
In Chapter 7, word/phrase frequencies will be used as features over which to 
compare texts. It still remains, though, to decide which words/phrases to compare. There 
are two approaches to selecting the words/phrases to be used: Either there is a pre-defined 
set of specific words/phrases that are theoretically significant, like in the “AKP” vs. “AK 
Parti” example above, or the selection of words/phrases is part of the process of 
comparison, which would be the case if we were to create, for example, lists of “top ten 
most frequent words” in the two texts to compare these lists. I will be using both of these 
approaches in Chapter 7, to be employed for different purposes.  
Three groups of phrases will be used as text features to compare newspaper 
contents: Frequency of party names (to study amount of coverage), preferred words when 
referring to parties (to study overlap with party preferences), and most distinguishing 
phrases (to study overlap with party preferences more systematically). 
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a) Frequency of party names as a measure of amount of coverage: To study amount 
of coverage, researchers use different strategies: Balkir et al. (2006) code up to ten main 
actors for each story, with actors being party leaders or party candidates. Brandenburg 
codes “party and/or candidate references” (p. 163) in each standardized text line. I search 
for party names and abbreviations to examine amount of coverage. The same party names 
and abbreviations (“AKP”, AK Parti”, “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi”, “CHP”, 
“Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi”, “MHP”, and “Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi” for Turkey, and 
“Conservative(s)”, “Tori(es)” “Labour”, “Libdem(s)”, “Lib Dem(s)”, and “Liberal 
Democrat(s)” for the UK)  used in selecting newspaper articles will be used this time to 
analyze amount of coverage. 
b) Word choice when referring to parties: It is no secret that the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) of Turkey wants newspapers, indeed all 
actors, to use the abbreviation “AK Parti” (also meaning “Clean Party” in Turkish), which 
is the official abbreviation, instead of the shorter and less glorifying “AKP”. Indeed, party 
officials have a number of times stated this preference in strongly worded statements.
27
 
Thus, the degree to which newspapers conform with this preference can serve as a proxy 
measure of how much a newspaper supports the Justice and Development Party. A similar 
situation exists in the British case as well, with the Conservative Party not preferring use 
of the word Tory to mean modern day Conservatives. The official website of the 
Conservative Party, Conservatives.com, is clear as to the preferred word choice of the 
party: The frequency of the word Tory is less than one tenth of the frequency of the word 
Conservative in site‟s overall content (See Table 7.4). Labour.org.uk is also clear in this 
respect: They prefer the word Tory over Conservative when referring to the Conservative 
Party (See Table 7.4). The same applies in the Turkish case as well: AKP not only stated 
its express preference for the abbreviation “AK Parti” over “AKP”, but also used the 
former much more frequently in its official website, Akparti.org.tr (6100 over 429, 
Google search conducted November 25, 2010). CHP, on the other hand, used the 
abbreviation “AKP” much more frequently in its official website, chp.org.tr (561 over 43, 
                                                 
27
 AKP leader and Prime Minister Erdoğan said “The abbreviation of out party‟s name is 
AK Parti, not AKP. Those who insist on saying AKP, to be honest, have no sense of 
democratic ethics, no sense of political ethics, and no good manners.” “Bizim 
partimizin kısaltılmıĢ adı AK Parti‟dir, AKP değil. AKP diyenler, ne yazık ki 
demokratik noktadaki etik kurallara uymadan, siyasi etiği hiçe sayarak, bunu edep dıĢı 
söylemektedirler, bu kadar açık ve ağır söylüyorum.” (AKP değil Akp Parti, Hürriyet, 
June 3, 2009). Also see Yıldırımkaya (2009, June 5).  
 62 
Google search conducted November 25, 2010). Thus, if we detect meaningful differences 
between newspapers, and if we find some of them to conform with one party‟s preference, 
while others conform with the other‟s, then we can attribute this difference to differential 
support for parties. The logic of the third text feature to be used, explained in the 
following section, is similar: we will learn, from a systematic comparison of party texts, 
the relative preferences of the parties for different phrases, thus identifying the phrases 
that distinguish the most between party texts, and then use these phrases as text features 
over which to compare newspaper content. 
c) Most distinguishing phrases: A third set of text features, or lists of phrases, are 
selected using the chi-square statistic. Pearson‟s chi-square28 is frequently used in textual 
analysis to identify the most distinguishing words/phrases between two texts. The need to 
use this somewhat sophisticated tool arises because more naïve statistics, like the ratio 
between the frequencies of words in the two texts compared, fail in the task, especially for 
the words/phrases that are used in only one of the texts and not in the other.
29
  
In 2007 elections, the two-word and three-word phrases
30
 that distinguished the 
most between AKP and CHP manifestos, according to chi-square ranking, were as 
follows: 
                                                 
28
 See Appendix C for the details of chi-square calculation. 
29
 Compare “% CHP” column in Table 9 to chi-square column. If a phrase is not used in 
the AKP manifesto, it will have the same % CHP value regardless of how frequent that 
phrase is in the CHP manifesto. Chi-square statistic, however, does differentiate beween 
the phrase “chp iktidarında” (used 19 times in CHP manifesto and 0 times in AKP 
manifesto) and the phrase “cumhuriyetin temel” (used 3 times in CHP manifesto and 0 
times in AKP manifesto), assigning 0,0006 to the former and 0,0001 to the latter. 
30
 This table is for demonstrative purposes only, and reports the top 50 phrases according 
to chi-square ranking. In the calculations that follow, all phrases that had a chi-square 
value higher than 0,00001 were used. The following procedures were also applied in the 
pre-analysis period: 1- In the calculations reported, only two-word and three-word 
phrases were used, following Gentzkow and Shapiro (2007). Including single words or 
phrases with more words contribute little to the overall results compared to the 
computational burden they bring. 2- Another pre-analysis operation conducted on the 
texts to be analyzed was the deletion of very common words, also called stopwords, a 
routine procedure in quantitative text analysis that excludes words like “and”, “or”, etc. 
from the analysis. For English texts, the Snowball stopword list was used (An English 
stop word list, n.d.), and for the Turkish texts, the stopword list developed by the 
Natural Language Processing group at Fatih University (2010) was used. 3- Another 
pre-analysis operation conducted by Genzkow and Shapiro (2007) but not in present 
study is segmentation, which strips words down to their roots, so that the words “make” 
and “making” are treated as the same word. Segmentation was not applied because 
 63 
Table 3.3- Most Distinguishing Phrases between AKP and CHP Election Manifestos in 
2007 
Most distinguishing 
CHP phrases #
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 C
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Most distinguishing 
AKP phrases 
chp_iktidarinda 19 0 1,00 0,000649 0,000603 1,00 0 193 ak_parti 
hedef_alacagiz 18 0 1,00 0,000615 0,000222 1,00 0 71 ak_parti_iktidari 
uretime_dayali 9 0 1,00 0,000307 0,000222 1,00 0 71 parti_iktidari 
5_yildir 7 0 1,00 0,000239 0,000175 1,00 0 56 iktidarimiz_donemin
de sahip_cikacagiz 6 0 1,00 0,000205 0,000165 1,00 0 53 onumuzdeki_donem
de dis_kaynak 6 0 1,00 0,000205 0,000159 1,00 0 51 2002_yilinda 
dis_rekabet 6 0 1,00 0,000205 0,000096 0,97 1 38 devam_edecektir 
terorle_mucadelede 6 0 1,00 0,000205 0,000096 0,97 1 38 iktidari_doneminde 
kibris_rum 6 0 1,00 0,000205 0,000094 1,00 0 30 parti_iktidari_donem
inde tarimsal_uretim 5 0 1,00 0,000171 0,000080 0,95 2 39 2006_yilinda 
terorle_mucadele 5 0 1,00 0,000171 0,000072 1,00 0 23 milyon_ytl 
semt_konseyleri 5 0 1,00 0,000171 0,000066 1,00 0 21 uluslar_arasi 
gerekli_siyasi 5 0 1,00 0,000171 0,000066 1,00 0 21 olarak_gormektedir 
kuzey_irak'taki 5 0 1,00 0,000171 0,000062 1,00 0 20 parti_iktidarinda 
hedef_alinacaktir 5 0 1,00 0,000171 0,000062 1,00 0 20 ak_parti_iktidarinda 
gerekli_siyasi_irade 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000050 1,00 0 16 kultur_sanat 
saglayacagiz_ulkemiz
in 
4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000050 1,00 0 16 buyuk_onem 
uygulamaya_koyacag
iz 
4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000047 0,96 1 22 milyar_ytl 
destek_saglayacagiz 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000047 0,96 1 22 ozel_sektor 
irade_ortaya 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000047 1,00 0 15 ytl_iken 
akp_iktidari 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000047 1,00 0 15 devam_edilecektir 
mali_piyasalar 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000047 1,00 0 15 sosyal_yardim 
dayali_hizli 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000044 1,00 0 14 ilk_defa 
etkinlik_kazandiracagi
z 
4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000041 1,00 0 13 yili_sonunda 
islerlik_kazandiracagi
z 
4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000037 1,00 0 12 milyar_dolara 
basvuru_burolari 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000037 1,00 0 12 milyar_dolar 
cari_acik 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000037 1,00 0 12 yeni_donemde 
dayali_hizli_buyume 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000037 1,00 0 12 hak_ozgurlukler 
siyasi_irade_ortaya 4 0 1,00 0,000137 0,000037 1,00 0 12 2006_yili 
hizli_buyume 7 3 0,70 0,000127 0,000036 0,92 2 24 devam_edecegiz 
sabit_sermaye 5 1 0,83 0,000126 0,000034 1,00 0 11 ak_parti'nin 
yuksek_faiz 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000034 1,00 0 11 dar_gelirli 
yuksek_reel 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000034 1,00 0 11 icme_suyu 
konseyleri_basvuru 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000034 1,00 0 11 yerel_yonetimler 
                                                                                                                                               
currently, software used in segmentation requires a level of programming knowledge 
exceeding that of the author. This is a probable cause of contamination in the data, 
making our calculations more blunt, but does not introduce any bias, for it affects all 
texts in the same way. 4- Another pre-analysis operation was the deletion of some page 
headers. Manifesto texts used were extracted from the .pdf versions of the manifestos, 
and the pdf versions have a practice of using different headers on odd and even pages. 
Of these page headers, generally one is something like “… party manifesto” running 
throughout the text, and the other is the chapter title, running only a couple of pages. 
Manifesto titles were deleted but chapter titles were retained, for they do represent 
issues emphasized by the party. 
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Most distinguishing 
AKP phrases 
1_mart 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000034 0,92 2 23 temel_hak 
dogu_guneydogu_an
adolu 
3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000031 1,00 0 10 temel_hak_ozgurluk
ler duzenlemeleri_yapac
agiz 
3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000031 1,00 0 10 milyar_ytl'ye 
yargi_onunde_hesap 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000031 1,00 0 10 onumuzdeki_donem 
risk_sermayesi 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000031 1,00 0 10 iken_2007 
halkin_guvenligi 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000031 1,00 0 10 karar_alma 
uretime_dayali_hizli 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000031 1,00 0 10 iken_2006 
rekabet_gucunu_artir
acak 
3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000031 1,00 0 10 rekabet_gucumuzu 
butce_disiplinine 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000031 1,00 0 10 yillik_donemde 
esnaf_sanatkârlarin 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000028 1,00 0 9 diyanet_İsleri_baska
nligi sermayenin_tabana 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000028 1,00 0 9 İsleri_baskanligi 
buyuk_kentlerde 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000028 1,00 0 9 uluslararasi_alanda 
yargi_onunde 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000028 1,00 0 9 2007_yilinda 
guney_kibris 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000028 1,00 0 9 parti_iktidarinin 
yuksek_yargi 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000028 1,00 0 9 ak_parti_iktidarinin 
cumhuriyetin_temel 3 0 1,00 0,000102 0,000027 0,94 1 15 ayni_zamanda 
 
The names of the two parties, CHP and Ak Parti, rank first in the list of most 
distinguishing phrases, providing an early check on the validity of the chi square ranking. 
Looking down the list, we can discern the overall strategies of the two parties, and some 
of the issue areas they emphasized the most during the campaign. The overall strategy of 
the AKP manifesto seems to consist of emphasizing its record in the 5 years of 
government, frequently citing relevant statistics (“milyon ytl” -million ytls-, “milyar ytl” -
billion ytls-, “ytl iken” -was … ytls-, “milyar dolara” -to … billion dollars-, “milyar 
dolar” -billion dollars-, “milyar ytl’ye” -to … billion ytls-) concerning the period 
(“iktidarımız döneminde” -during our government-, “(AK) parti iktidarı döneminde” -
during AK Parti government-), and promising to continue (“devam edecektir” -will 
continue-, “devam edeceğiz” -we will continue-) these policies in the following period 
(“önümüzdeki dönemde” -in the following period-, “yeni dönemde” -in the new period-, 
“önümüzdeki dönem” -the following period-). The strategy of the CHP manifesto, on the 
other hand, seems to be based on avoiding statistics concerning the previous 5 years of 
AKP government, and making many promises, as indicated by the high frequency of 
future tense statements (“hedef alacağız” -we shall aim-, “sahip çıkacağız” -we shall 
protect-, “hedef alınacaktır” -shall be aimed-, “uygulamaya koyacağız” -we shall apply-, 
“destek sağlayacağız” -we shall support-, “etkinlik kazandıracağız” -we will make it 
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efficient-, “işlerlik kazandıracağız” -we will make it work-, “düzenlemeleri yapacağız” -
we shall make the arrangements-).  
The issue areas emphasized by the AKP include economic goals
31
, basic rights and 
freedoms
32
,social welfare
33
, local governments
34
, Directorate of Religious Affairs
35
, and 
culture
36
, all of which can be argued to be the issues AKP felt most at ease. Economic 
goals
37
 and local governments
38
 are issues that are emphasized by the CHP as well; but 
the Kurdish issue
39
, Cyprus
40
, relations with the US
41
, agriculture
42
, corruption
43
, and the 
secular character of the Republic
44
 are areas exclusively emphasized by the CHP. 
To examine party parallelism and bias in British national dailies, we need to 
identify the most distinguishing phrases that differentiate British party manifestos from 
each other. Table 3.4 reports the top 25 most distinguishing Conservative and Labour 
                                                 
31
 As indicated by the YTL and dollar statistics cited above, and the phrases “özel sektör” 
-private sector-, and “rekabet gücümüzü” -our competitiveness-. 
32
 “hak (ve) özgürlükler” -rights and freedoms-, “temel hak” -basic rights-, “temel hak (ve) 
özgürlükler” -basic rights and freedoms-. 
33
 “sosyal yardım” -social assistance-, “dar gelirli” -the poor-. 
34
 “içme suyu” -drinking water-, “yerel yönetimler” -local governments-. 
35
  “diyanet iĢleri baĢkanlığı” “directorate of religious affairs-, “iĢleri baĢkanlığı” -
directorate of … affairs-. 
36
  “kültür (ve) sanat” -culture and art-. 
37
 “üretime dayalı” -based on production-, “dış kaynak” -foreign resources”, “dış rekabet” 
-foreign competition-, “mali piyasalar” -financial markets-, “cari açık” -current deficit-, 
“dayalı hızlı” -rapid … based on- , “dayalı hızlı büyüme” -rapid growth based on-, “hızlı 
büyüme” -rapid growth-, “sabit sermaye” -fixed capital-, “yüksek reel” -high real-, 
“yüksek faiz” -high interest rates-, “risk sermayesi” -risk capital-, “rekabet gücünü 
artıracak” -to increase competitiveness-, “bütçe disiplinine” -budget discipline-, 
“sermayenin tabana” -capital to base-. 
38
 “semt konseyleri” -neighborhood councils-, “konseyleri başvuru” -council application-, 
“başvuru büroları” -application bureaus-, “büyük kentlerde” -in large cities-.  
39
 “terörle mücadelede” -in the fight against terrorism-, “terörle mücadele” -the fight 
against terrorism-, “kuzey ırak’taki” -in northern Iraq-, “doğu (ve) güneydoğu anadolu” 
-southern and southeastern Anatolia-, “halkın güvenliği” -security of the people-. 
40
 “kıbrıs rum” -Greek Cypriot-, “güney kıbrıs” -southern Cyprus-) 
41
 “1 Mart” -March 1st - referring to the motion, rejected in the TGNA on March 1st, 2003, 
to allow US soldiers use Turkish land in invading Iraq. 
42
 “tarımsal üretim” -agricultural production-. 
43
 “yargı önünde hesap” -accountable before law-, “yargı önünde” -before law-. 
44
 “cumhuriyetin temel”, -the basic … of the Republic-  
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phrases in the 2001, 2005, and 2010 election manifestos. Although this is not the place to 
analyze party manifestos and strategies in detail, the following observations are in order. 
Compared to the Turkish party manifestos, British ones seem to make more use of 
catchy, repeated slogans: “It‟s time for common sense” (Conservative 2001), “Britain 
forward not back” (Labour 2005) “Are you thinking what we‟re thinking” (Conservative 
2005) are most notable examples of this practice. Naturally, these slogans appear at the 
top of our most distinguishing phrases lists. 
Looking at party strategies, Labour seems to have put a strong emphasis on its track 
record in government on every election eve, with the phrase “since 1997” appearing in all 
three lists among the top phrases. This emphasis is supported by statistics in 2001 and to 
some extent in 2005, with the phrase “per cent” being frequently used to make 
quantitative points. The 2010 Labour manifesto is not so fond of statistics, instead 
emphasizing “tough choices” to be made, probably a reflection of the economic crisis 
Britain -along with most of the world- went through during Labour‟s third consecutive 
term. Indeed, when we examine the ratio of the frequency of the phrase “per cent” in 
consecutive elections, a very telling trend emerges: In 2001, Labour is very confident 
about its track record, and uses the phrase a total of 92 times in its election manifesto, 
compared to a mere 6 times in the Conservative manifesto, placing the expression at the 
very top of the most distinguishing Labour phrases list (ratio: 15,3). In 2005, Labour‟s 
enthusiasm for percentages seems to have waned somewhat (53 times), however, the 
expression remains in the list of most distinguishing phrases because Conservatives seem 
to be still avoiding statistics (8 times) (ratio: 6,6). In 2010, Labour loses even more of its 
confidence in statistics, using the expression 41 times, but it is the big jump in 
Conservatives‟ use of the phrase (from 8 to 17) that takes it out of the most distinguishing 
phrases list (ratio: 2,4). It seems like we can use the ratio of the use of percentages in 
manifestos as an indicator of parties‟ confidence in their statistics, and indirectly, as a 
measure of the incumbent‟s performance, with implications for its vote share in the 
coming elections. 
The phrase “Conservative government” is at the top of the most distinguishing 
Conservative phrases lists in all three elections, indicating that promises concerning future 
made up a very important part of the Conservative Party‟s strategy in these elections. The 
Conservative focus in 2001 was on “cutting taxes” and “stronger society”. In 2005, the 
emphasis on “lowering taxes” remained, but it was supplemented with a strong rhetoric 
for “controlled immigration”, “controlling borders”, and border “control police”, along 
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with retaining “national control” in EU matters. In 2010, the single most favorite word in 
the Conservative manifesto was change, with promises to “change the economy”, “change 
society”, and “change politics”. Notably, taxes and migration, traditional themes in 
Conservative politics, do not appear to have been strong emphases in the 2010 elections. 
These comparisons, although interesting in and of themselves, mainly serve, for the 
purposes of this study, to provide some face validity to a chi-square based selection of 
phrases. To systematically examine how these party strategies are reflected in newspaper 
contents, Chapter 7 looks at the relative frequencies of the most distinguishing phrases in 
individual newspapers.
45
 In other words, newspaper contents are compared with each 
other based upon what we learn from the comparison of party texts. This, in turn, is done 
by looking at which newspapers give more space to the so-called AKP phrases, and which 
newspapers give more space to the CHP phrases. To make these calculations in a 
systematic manner, the Wordscores program developed by Laver, Benoit and Garry 
(2003) is used.  
Wordscores works by assigning “reference” texts (AKP and CHP manifestos in this 
case) certain numeric values, and then calculating estimates for “virgin” texts (newspaper 
contents in this case) as to where they stand in relation to the reference texts, using the 
relative frequencies of words or phrases (see Appendix C for a detailed example of 
Wordscores calculations). These estimates are then used as party scores of individual 
newspapers, and as inputs in the calculation of system-wide parallelism measures, 
reported in Chapter 7. 
 
                                                 
45
 Note that calculations reported in Chapter 7 are not restricted to the top 25 or top 50 
phrases, but include all phrases with a chi-square value higher than 0,00001. 
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3.3.3.3. Limitations 
Although it does enable us to answer some important questions, the content analysis 
method employed in Chapter 7 has two major shortcomings: 
1- Loss of detail: The method produces a single measure for the texts analyzed: how 
much a virgin text resembles the reference texts. Based upon these resemblance scores, 
we make further analyses of newspapers‟ support for specific parties and overall 
parallelism in the system. Beyond the presence and degree of support, however, we gain 
no other knowledge about the texts analyzed. We could, however be interested in 
questions that go beyond the presence or degree of support. For example, even if we 
know that The Guardian supported Labour and the The Telegraph supported the 
Conservatives in the 2005 elections, we may still want to learn about the content of the 
Guardian‟s support for Labour: Did it support Labour on Iraq War, on immigration, or on 
economic issues? Similarly, was The Telegraph supportive of all Conservative policies, or 
only of some of them? On which issues was The Telegraph closer to the Labour line? We 
cannot utilize the method used in Chapter 7 to answer these questions, which require a 
substantive reading of the texts in question. 
2- Establishing validity: As Slava Mikhaylov, Daniel Laver and Kenneth Benoit 
(2008) note, “the debate over computerized versus hand-coded content analysis largely 
revolves around the tradeoff between reliability and validity. Proponents of computerized 
schemes […] cite perfect reliability in their favor, and struggle to demonstrate validity, 
while hand-coded schemes such as the CMP claim validity as a central advantage and 
then devote huge resources to attempts to enhance reliability” (p. 3). This study proposes 
to use a computerized scheme that solves reliability problems, but establishing validity 
will be a challenge.  
Now that I have laid out the methodology used in detail, it is now time to present 
the empirical results. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the data on history of political 
parallelism in the Turkish press, gathered from the secondary literature on press history. 
  
 70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
Part II deals with the history of political parallelism in Turkey and in the UK. 
Chapter 4 reviews history of political parallelism in the Turkish press from 1830s to 2002, 
and Chapter 5 reviews history of political parallelism in the British press from 1945 to 
2010. Chapter 6 offers an evaluation of the theoretical explanations based upon historical 
data from these two cases. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN THE TURKISH PRESS 
To understand the present state of political parallelism in the Turkish press, it is first 
necessary to examine the roots of journalism in Turkey, and track the history of 
parallelism through the many different political periods. In the process, we would learn a 
lot about the conditions surrounding press-party parallelism in Turkey, observe –if any- 
the regularities in the relationship between the political environment and press 
partisanship, and see if there are any over-time trends; all of which would help put the 
present state of political parallelism in the Turkish press in –historical- perspective. 
As with so many things, a historical account of political parallelism in the Turkish 
press would be lacking without a glance –if cursory- at the late Ottoman period. In what 
follows, I track the history of political parallelism from the late Ottoman period, when 
Turkish journalism started, to the 2002 elections –the most recent period will be taken up 
in Chapter 7-, using the secondary literature on the Turkish press, and following a 
commonly used periodization with slight changes
46
. 
 
 
                                                 
46
 The periods I use are as follows: 1- Until the First Constitutional Period ( - 1876), 2- 
First Consitutional Period and the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1908), 3- Second 
Constitutional Period (1908-1918), 4- War of Independence (1918-1923), 5- Early 
Republican Era (1923-1931), 6- One-Party Rule (1931-1946), 7- Transition to 
Democracy (1946-1950), 8- DP Governments (1950-1960), 9- 1960 Coup and Its 
Aftermath (1960-1971), 10- 1971 Intervention and Its Aftermath (1971-80), 11- 1980 
Coup and ANAP Govenments (1980-1991), 12- The Era of Coalitions (1991-2002). 
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4.1. Political Parallelism in First Turkish Newspapers – Until the First 
Constitutional Period (1831 - 1876) 
In multi-party democracies, press-party parallelism is easy to define. Main political 
positions are crystallized into political parties, and the press system parallels the party 
system to the degree papers are aligned with different parties. In one-party and no-party 
regimes, because (additional) parties are not allowed to exist, political parallelism has to 
be defined in relation to positions towards the government. In other words, for purposes 
of analysis, no-party and one-party regimes can be treated like a two-party system where 
one of the parties is the government and the other is the opposition. The press system 
parallels the party system to the degree the press is divided into pro-government and anti-
government camps. 
To see whether this was the case in the period between 1831 and 1876 –from the 
publication of Takvim-i Vakayi, the first Turkish newspaper,
47
 to the adoption of the First 
Constitution- we need to look at the political alignments of individual papers in some 
detail. The early years of this period deserve special emphasis because it is here that the 
roots of Turkish journalism lie. Practices adopted in this period are certain to affect 
practices in later periods, because early titles like Ceride-i Havadis, Tecüman-ı Ahval and 
Tasvir-i Efkar also acted as schools of journalism that trained the journalists who 
published their own papers in the following periods.  
Comparing the roots of journalism in Southern Europe, where political parallelism 
is high, to Northern Europe and North America, Hallin and Mancini (2004) make the 
following observation: “The media developed in Southern Europe as an institution of the 
political and the literary worlds more than of the market. In Northern Europe and North 
America, the commercial bourgeoisie, whose success in a market economy depended on a 
steady flow of reliable information about trade, navigation, technology, and politics, 
played a key role in the development of the first newspapers” (p. 90). In Southern Europe, 
on the other hand, “the purpose of the nineteenth century newspaper […] was the 
expression of ideas” (p. 91). Hallin and Mancini (2004) also cite Balzac, as a 
                                                 
47
 More properly, Takvim-i Vakayi is the first Turkish newspaper paublished in what is 
contemporary Turkey. The first newspaper in the Otoman Empire, Bulletin des 
Nouvelles, was published by the French Embassy in Ġstanbul in 1795. The first 
newspaper in Turkish, Vakayi-i Mısriye, was published in 1828 in Egypt by the 
governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha. (Topuz, 2003, p. 13, 34) 
 73 
contemporary witness on Southern Europe, defining the word „press‟: “the word adopted 
to express everything that is published periodically in politics and literature” (quoted in p. 
91). 
Early Turkish journalism fits the picture Hallin and Mancini (2004) draw for 
Southern Europe, but not perfectly. The first Turkish newspaper, Takvim-i Vakayi, was 
founded by the initiative of Sultan Mahmud II, owned and staffed
48
 by the state, sent to 
prominent state officials around the country (ġapolyo, 1971, p. 104), and contained news 
about the state. The Sultan was very involved in the project, so much so that he personally 
chose the name for the paper
49
, intervened in typographical errors,
50
 and did some 
editorial work, trying to have the staff simplify their language.
51
 The paper, however, was 
not all about the state. Besides official news, non-official news was also given (ġapolyo, 
1971, p.104). Of the six parts of the paper, one was reserved for news on commerce and 
prices, one for sciences, and one for foreign news.
52
 
The first Turkish newspaper, then, belonged to the political world in the sense that it 
was owned and managed by the state, but also belonged to the world of market in the 
sense that it contained news on commerce and prices too.  
Ceride-i Havadis, the second Ottoman paper to be published in Turkish and 
considered by many to be a semi-official paper because it received a monthly aid from the 
state, also displays a dual character, but its market aspect is stronger. Published by 
                                                 
48
 Official chronicler of the state, Esat Efendi, was assigned as the director of the paper. 
(Kabacalı, 2000, p.19) 
49
 Sultan Mahmud II was given a list of suggestions for the paper‟s name, but he liked 
none of them and came up with his own, Takvim-i Vakayi. SeeTopuz (2003, p. 15), 
Kabacalı (2000, p. 49); ġapolyo, 1971, p. 101) 
50
 Kabacalı (2000) cites the following from the Mahmud II: “Basılan Takvim-i Vakayi 
nüshalarında yine bazı harfler tam çıkmayıp eksik çıkmakta olduğundan ve bu hususa 
özen gösterilip dikkat edilmemesi daha önce de yinelendiğinden, yine öyle eksik harf 
görülmesi sözü geçen tezgahın henüz kullanılmamasından mıdır, yoksa özensizlikten 
midir?” (Nesimi Yazıcı, Takvim-i Vakayi “Belgeler”. Ankara, 1983, p. 33, 94-95. 
Quoted in Kabacalı, 2000, p.51) 
51
 Ġnuğur (1993) cites the following from Mahmud II: “Umuma neĢrolunacak Ģeylerde 
yazılacak elfaz (sözler) herkesin anlayabileceği surette olmak lazımdır. Öyle 
(çetrgerdune) ve (tevsen) gibi Ģeylerin Türkçe olarak tashihi muktazidir.” (p. 178, 
quoted from Hıfzı Topuz, 100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi, Ġstanbul, 1973, p.7) 
52
 The six parts were as follows: Internal news (Umur-u Dahiliye), Military News 
(Mevad-dı Askeriye), Foreign News (Umur-u Hariciye), Sciences (Fünun), 
Assignments of Religious Personnel/Scholars (Tevcihat-ı Ġlmiye), and Commerce and 
Prices (Ticaret ve Es‟ar). (Baykal, 1990, p. 53) 
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William Churchill, an English tradesman residing in Istanbul, who was also a reporter for 
the British newspaper Morning Herald, Ceride-i Havadis expanded its narrow readership 
during the Crimean War with fresh news from the front. Its irregular supplement, 
Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis, which was published before the regular ten day period of 
the main paper as important news arrived, became so popular that it later replaced the 
main paper. 
The second Turkish newspaper, then, belonged to the world of market in the sense 
that its publishers actively tried to increase the sales by improving news content and by 
introducing a novel product in the form of an irregular supplement with fresh news. 
Ceride-i Havadis belonged to the world of market in two other respects too: It was the 
first Turkish newspaper to publish private ads to generate revenue, and it placed a major 
emphasis upon economic news. According to ġapolyo (1971), “its content consisted 
mainly of economic news” (p. 111). According to Jeltyakov (1979), the content of Ceride-
i Havadis “mainly interested local and foreign tradesmen” (p. 46). 
 The third and the fourth Turkish newspapers, which appeared in 1860s, some 20 
years after Ceride-i Havadis started publication and 30 years after Takvim-i Vakayi did, 
were Agah Efendi‟s Tercüman-ı Ahval and ġinasi‟s Tasvir-i Efkar. Both men were among 
the founders of the Society of Young Ottomans, who wanted to establish a constitutional 
monarchy, and their papers belonged more strongly to the political and the literary worlds 
than to the world of market. The political and the literary worlds, in turn, were so 
intertwined in these years that it made little sense to make a distinction between the two. 
This was not only because the two worlds shared prominent figures –ġinasi was the writer 
of the first modern play in Turkish, Şair Evlenmesi, and Namık Kemal, who managed 
ġinasi‟s paper after he went to Europe, was also a successful playwright, a novelist, and a 
poet. Both men were also members of the Young Ottomans.- but also because 
controversies in literature had open political connotations. The controversy over the need 
to adopt Western literary forms and to simplify the language did not arise from the whims 
of eccentric literary men, but pitted reformers against the conservative forces in the 
society. Jeltyakov (1979) argues that “the new language and the new literature started by 
ġinasi and Namık Kemal on the pages of Tasvir-i Efkar aimed to help the progressive 
forces in their struggle against the feudal order” (p.55). This was the reason that the 
polemic between ġinasi and Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis over a grammar mistake drew 
large audiences and Tasvir-i Efkar sold 20-24 thousand copies, the highest figure enjoyed 
by a Turkish newspaper until then (Jeltyakov, 1979, p. 55). 
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Three of the first four Turkish newspapers, then, belonged more clearly to the world 
of politics (Tercüman-ı Ahval, Tasvir-i Efkar, and Takvim-i Vakayi) both content-wise 
(literary polemics with political connotations and open criticism of government in 
Tercüman-ı Ahval and Tasvir-i Efkar; official news, decrees and orders in Takvim-i 
Vakayi) and organization-wise (founders of Tercüman-ı Ahval and Tasvir-i Efkar were 
also prominent members of the Young Ottomans; Takvim-i Vakayi was founded, 
financed, staffed, and distributed by the state). 
One of the papers, Ceride-i Havadis, on the other hand, belonged more clearly to 
the world of market, especially in terms of content (it had more news than political 
commentary, and its news content consisted mainly of economic news), but also in terms 
of organization (Ceride-i Havadis did receive some funding from the state, but in other 
organizational matters like staffing and distribution, it was independent. State funding 
must also have decreased in importance as the paper increased its sales and started to 
publish private ads). 
To widen our scope and make a fuller analysis of political parallelism in the period 
before the Proclamation of the First Constitution, we need to look at all the papers 
published in this perod, and see if there is a pro-/anti- government divide in the press. 
Table 4.1 lists all the papers published in the Ottoman Empire prior to 1876. It 
excludes papers published in languages other than Turkish, provincial papers published 
outside Istanbul, and papers published by Young Ottomans in Europe and other parts of 
the world. Satirical papers (like Hayal, Meddah, Diojen, Çaylak, Çıngıraklı Tatar, etc.) 
and thematic papers that target specific audiences like those on theater (Tiyatro), child 
education, and military (Ceride-i Askeriye) were also left out. The upper part of the table 
lists the „major‟ papers of the period, and the bottom half displays the relatively minor 
papers.
53
 
Table 4.1 shows that, of the 19 major papers published in the period before the 
proclamation of the First Constitution, 2 were pro-government, 9 were anti-government, 
and 8 were in the middle, with mixed content or organizational connections. This is quite 
a lop-sided picture, with much more papers being on the opposition rather than being pro-
government, although the picture is moderated with a substantial middle group of papers 
that do not have clear pro- or anti-government positions. 
                                                 
53
 See Chapter 3 on how the „major‟ papers were selected and on other details concerning 
the preparation of the tables in this chapter. 
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Table 4.1- Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Period Prior to the 
Proclamation of the First Constitution 
      Pro-Gov't Anti-Gov't Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Takvim-i Vakayi 8   x
1
 x
2
                           P Pro- 
Gov't 2 Ceride-i Havadis 8 x
3
   x
4
                           P 
3 Hakayik-ül Vakayi 7     x
5
           x
6
               PI 
M
ix
e
d
 
4 Basiret 8     x
7
     x
8
   x
9
         x
10
       PA 
5 Muhib-bi Vatan 8 x
11
             x
12
                 PA 
6 Sadakat 7                         x
13
         
7 Mümeyyiz 7                                   
8 Vakit 7                                   
9 Sabah 7                                   
10 Utarit 7         x
14
     x
15
   x
16
             AI 
11 Tercüman-ı Ahval 8         x
17
 x
18
 x
19
 x
20
                 A 
Anti- 
Gov't 
12 Tasvir-i Efkar 8         x
21
 x
22
 x
23
 x
24
                 A 
13 Muhbir 8         x
25
 x
26
 x
27
 x
28
           x
29
     A 
14 İbret 8         x
30
 x
31
 x
32
 x
33
                 A 
15 Ayine-i Vatan 8         x
34
 x
35
   x
36
                 A 
16 Terakki 8           x
37
   x
38
         x
39
 x
40
     A 
17 Hadika 8           x
41
   x
42
                 A 
18 İstikbal 8               x
43
                 A 
19 Muhip 7               x
44
                 A 
20 Vakayi-i Zaptiye 5 x
45
                               P   
21 Şark 6   x
46
           x
47
                 PA   
22 Mir'at 2           x
48
 x
49
                   A   
23 Devir 5           x
50
   x
51
                 A   
24 İttihat 5                                 A   
25 Sirac 6           x
52
   x
53
                 A   
26 Medeniyet 6               x
54
                 A   
27 Kevkeb-i Şarki 4               x
55
                 A   
28 Asır 6                                     
29 Takvim-i Ticaret 4                                     
30 Mecmua-i Maarif 4                                     
31 Selamet 3                                     
32 Müsavat 3                                     
33 Veled-ül Cevaib 2                                     
34 Arkadaş 2                                     
35 İbretname-i Alem 1                                     
Note: A: Author evaluation C: Content O: Organization L: Legal action n: Number of books that mention 
the paper 
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From another angle, close to 60 percent (57 %) of the papers have a pro- or anti-
government position. If we take this figure as a measure of the degree of political 
parallelism in the system, what we have in the period before the proclamation of the First 
Constitution is moderate parallelism,
54
 a picture consistent with our analysis of the first 
Turkish newspapers, which, overall, displayed a dual character with some papers 
belonging to the world of politics and literature and some to the world of market. When 
newspapers did belong to the world of politics in this period, they did so pre-dominantly 
on the side of the opposition, criticizing the actions of the government and acting as a 
platform for the propagation of ideas of political reform along constitutional and 
parliamentary lines. Few papers, indeed only two, took active pro-government positions. 
Two questions arise from the analysis of political parallelism in this period: First, is 
the moderate parallelism that characterizes these early and formative years of Turkish 
journalism carried over to the future periods? Second, does the pro-opposition lop-
sidedness of the Turkish press remain intact, disappear altogether, or change nature? It is 
now time to turn to the First Constitutional Period and the reign of Abdulhamid II to 
partially answer these questions. 
4.2. Political Parallelism in the First Constitutional Period and the Reign of 
Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) 
When we look at Table 4.2, the first thing that draws attention is the drastic 
reduction in the number of papers published. A total of 18 newspapers are mentioned in 
                                                 
54
 Of course, this picture would have changed quite substantially if we were to include the 
papers Young Ottomans published outside the country. From the infamous Ali Pasha 
decree of 1867, which introduced a harsh press regime, until Ali Pasha‟s death in 1871, 
Young Ottomans published numerous papers in Turkish and in European languages 
outside the country, all of which supported the idea of political reform to limit the 
Sultan‟s authority. Their inclusion would tip the balance towards more parallelism. 
However, papers published outside the country by Young Ottomans before the 
Proclamation of the First Constitution, and by Young Turks before the Second 
Constitution of 1908, are left out because, first, their inclusion would swell the analysis, 
and second, they lie in the margins of the Turkish press, finding only limited 
opportunity to enter the country and reach their target audiences. 
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the 6 books that cover this period, compared to the 35 titles of the previous era.
55
 The 
reason for this reduction is the harsh press regime of the “Oppression Era”, as it is usually 
called, that followed the brief Constitutional Period, which lasted only 14 months. Many 
papers were closed down, including the state owned Takvim-i Vakayi, and the government 
was not very enthusiastic about giving new licenses. 
Table 4.2 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the First Constitutional Period 
and the Reign of Abdulhamid II 
      Pro-Gov't Anti-Gov't Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 
Tercüman-ı 
Hakikat 6     x
1
                   x
2
       P Pro- 
Gov't 
2 Ayine-i Vatan 6     x
3
                           P 
3 Sabah 6 x
4
             x
5
                 PA M
ix
e
d
 
4 Takvim-i Vakayi 6 x
6
   x
7
         x
8
                 PA 
5 İkdam 6     x
9
         x
10
                 PA 
6 Muhib-bi Vatan 6                                   
7 Basiret 6           x
11
   x
12
                 A Anti- 
Gov't 
8 Vakit 5           x
13
   x
14
                 A 
9 Saadet 3 x
15
   x
16
                   x
17
       P   
10 Tarık 2     x
18
         x
19
                 PA   
11 Malumat 4     x2
20
     x
21
   x
22
                 PA   
12 Selamet 3                                     
13 Müsavat 3                                     
14 Tercüman-ı Şark 2                                     
15 Mecmua-i Şark 2                                     
16 Servet 1                                     
17 Hakikat 1                                     
18 Osmanlı 1                                     
 
Of the 8 major titles, 2 were pro-government, 2 were in the opposition, and 4 were 
in the middle. 50 percent of the papers had clear political positions, implying, as before, a 
moderate level of parallelism. The dominant position of the pro-opposition papers is no 
longer, with equal numbers of pro- and anti-government papers in the parallel part of the 
Turkish press. 
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 Papers published by Young Turks outside the country are not included in this count. 
Takvim-i Vakayi, which from 1861 onwards became more of an official gazette than a 
newspaper (Baykal, 1990, p.49; Topuz, 2003, p.16), was included in the list because it 
was closed down by the Sultan in this period, showing, at least as perceived by the 
authorities, that it had a political impact. 
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Another difference, compared with the earlier era, is the make-up of the evidence, 
which is generally thinner in this period. We have fewer author evaluations and fewer 
content examples from this era regarding political positions taken. What we do have as 
evidence for political parallelism in this era mostly consists of legal actions taken against 
papers and journalists –implying an anti-government position for the paper concerned-, 
and organizational connections with the government, in the form of financial aid and 
owners‟ relations with prominent state officials –implying a pro-government position. For 
example, compared to Tercüman-ı Ahval, Tasvir-i Efkar, Muhbir, and İbret of the 
previous period, which had all four anti-government boxes filled (author evaluation, 
content, organization, and legal action), we have Basiret and Vakit in this period as 
opposition papers, and they have only two boxes filled, content and legal action. Their 
opposition, in other words, is thinner. Similarly, compared to the pro-government papers 
of the earlier era (Takvim-i Vakayi and Ceride-i Havadis), which had two boxes filled 
each (content and organization for the former, author evaluation and organization for the 
latter), we have Tercüman-ı Hakikat and Ayine-i Vatan in this period, with only 
organizational evidence for their pro-government position. In general, then, we can say 
that the political character of the “parallel” part of the Turkish press –which remained the 
same in size relative to the non-parallel part- was muted down. 
To sum up our observations for this period, there was a drastic reduction in the 
number of papers published, the dominant position of the opposition papers ended with 
equal numbers of pro- and anti-government papers, and moderate parallelism continued to 
be the case with the caveat that it is a thinner parallelism. That Abdulhamid‟s reign was 
more authoritarian in character than the previous era probably explains many of these 
changes, especially the reduction in the number of anti-government papers and in the total 
number of papers published. Part of the explanation, however, lies with the fact that more 
sophisticated measures were taken against the opposition press. In fact, blunt 
legal/administrative action like closure and suspension was used more frequently in the 
previous period: A total of 12 papers faced such action in the period before the 
Proclamation of the First Constitution, compared to 5 in Abdulhamid‟s reign. By limiting 
the number of licenses given and by using refined measures against opposition press like 
lists of forbidden words, special agencies for press censure, and a much more generous 
use of financial aid (Topuz, 2003), Abdulhamid II was able to prevent anti-government 
content before it was published, rather than punishing it afterwards. This should also 
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explain the thinner character of parallelism seen in this period, muting any evidence on 
political positions down. 
4.3. Political Parallelism in the Second Constitutional Period (1908-1918) 
In the Second Constitutional Period that brought the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) to power, political parallelism is higher than in earlier periods. Of the 18 
major papers published in this period, only 3 have mixed political positions, with the 
remaining 15 (83 %) having clear pro- or anti-CUP positions. Compared to the moderate 
levels of 50 percent in the reign of Abdulhamid II and 57 percent in the period before the 
Proclamation of the First Constitution, this figure means a significantly higher level of 
political parallelism. 
Looking at Table 4.3, we can also see that anti-CUP papers outnumber pro-CUP 
papers. The balance that existed in the earlier period between the pro- and anti-
government papers in the parallel part of the press is now tilted towards the opposition. 
Table 4.3 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Second Constitutional Period 
      Pro-CUP Anti-CUP Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Tanin 5 x
1
   x
2
 x
3
                 x
4
       P 
Pro- 
CUP 
2 Şura-yı Ümmet 5 x
5
     x
6
                         P 
3 Tasvir-i Efkar 5 x
7
   x
8
                           P 
4 Vakit 5 x
9
                               P 
5 Basiret 5 x
10
                               P 
6 Sabah 5                 x
11
               I 
Mixed 
7 
Tercüman-ı 
Hakikat 5 x
12
       x
13
       x
14
               PAI 
8 Sırat-ı Müstakim 5                         x
15
         
9 Mizan 5         x
16
 x
17
 x
18
 x
19
                 A 
Anti- 
CUP 
10 Volkan 5         x
20
 x
21
 x
22
 x
23
         x
24
       A 
11 Serbesti 5         x
25
 x
26
   x
27
                 A 
12 Hukuk-u Umumiye 4         x
28
     x
29
                 A 
13 Sada-yı Millet 4         x
30
     x
31
         x
32
       A 
14 İkdam 5         x
33
 x
34
             x
35
       A 
15 Osmanlı 5         x
36
 x
37
             x
38
       A 
16 Yeni Gazete 5           x
39
             x
40
   x
41
   A 
17 Alemdar 5               x
42
                 A 
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      Pro-CUP Anti-CUP Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
18 İştirak 4               x
43
         x
44
   x
45
   A 
20 Metin 1 x
46
                               P   
21 Millet 1 x
47
                               PA   
22 İttifak 1 x
48
                               A   
23 İleri 1                                 A   
24 İttihad 1 x
49
                               A   
25 Payıtaht 1 x
50
                               A   
26 Hürriyet 1                                 A   
27 Servet 1 x
51
                               A   
28 Zaman 1 x
52
                                   
29 Ahali 1 x
53
                                   
30 İstikbal 1 x
54
                                   
31 Servet-i Fünun 3                 x
55
                   
32 Saadet 3 x
56
               x
57
                   
33 Şehrah 1               x
58
         x
59
           
34 Tanzimat 2             x
60
               x
61
       
35 
Hakimiyet-i 
Milliye
63
 1                         x
62
           
 
A third characteristic in this period is the unusually high number of papers 
published.
56
 A total of 35 titles are mentioned in the five books that cover the period,
57
 
most published in the early months before the CUP decided to tighten its grip on the press 
after the March 31 incident. 
A fourth characteristic of the period, not visible in Table 4.3, but hidden in the 
make-up of the evidence is that the legal action category in this stormy period, which also 
contains Balkan Wars and World War I, consisted mostly of violent actions by political 
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 Kabacalı (2000) notes that in the eight months‟ period from the Proclamation of the 
Second Constitution, close to 350 newspapers and other periodicals were published. 
The sudden increase in the number of papers published in this period is the subject of a 
book by Orhan Koloğlu (2005).  
57
 In addition to these 35 titles, Baykal (19909) and Kabacalı (2000) give long lists of 
other papers published, on which they give little information. The titles that appear in 
their lists, which were not included in the Table 3 for lack of space, are the following: 
Adalet, Ahrar, Bayrakdar, İnkılab, İttihat ve Terakki, Sada-i Haki Vazife, Hak, Protesto, 
Hakikat, Hayret, Hak Yolu, Havadis, İctihad, Hamiyet, Devlet, Hayal-i, Cedid, 
Haberdar, Rençber, Rivayet, Tevhid-i Anasır, Tenvir-i Efkar, Teşvk, Tcelli, Tasavvuf, 
Tevsii Mezuniyet, Fazilet, Cuma, Baskın, Siper, Şark, İtimat, Hilal, İkbal, İtilaf, Hikmet, 
Muahede, Darbe, Ramazan, Nimet, Meslek, Ziya, Zühre, Millet ile Musahabe, Alem, 
Hilal-i Osmani, Müdafaa, Akvam, Yeni İstanbul, Türkçe İstanbul, Söz, İnkılab-ı Beşer, 
İrşad el-Müslimin, İslam. 
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groups –like looting and assassinations- instead of administrative/punitive measures by 
the government –like closure, suspension, etc. Leader writers of anti-CUP papers 
Serbesti, Hukuk-u Umuiye, Sada-yı Millet, and Şehrah were assassinated by gunmen 
known to be associated with the Committee, but acting, allegedly, outside the command 
of the CUP headquarters; and Tanin and Şura-yı Ümmet, prominent pro-CUP papers, 
were looted by the mob during the March 31 incident, which was fuelled in part by the 
anger directed at the police, who, the protestors claimed on purpose, failed to capture the 
assassins. 
As a fifth characteristic, we can mention the unusually high number of papers with 
“other” political positions, displayed in the fourth column in Table 4.3, whose political 
stands are not fully captured by the pro-/anti-CUP dichotomy. For example, Ġkdam and 
Osmanlı are not only anti-CUP papers, they are also supporters of the Liberal Party 
(Ahrar Fırkası), which was founded by followers of Prince Sabahattin and defended 
decentralization and economic liberalism. Similarly, the label “anti-CUP” fails to do 
justice to the political positions of Volkan and Beyan-ül Hak, which defended pro-Islamic 
political views. Papers owned or managed by Ali Kemal –Peyam and for a brief period 
İkdam-, who later served as a minister in Damat Ferit‟s cabinet, were, according to Ġnuğur 
(1993), proponents of the Ottomanist view in the press (p. 315). The first socialist 
newspaper, İştirak, was also published in this period. 
Finally, we can say that the political parallelism of the era is not only higher but 
also thicker compared to the reign of Abdulhamid II, with multiple pieces of evidence 
leading us towards the political positions taken by papers. 
The unusually high number of papers published and the thicker nature of 
parallelism in this period needs to be explained by the freedom of press that came after 
many years of “oppression”, as the reign of Abdulhamid II is usually called. In the brief 
period of freedom that lasted from the proclamation of the Second Constitution on 24 July 
1908 to the March 31 incident on 13 April 1909, many papers were published, and all 
sorts of political positions, including those against the Union and Progress, found the 
opportunity to be voiced in the press. 
The high level of parallelism, the high number of papers with “other” political 
positions, and the frequency of violent actions against newspapers and journalists, on the 
other hand, needs to be explained by reference to the fact that these were years of turmoil 
for the Empire, with a new authority, Union and Progress, replacing the old one, the 
Empire continuously losing land, many different political groups forming around varying 
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ideas on “how to save the Empire”, and finally, WWI going on, contributing to the lack of 
authority in the country and the general feeling of anarchy. In this environment, it must 
have been difficult for journalists and newspapers to avoid taking strong positions –
because too much is at stake to remain aloof- and being easy targets for violence. 
The higher percentage of anti-CUP papers among the parallel part of the Turkish 
press in this period can be explained by the disappointment in CUP rule following initial 
enthusiasm, exacerbated by the CUP‟s failure to stop independence movements around 
the Empire and the extra hardships brought upon the society by WWI. 
4.4. Political Parallelism During the War of Independence (1918-1923) 
Also referred to as the era of National Struggle, the period from 1918 to the 
formation of the Republic in 1923 is in many ways similar to the preceding Second 
Constitutional Period.  
Political parallelism is high, even higher than the previous period, with only 2 of the 
16 major papers having mixed positions, and 14 (87,5 %) having clear pro- or anti-
National Struggle (NS) positions. Like in the previous era, the parallelism of the period is 
also a thick one, with multiple boxes of evidence filled. The number of papers published
58
 
and the number of papers taking “other” political positions –besides being pro- or anti-
national struggle- are also high. 
Table 4.4 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers during the War of Independence 
      Pro-NS Anti-NS Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Ati 6 x
1
 x
2
 x
3
 x
4
                 x
5
       P 
Pro- 
NS 
2 Yenigün 6 x
6
 x
7
 x
8
 x
9
                         P 
3 Akşam 6 x
10
 x
11
 x
12
 x
13
                         P 
4 Vakit 6 x
14
 x
15
 x
16
 x
17
                         P 
5 Tanin 5 x
18
 x
19
   x
20
                 x
21
       P 
6 Tasvir-i Efkar 6 x
22
 x
23
                             P 
                                                 
58
 Starting with this period, papers published in Ankara are also included in the list. 
Before 1960s, when truly national networks of newspaper distribution were set up, only 
papers published in Istanbul had a national distribution, however delayed. Starting with 
this period, but especially after Ankara was made the capital of the new Republic, 
papers published in Ankara also gained a national character. 
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      Pro-NS Anti-NS Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
7 Payıtaht 6 x
24
                               P 
8 
Tercüman-ı 
Hakikat 5 x
25
 x
26
                             P 
9 
Hakimiyet-i 
Milliye 6   x
27
 x
28
                           P 
10 Sebilürreşad 5 x
29
                           x
30
   P 
11 İkdam 6 x
31
 x
32
             x
33
               PI 
Mixed 
12 
Ceride-i 
Havadis 5                                   
13 
Peyam-ı 
Sabah 6         x
34
 x
35
 x
36
 x
37
         x
38
       A 
Anti- 
NS 
14 Alemdar 6         x
39
 x
40
   x
41
         x
42
 x
43
 x
44
   A 
15 
Türkçe 
İstanbul 5         x
45
 x
46
   x
47
         x
48
   x
49
   A 
16 Serbesti 6               x
50
             x
51
   A 
20 Öğüt 4 x
52
 x
53
                             P   
21 
Hukuk-u 
Beşer 4   x
54
 x2
55
                           PA   
22 Minber 3   x
56
 x
57
                   x
58
   x
59
   A   
23 Hadisat 2   x
60
   x
61
                         A   
24 İstiklal 2 x
62
                         x
63
     A   
25 Zaman 2 x
64
                               A   
26 Memleket 2 x
65
                               A   
27 Tan-2 1 x
66
                       x
67
       A   
28 Tarık 1 x
68
                                   
29 İfham 1 x
69
                       x
70
           
30 
Seyyare-i 
Yeni Dünya 4   x
71
                     x
72
 x
73
 x
74
       
31 İdrak 4                         x
75
   x
76
       
32 Yeni Gazete 3                         x
77
           
33 Emek 3                             x
78
       
34 Şarkın Sesi 2                         x
79
           
35 Tan-1 2                         x
80
   x
81
       
36 Selamet 2                                     
37 Köy Hocası 2                                     
38 Ankara 2                                     
39 Mefkure 2                                     
40 Akvam 2                                     
41 Hakikat 1                                     
42 Yeni İstanbul 1                                     
43 Evkat 1                                     
44 Hikmet 1                                     
45 Söz 1                                     
46 Türk Dünyası 1                                     
47 Vahdet 1                                     
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      Pro-NS Anti-NS Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
48 Yeni Şark 1                                     
49 Yirminci Asır 1                                     
 
Among the parallel part of the press, pro-national struggle papers have a clear 
majority, with 10 papers supporting the movement and 4 opposing. Scholars studying this 
period make further distinctions among the papers based upon their positions towards the 
National Struggle. Koloğlu (1993) describes political alignments in this period as follows: 
“On the one hand, there was the oppositional press of Istanbul and Anatolia, on the other, 
pro-National Forces (Kuva-yi Milliye) papers. Besides these, there was also an Ankara 
press, which was personally directed by Mustafa Kemal and which shaped the future 
Turkey” (p. 12). A similar, tri-partite classification is also made by Ġnuğur (1993) for the 
Anatolian press of the period: “Papers that led the National Struggle, papers that 
supported it, and papers that tried to weaken the National Struggle” (p. 351). A different 
tri-partite classification is made for the Istanbul press of the period by Topuz (2003) and 
Ġnuğur (1993). Topuz (2003) describes the press environment of Istanbul in those days as 
follows: “On the one hand there were supporters of the National Struggle […] On the 
other hand, those who fiercely opposed the National Struggle […] The rest had 
sympathies for the resistance movement in Anatolia” (p. 98). Ġnuğur (1993) describes the 
third group as those who “sometimes support one and sometimes support the other, and 
sometimes express sympathy for the resistance movement in Anatolia too” (p. 344). The 
final categories in these tri-partite classifications (papers that “led” and that “had 
sympathies for” the struggle) were collapsed into the pro-National Struggle category in 
Table 4.4. 
Papers that “led the struggle” in Atatürk‟s “personal direction”, however, deserve 
further emphasis, not least because they draw attention to Ataturk‟s rather strong 
involvement in press and journalism. Being the founder of the Republic and its first 
President, the involvement of such a prominent political figure in the press should have 
implications for press-party parallelism in later periods. 
 
 86 
4.5. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Press 
The story of Ataturk‟s involvement in the press is best told through following the 
roles he assumed in this regard. Ataturk got involved in the press as a student aspirant, as 
a fake journalist, as a newspaper owner, as a columnist, as a distributor, as a manager, as a 
content provider, and finally as a regulator. 
1) Student aspirant: His earliest encounter with active journalism starts in the 
military school. A group of students, in Mustafa Kemal‟s leadership, prepare a hand-
written newspaper to be distributed among the students, and when it is found out, receive 
a mild punishment of verbal warning from the commander of the military school.
59
 Upon 
graduation from school and waiting for their assignments in Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal and 
his friends continue their journalism activity, along with a secret committee they formed, 
but this time they get arrested and stay in jail for a few months. They are let go after the 
commander of the military school, Rıza Pasha gets involved in the case on their behalf.60 
                                                 
59
 Ataturk‟s account of this newspaper, in his own words, is as follows: “Mektep talebesi 
arasında okunmak üzere, mektepte el yazısıyla gazete tesis ettik. Sınıf dahilinde ufak 
teĢkilatımız vardı. Ben idare heyetinde idim. Gazetenin yazılarını çoğunlukla ben 
yazıyordum. [...] Rıza PaĢa‟ya haber vermiĢler sınıfı bastı. Yazılar masa üzerinde ve ön 
tarafta duruyordu. Görmemezliğe geldi. Ancak dersten baĢka Ģeylerle iĢtigal vesilesi ile 
tevkifimizi emretti. Çıkarken yalnız izinsizlikle iktifa olunabilir dedi. Sonra hiçbir ceza 
tatbikatına lüzum olmadığını söylemiĢ.” (“We established a hand-written newspaper to 
be read among the students. We had a small organization at class. I was a member of 
the executive committee, and wrote most of the articles published in the paper. […] 
Someone informed Rıza Pasha about us, and he raided the class. Articles were on the 
table at the front. He pretended he did not see any of them, but ordered that we be 
arrested for being occupied with non-educational activities. As he left the room, he said 
cancelling our vacations would be sufficient. Later, we learnt, he said no punishment 
was necessary.”) (Ġnuğur, 1992, p.15-16, quoted from Hikmet Bayur, Atatürk, p.12) 
60
 Ataturk‟s account of these events is as follows: “YüzbaĢı olarak mektepten çıktıktan 
sonra Ġstanbul‟da geçireceğimiz müddet zarfında bu iĢlerle daha iyi iĢtigal için bir 
arkadaĢ namına bir apartman tuttuk. [...] Bizi tevkif ettiler. [...] Gazete çıkardığımızdan, 
teĢkilat yaptığımızdan, apartmanda çalıĢtığımızdan, hülasa bütün bu iĢlerden dolayı 
maznun bulunuyorduk. Daha evvelki arkadaĢlar itiraflarda bulunmuĢlar. Birkaç ay bizi 
mevkuf tuttuktan sonra bıraktılar. Serbest bırakılmamızın Rıza PaĢa‟nın mesaisi 
neticesinde olduğunu kendisi söyledi.” (“When we graduated from the military school 
as captains, we rented an apartment for one of our friends during our stay in Istanbul, to 
be able to take better care of these activities. […] They arrested us. […] We were 
suspect for publishing a newspaper, establishing an organization, working out of an 
apartment, in sum for all of these activities. Some of our friends had made some 
confessions. They kept us in jail for a couple of months and then let go. Rıza Pasha later 
told us himself that we were let go thanks to his efforts.”) (Kasım, 1999).  
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2) Fake journalist: In 1912, when Mustafa Kemal went to Libya to help organize 
the resistance against the Italians, he used the fake identity of journalist ġerif Bey 
(Baykal, 1990, p.323). 
3) Newspaper owner: In 1918, Mustafa Kemal returned to Istanbul from the front in 
Syria, and for a while, did not have an active military duty. In these days, he provided the 
capital for the newspaper Minber, formally owned by his friend Fethi Okyar, withdrawing 
his savings that were invested in pearl trade (Topuz, 2003, p. 117; Ġnuğur, 1992, p. 19). 
The paper was a failure in financial terms, and closed within two months. 
4) Columnist: According to Ġnuğur (1992, p. 20) many unsigned editorials of 
Minber were written by Mustafa Kemal. Mustafa Kemal also wrote editorials for İrade-i 
Milliye amd Hakimiyet-i Milliye, organs of the national struggle in Anatolia, and a series 
of columns in Kurun (Vakit) in 1937, on the then unresolved issue of Hatay, under the 
signature of the paper‟s leader writer, Asım Us (Topuz, 2003, p. 165).  
5) Distributor: According to Koloğlu (1993), one of the first things Ataturk did in 
Anatolia, within the seven months of his landing in Samsun, was to capture and control 
the network of newspaper distribution (p. 22). 
6) Manager: Mustafa Kemal was practically the manager of the papers İrade-i 
Milliye and Hakimiyet-i Milliye, organs of the Society for the Defense of Rights of 
Anatolia and Rumelia, as the president of the „representative committee‟. He personally 
chose the names and the personnel of the papers, gave detailed editorial orders (like no 
bylines in İrade-i Milliye), and referred to Hakimiyet-i Milliye as “my newspaper” in later 
accounts (Ġnuğur, 1992, p. 23-24, 26).  
7) Content provider: Anadolu Agency (AA) was founded during the early days of 
the War of Independence, in 1920, by Mustafa Kemal‟s order (Ġnuğur, 1992, p. 28), to 
feed the pro-resistance papers and local resistance groups around the country with news 
on the activities and official views of the leadership of national struggle. 
8) Regulator: After the first GNA was assembled and the government formed, the 
efforts of the leadership regarding press moved beyond providing content to regulating 
activity, and a General Directorate for Press and Communication (Matbuat ve Ġstihbarat 
Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi) was founded on 7 June 1920. Anadolu Agency was also to work 
under this directorate. Responding to a question asked in the Parliament on whether the 
Directorate does its job properly, Mustafa Kemal gave the following answer: “All the 
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newspapers were given detailed orders on which line to follow, and inspected. […] Only 
one paper did not follow the orders.”61 (Koloğlu, 1993, p. 36) 
Getting involved in press and journalism at so many levels and in so many roles, 
Mustafa Kemal was, it seems, a journalist-cum-politician as much as he was a soldier-
cum-politician. This should have some consequences for the following periods, most 
probably as a factor pulling towards more, instead of less, parallelism. 
 
4.6. Political Parallelism in the Early Republican Era (1923-1931) 
The boundaries of this era, unlike earlier ones, are not self-evident. Some scholars 
choose Ataturk‟s death as the natural ending point for this period (Oral, 1968), some 
cover the whole 1923-1945 period as the period of Republican reforms (Koloğlu, 1992), 
and some examine 1923-1927 as a prelude to the following one-party regime (Zürcher, 
2004). The year 1930 is also taken as a turning point in some treatments (Berberoglu, 
1992), taking economic criteria into account, with the state getting more involved in the 
economy in 1930s.  
Because my concern in this study is to homogenize periods in terms of political 
fault lines and positions taken in the press, I chose 1931 as the ending point of this period. 
Before 1931, the new regime had to deal with two major waves of opposition, one formed 
around the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) in 1924-1925, the other around the 
controlled experiment of Free Republican Party (SCF) in 1930. After SCF‟s closure 
towards the end of 1930, no such opposition is observed. 1931 is also an important year 
for the press: 1931 press law is the first major legislative activity in the TGNA concerning 
press. Until that time, the press law of 1909, amended many times, was in effect (Ġnuğur, 
1992, p.105). The most important article of the 1931 press law was the one that gave the 
government the authority to “temporarily suspend” the publication of papers that damage 
                                                 
61
 The quote, in Turkish, is as follows: “Bütün gazetelere ne yolda kalem kullanacaklarına 
iliĢkin tarafımızdan yönerge verilmiĢtir ve izlenmiĢtir. [...] Buna yalnız uymayan bir 
gazete olmuĢtur.” The question was asked in the Assembly session on 26 September 
1920. (Koloğlu, 1993, p. 36) 
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“the general policy of the country” (Ġnuğur, 1992, p. 105; Topuz, 2003, p. 159), which, in 
effect, meant that the government could close down any paper because of the vagueness 
of the wording and because no upper limit was defined for “temporary suspension” 
(Güvenir, 1991). 
In the early Republican period from 1923 to 1931, the upward trend in parallelism 
continued, with only 1 of the 15 major papers having a mixed position, and 14 (93 %) 
having clear pro- or anti-government positions. The parallelism of the era is also a thick 
one, with multiple boxes of evidence for political positions taken filled. Unlike in the 
earlier period, however, there is a significant decrease in the number of papers published, 
and in the number of papers with “other” political positions. The political conflict in the 
country, it seems, is simplified and positions taken towards the new regime became 
primary, marginalizing other political positions. 
 
 
Table 4.5 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Early Republican Era 
      Pro-Gov't Anti-Gov't Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Vakit 6 x
1
 x
2
 x
3
                           P 
Pro- 
Gov't 
2 Akşam 6 x
4
 x
5
 x
6
                           P 
3 Milliyet  6 x
7
 x
8
 x
9
                           P 
4 Cumhuriyet 6 x
10
   x
11
                           P 
5 Son Saat 5 x
12
                               P 
6 İleri 6     x
13
                           P 
7 Hakimiyet-i Milliye 6     x
14
                           P 
8 İkdam 6     x
15
     x
16
   x
17
                 PA Mixed 
9 Tanin 6         x
18
 x
19
 x
20
 x
21
                 A 
Anti- 
Gov't 
10 Vatan 6         x
22
 x
23
 x
24
 x
25
                 A 
11 Tevhid-i Efkar 6         x
26
 x
27
 x
28
 x
29
                 A 
12 Sebilürreşat 5         x
30
   x
31
 x
32
                 A 
13 Son Telgraf 6         x
33
     x
34
                 A 
14 Yarın 6         x
35
   x
36
 x
37
         x
38
       A 
15 Son Posta 5         x
39
                       A 
16 İnkılap-1 4 x
40
 x
41
 x
42
                           P   
17 İstiklal 4               x
43
                 PA   
18 Aydınlık 3               x
44
                 A   
19 Orak-Çekiç 2               x
45
         x
46
       A   
20 
Tercüman-ı 
Hakikat 4                                 A   
21 İnkılap-2 1                                 A   
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      Pro-Gov't Anti-Gov't Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
22 Yeni Türkiye 1                                 A   
23 Yeni Ses 1                                 A   
24 Ekonomi 1                                     
25 Ankara Gazetesi 1                                     
26 Hergün 1                                     
27 Hür Gazete 1                                     
28 Hür Adam 1                                     
 
In the parallel part of the press, again unlike in the earlier period, there is a perfect 
balance: 7 papers oppose the new regime, and 7 support it. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that few of the opposition papers made it to the chronological limit of 1931, 
many being closed down by the government for their publications or owners‟ and 
journalists‟ political activities (See notes for Table 4.5). 
4.7. Political Parallelism in One-Party Era (1931-1946) 
Compared to the Early Republican Era, political parallelism in 1931-1946 period is 
both lower -9 out of 13 papers (62 %) have clear pro- or anti-government positions-, and 
thinner. Following three continuous periods of high political parallelism in the Second 
Constitutional Period, War of Independence and the Early Republican Era, parallelism in 
this period is at moderate levels again, close to where it started before the proclamation of 
the First Constitution. That these three periods were times of intense and sometimes 
violent political conflict probably explains the high levels of parallelism seen from 1908 
to 1931. These years saw the Balkan Wars, WWI, War of Independence, constitutional 
monarchy replacing Abdulhamid‟s rule and then turning into some sort of a military rule 
in the hands of CUP strongmen, followed by anarchy during the War of Independence, 
and the foundation of the Republic with a radical reform program that had to overcome 
much fierce resistance. Newspapers and journalists were not cool observers of these 
events, but active participants in them, taking strong political positions and aligning with 
political parties, and –when parties were not present- with other political forces. 
Table 4.6 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in One-Party Era 
      Pro-Gov't Anti-Gov't Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
 91 
      Pro-Gov't Anti-Gov't Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Vakit 6 x
1
 x
2
 x
3
                           P 
Pro- 
Gov't 
2 Ulus 6 x
4
   x
5
                           P 
3 Tanin 6 x
6
   x
7
                   x
8
   x
9
   P 
4 İkdam 6 x
10
                               P 
5 Cumhuriyet 6 x
11
   x
12
         x
13
         x
14
 x
15
     PA 
Mixed 
6 Akşam 6     x
16
         x
17
         x
18
       PA 
7 Tasvir-i Efkar 6                         x
19
   x
20
     
8 Yeni Sabah 5                             x
21
     
9 Tan 6         x
22
 x
23
   x
24
         x
25
   x
26
   A 
Anti- 
Gov't 
10 Yarın 6         x
27
     x
28
                 A 
11 Vatan 6         x
29
   x
30
           x
31
       A 
12 Son Posta 5               x
32
         x
33
       A 
15 Zaman 5               x
34
                 A 
16 Bugün 3 x
35
                               P   
17 Yurd 1     x
36
                           PA   
18 Akın 4           x
37
                     A   
19 Hergün 4                                 A   
20 Haber 3                                 A   
21 Yılmaz 2                                 A   
22 İnkılap 1                                 A   
23 Çankaya 1                                 A   
28 Ankara Haftası 1                                     
 
The decrease in the political nature of the press in this period is observed by other 
authors too. According to Ġnuğur (1992), between 1931 and 1938, “newspapers started to 
emphasize non-political issues” like “tabloid news, fiction, short stories and foreign 
news” (p.162). Wrestlers‟ stories were another peculiarity of this period, which, Ġnuğur 
(1992) notes, appeared in almost all newspapers. Ġnuğur (1993) explains this trend by 
reference to the restrictive press environment of the period, instituted by the press law of 
1931 against the background of armed opposition to the regime between 1925 and 1930, 
with Sheikh Said Rebellion, the attempt on Ataurk‟s life in Ġzmir, and the infamous 
Menemen incident. In a similar account, Koloğlu (1993) observes that “The brakes on 
politics encouraged papers to cover other issues. The place reserved for movies, sports, 
and interesting events from around the world increased. […] Reading the pre-1939 
papers, one can easily get the feeling of a happy and peaceful Turkey. […] Everybody 
knew that everything was not perfect, that especially the peasants lived under dire 
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economic conditions, but the regime of that time did not want to hear such criticisms” 
(p.77). 
In the parallel part of the press, the balance between pro- and anti-government 
papers roughly remained in place, with 5 papers in the opposition against 4 pro-
government papers. The number of papers published also remained low, with a slight 
decrease.  
Most of the oppositional content in this period is seen towards the end of the period, 
during the WWII years. The increase in the number of papers with other political 
positions is also a side effect of the WWII, with some papers supporting Germany and 
others supporting the Allies.  
WWII years and its immediate aftermath form a most interesting period in Turkish 
press history,
62
 demonstrating the efforts of a one-party regime to keep the newspapers in 
line, the different foreign policy preferences of newspapers, and the way these preferences 
are connected to their positions towards the one-party regime. Oppositional papers 
generally supported the Allies, which they referred to as the pro-democracy alliance, with 
the hope that if the Allies won, the one-party regime would have to loosen its grip on the 
opposition and take further steps towards democratization. When the Allies did win, 
opposition papers Tan and Vatan used this to make the case that Turkey needed to 
become a multi-party democracy to take its proper place in the new international order 
being formed. Against such arguments, Falih Rıfkı Atay, the leader writer of the CHP 
party paper Ulus, argued that the war was not won by democracies against one-party 
regimes –since one of the Allies, USSR, was also a one-party-regime- and that democracy 
was possible in a one-party regime too (Atay, as cited in Gürkan, 1998, p.165). 
The pro-government papers‟ position in WWII, on the other hand, was shaped, 
more than anything else, by the government‟s concern to stay out of the war, and swung 
from a pro-Ally position in the beginning of the war, to a pro-Germany attitude when the 
Nazis seemed to be winning, and then back to the pro-Ally position at the end of the war, 
in line with the government‟s maneuvers to keep Turkey out of the war (Güvenir, 1991). 
4.8. Political Parallelism in Transition to Democracy (1946-1950) 
                                                 
62
 Two great sources on this period are Güvenir (1991) and Gürkan (1998). 
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In some respects, the period between 1946-1950 is a continuation of the preceding 
one-party period. The same party that ruled the country since the foundation of the 
Republic remained in power (alternation in government was not achieved), and more 
important than that, there are serious doubts about the “free and fair” character of the 
1946 elections, which is the reason why many authors start the multi-party era with 1950 
elections. In other respects, the period between 1946-1950 is part of the multi-party era. 
First of all, elections were held in which more than parties participated, meaning the CHP 
had to tolerate first the idea then the practice of a second party; and what is more 
demonstrative of the presence of a race, the CHP has made some very major policy 
changes in this period, including but not limited to liberalizing the press regime on the eve 
of the 1946 elections and opening training courses for prayer leaders before the 1950 
elections, moves that were clearly aimed at winning more votes. For these reasons, it is 
best to treat the years between 1946 and 1950 as a separate, transitional period. This 
decision is also supported by our concern to homogenize periods in terms of their political 
parallelism characteristics. Political parallelism in this era is in many respects different 
from both pre-1946 and post-1950 periods. 
The downward trend in parallelism continues, as can be seen in Table 4.7, with 8 of 
the 16 major papers having mixed positions, and 8 (50%) having clear pro-CHP or pro-
DP positions. This makes the parallelism of the era a moderate one, similar to the 
preceding one-party period. Again similar to the one-party period, parallelism is also thin, 
with few papers having multiple boxes of evidence filled. There is a slight increase in the 
number of papers published, from 13 to 16 major papers. 
Table 4.7 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in Transition to Democracy 
      Pro-CHP Pro-DP Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Vakit 6 x
1
 x
2
 x
3
                           C 
Pro- 
CHP 2 Ulus 6 x
4
   x
5
                           C 
3 Tanin 6 x
6
 x
7
                             C 
4 Akşam 6 x
8
   x
9
   x
10
       x
11
               CDI 
M
ix
e
d
 
5 Milliyet 6                                   
6 Hergün 5                         x
12
         
7 Son Telgraf 5                                   
8 Yeni İstanbul 5                                   
9 Tan 6                         x
13
         
10 Yeni Sabah 6         x
14
     x
15
   x
16
     x
17
   x
18
   DI 
11 Hürriyet 6         x
19
       x
20
 x
21
             DI 
 94 
      Pro-CHP Pro-DP Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
12 Vatan 6         x
22
 x
23
 x
24
                   D 
Pro- 
DP 
13 Cumhuriyet 6         x
25
   x
26
                   D 
14 Tasvir 6         x
27
               x
28
       D 
15 Son Posta 5         x
29
                       D 
16 Zafer 5         x
30
                       D 
17 Memleket 1     x
31
                           P   
18 Zaman 1     x
32
                           PA   
19 Kudret 3         x
33
     x
34
         x
35
   x
36
   A   
20 Yeni Çağ 1         x
37
               x
38
       A   
21 Demokrasi 1         x
39
                       A   
22 Demirkırat 1             x
40
                   A   
23 Gerçek 2                         x
41
     x
42
 A   
24 Tek Dünya 1                         x
43
       A   
25 Barış 1                         x
44
           
26 Yaprak 1                         x
45
           
27 
Yurtta 
Kalkınma 1                         x
46
           
28 Nuhun Gemisi 1                         x
47
           
29 Beşer 1                         x
48
           
30 Son Saat 3                                     
31 Gece Postası 3                                     
32 Yarın 2                                     
33 
Herşey 
Memleket İçin 1                                     
 
Because WWII is over, positions taken towards the warring sides are out of the 
table, leaving few papers with positions other than those towards CHP and DP. The race 
between the party in government and the newly founded opposition party is the main 
political conflict around which the parallelism of the era is defined. Unlike in the one-
party era, opposition to the government is not amorphous, but formed around a political 
party. From this period onwards, we can speak of press-party parallelism proper, instead 
of political parallelism. 
Among the parallel part of the press, pro-DP papers outnumber pro-CHP papers by 
a ratio of 5 to 3. The pro-/anti-government balance of the early Republican era (7:7), 
slightly deformed in favor of the opposition in one-party years (4:5), now seems to be 
even more strongly tilted towards the opposition (3:5). Other authors also note the pro-DP 
press environment of the pre-1950 years. Topuz (2003) quotes Sadun Tanju making the 
following observation: “As time went by, the number of pro-opposition papers increased, 
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which was only natural. For the opposition promised the best of everything in thought and 
in action” (Tanju, as cited in Topuz, 2003, p. 192). It will be interesting to see how this 
picture changes after the 1950 elections, which brought the opposition party to power.  
4.9. Political Parallelism in the Democratic Party Era (1950-1960) 
The press environment of the Democratic Party (DP) era is in many ways different 
from the preceding period. First of all, there is a significant increase in the number of 
papers published, although most of these are minor papers mentioned by a few authors 
only. More significantly, the downward trend in political parallelism is reversed: 10 of the 
15 papers (67 %) have clear pro- or anti-DP positions, meaning parallelism in this era 
became quite high, following two periods of moderate parallelism in one-party and 
transition periods. 
Table 4.8 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in the Democratic Party Era 
      Pro-DP Anti-DP Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Zafer 5 x
1
 x
2
 x
3
 x
4
                         P 
Pro- 
DP 2 Son Posta 5 x
5
 x
6
 x
7
 x
8
                         P 
3 Milliyet 6 x
9
 x
10
 x
11
                   x
12
       P 
4 Yeni Sabah 6     x
13
         x
14
   x
15
             PAI 
Mixed 
5 Dünya 5     x
16
 x
17
 x
18
 x
19
 x
20
 x
21
                 PA 
6 Yeni İstanbul 5                                   
7 Hergün 5                                   
8 Akşam 6         x
22
       x
23
               AI 
9 Ulus 6         x
24
 x
25
 x
26
 x
27
                 A 
Anti- 
DP 
10 Hürriyet 6         x
28
 x
29
 x
30
 x
31
                 A 
11 Cumhuriyet 6 x
32
       x
33
   x
34
 x
35
         x
36
       A 
12 Vatan 6         x
37
 x
38
   x
39
                 A 
13 Son Telgraf 5 x
40
       x
41
 x
42
                     A 
14 Son Havadis 5             x
43
 x
44
         x
45
       A 
15 Vakit 6             x
46
                   A 
16 Haber 2 x
47
 x
48
                             P   
17 Büyük Doğu 2   x
49
 x
50
                       x
51
   P   
18 Hür Ses 3 x
52
   x
53
   x
54
   x
55
                   P   
19 Tercüman-2 2 x
56
                               P   
20 Hakimiyet 2 x
57
                               P   
 96 
      Pro-DP Anti-DP Impartial Other 
Overall 
  Newspapers n A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
21 Bugün 1 x
58
                               P   
22 Yeni Cephe 1 x
59
                               P   
23 
İstanbul 
Ekspres 4     x
60
                           P   
24 Medeniyet 4     x
61
                           P   
25 Havadis 2     x
62
                           P   
26 İnkılap 1     x
63
                           P   
27 Türk Sesi 1     x
64
                           P   
28 Halkçı 4         x
65
 x
66
 x
67
 x
68
                 A   
29 Yeni Gün 2           x
69
 x
70
           x
71
       A   
30 Kudret 3         x
72
               x
73
       A   
31 Tercüman-1 4     x
74
       x
75
                   A   
32 Pazar Postası 1             x
76
           x
77
       A   
33 Kervan 2               x
78
                 A   
34 Son Saat 3                                     
35 Hür Vatan 2                                     
36 Akın 2                                     
37 Ankara Ticaret 1                                     
38 Hizmet 1                                     
39 Millet 1                                     
40 Merhaba 1                                     
 
Again unlike in the one-party and transition periods, parallelism in 1950s is thick 
with multiple pieces of evidence pointing towards the political positions taken. Two 
papers in the pro-DP camp, Zafer and Son Posta, have all four boxes filled, meaning they 
had organizational connections with DP, pro-DP content, faced legal action showing their 
pro-DP position (their managers and columnists were prosecuted after the 1960 coup), 
and were considered to be pro-DP papers by the authors covering the period. Similarly, 
two papers in the anti-DP camp, Ulus and Hürriyet, had four boxes filled: they had 
organizational connections with the opposition, anti-DP content, faced legal action 
showing their anti-DP position (Hürriyet was sued by the foreign minister of the DP 
government, and Ulus‟s publication was suspended for two months after the Pulliam trials 
– see notes for Table 4.8 for more on Pulliam trials), and they were considered to be anti-
DP by the authors covering this period. 
The most important difference with the pre-1950 period, however, is the reversal in 
the positions of formerly pro-DP papers. Vatan, Cumhuriyet, Son Telgraf, and Tercüman-
1 shifted from a pro-DP position to an anti-DP one towards the middle of the decade. The 
shift is most dramatic in Vatan‟s case, which was the paper that published DP founders‟ 
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articles even before the party was founded, and whose owner, Ahmet Emin Yalman, was 
a personal friend and political advisor to the leaders of the DP in opposition. Once the 
honeymoon between the press and the DP was over, Vatan became one of the fiercest 
critics of the DP rule, and Yalman faced prosecution in old age, being jailed in March 
1960 when he was 72, for publishing the translation of American journalist Eugene 
Pulliam‟s articles, originally published in US newspapers, criticizing the DP government. 
After the reversals,
 63
 the balance between pro- and anti-DP papers was 3 to 7, with DP 
facing an even harsher press environment than what the CHP faced in pre-1950 years.
64
 
4.10. Political Parallelism in 1960s, Beginnings of Class Politics (1961-1970) 
A common observation regarding the press environment in the post-coup period is 
that it had a pluralist character, in the sense that “each and every left or right fraction had 
its own publication” (Koloğlu, 1993, p. 105). Not only was it possible to divide papers 
into left and right camps, but divisions and differences within these camps were reflected 
in the press scene as well, although this applied more to the magazine press than to 
newspapers.  Topuz (2003) observes that in this period, “every color, every tendency 
within the left was represented in the press” (p. 238), and Kabacalı (2000) notes that 
“many magazines representing views from the farthest right to the farthest left end of the 
political spectrum were published” (p. 229). The phenomenon might be expected to be 
reflected among national dailies as well, in the form of being associated with the general 
political tendencies of left and right, if not with specific left or right fractions.  
Table 4.9 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1960s   
                                                 
63
 Positions prior to reversals are shown in Table 8 with thick borders around the evidence 
box. 
64
 At least this is the case when we focus upon the major papers that are mentioned by 
most of the authors. Among the minor papers whose positions we know, pro-DP papers 
outnumber anti-DP ones by a ratio of 2 to 1 (12 vs. 6). However, there are seven minor 
papers whose positions we do not know, which could tip the balance the other way, 
which is the reason minor papers are not included in the analyses in the first place. 
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n
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%
 C
ir
c
u
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ti
o
n
 (
1
9
6
5
-7
0
) 
"Right"  "Left"  Impartial Other 
O
v
e
ra
ll 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
T
it
le
s
 
C
ir
c
u
la
ti
o
n
 s
h
a
re
 (
%
) 
  Newspapers A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Tercüman 5 13,4 x
1
 x
2
       x
3
        R 
R
ig
h
t 
6
/1
5
  
(%
4
0
) 
2
3
,9
 
2 
Son 
Havadis 5 3,6 x
4
 x
5
               
R 
3 
Yeni 
İstanbul 4 3,1 x
6
                
R 
4 Zafer 4 0,5 x
7
                R 
5 Adalet 1 1,4 x
8
                R 
6 Bugün-1 1 1,3 x
9
            x
10
    R 
7 Hürriyet 5 38,2         x
11
        I 
M
ix
e
d
 
3
/1
5
 
(%
2
0
) 
3
9
,9
 
8 Yeni Sabah 5  -                 I 
9 Dünya 4 1,1                 I 
10 Milliyet 5 13,4      x
12
       x
13
    L 
L
e
ft
 
6
/1
5
 (
%
4
0
) 
3
2
,3
 
11 Cumhuriyet 5 8,1      x
14
 x
15
 x
16
     x
17
    L 
12 Akşam 5 7,3   x
18
  x
19
  x
20
    x
21
  x
22
    L 
13 Günaydın 5 2,2     x
23
  x
24
          L 
14 Ulus 5 0,9     x
25
  x
26
          L 
15 Vatan 5 0,4       x
27
          L 
16 
Babıalide  
Sabah 1 0,5 x
28
                       x
29
       R 
   
17 
Bizim  
Anadolu 1 0,1     x
30
                       x
31
   R    
18 
Hakimiyet-i  
Milliye -3 1  - x
32
                               R 
   
19 Haber 3 0,6                  x
33
              I    
20 Kudret 2  -                           x
34
     O    
21 Öncü 2  -                         x
35
       O 
   
22 Tanin 3  -                                   
   
23 Son 2  -                                   
   
24 Bugün-2 1  -                                   
   
25 Hareket 1  -                                   
   
26 İrade 1  -                                   
   
27 Yarın 1  -                                   
   
28 Ekspres 1 0,6                                   
   
29 Yeni Gazete 1 0,4                                   
   
30 Yeni Tanin 1 0,4                                   
   
31 Son Baskı 1 0,2                                   
   
32 
Ankara  
Telgraf 1 0,1                                   
   
33 Hergün   0,6                                   
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  Newspapers A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
34 Son Saat   0,5                                   
   
35 Havadis   0,4                                   
   
36 Medeniyet   0,3                                   
   
37 Hür Anadolu   0,1                                   
   
38 
Ankara  
Ekspres   0,1                                   
   
39 Başkent   0,1                                   
   
40 Tasvir   0,1                                   
   
41 Yeni Gün   0,1                                   
   
“Right”: pro-AP, anti-CHP, right, conservative, nationalist, pro-Islamist, anti-communist 
“Left”: pro-CHP, anti-DP, left. 
* Circulation shares include papers with less than 1 percent circulation share, shown in 
the lower part of the table, as well. 
Note: All daily papers published in Istanbul and Ankara were included in the tables up to 
this period, including the 1960s, for this is the closest approximation we have to the 
definition of “national dailies” prior to 1970s. From 1970s onwards, only papers on which 
BĠK collected circulation information and which were published in Istanbul will be 
included in the tables, for it was the major Istanbul papers that turned truly national. 
 
Indeed, when we look at Table 4.9, we can see that the upward trend in parallelism 
continues, witth 12 of the 15 major papers in this period having left or right positions (80 
%), and only 3 having mixed positions (20 %). The circulation share of these three papers, 
however, is quite high (39,9 %), for the highest circulation newspaper of the period, 
Hürriyet, is among the mixed papers. Compared to the 1950s, however, the parallelism of 
the period is a thin one, with most papers having only one or two boxes filled in Table 
4.9. 
Overall, then, we can say that the press secene in 1960s, including the daily press, 
was crowded with papers associated with left or right, with few mixed titles, but this 
numerical ascendancy was not reflected in circulation shares to the same degree (with as 
much as 40 percent of newspaper readership reading papers classified here as mixed), and 
the associations of national dailies with political currents being not as strong as in the 
earlier period, with few evidence being available pointing towards the positions they take. 
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4.11. Political Parallelism in 1970s, Left-Rigth Polarization (1974-1980) 
In 1970s, a decline is observed in parallelism, both in terms of the number of major 
parallel titles ( 4 out of 7, 57,2 %), and the circulation shares received (46,4 %). When we 
look at the bottom half of Table 4.10, however, a somewhat different picture emerges: we 
can see that many daily newspapers, representing various left and right fractions, continue 
to be published, although they fail to capture significant circulation shares. Many of the 
small circulation newspapers also prove to be short-lived, as few of these titles continue 
publishing into the 1980s. 
Table 4.10 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1970s 
    
%
 C
ir
c
u
la
ti
o
n
 (
1
9
7
4
-7
9
) 
Right Left Impartial Other 
O
v
e
ra
ll 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
T
it
le
s
 
C
ir
c
u
la
ti
o
n
 s
h
a
re
 (
%
)*
 
  Newspapers A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Tercüman 18,7 x
1
 x
2
               R 
R
ig
h
t 
2
/7
 
(%
2
8
,6
) 
2
5
,0
 
2 Son Havadis 
1,1 x
3
 x
4
               R 
3 Hürriyet 28,1         x
5
        I 
M
ix
e
d
 
3
/7
 
(%
4
2
,9
) 
5
0
,8
 
4 Günaydın 21,4         x
6
        I 
5 
Ayrıntılı 
Haber 1,1                   
6 Milliyet 14,2     x
7
 x
8
           L 
L
e
ft
 
2
/7
 
(%
2
8
,6
) 
2
1
,4
 
7 Cumhuriyet 
5,3     x
9
 x
10
 x
11
          L 
8 İstanbul 0,7 x
12
 x
13
                           R    
9 Milli Gazete 0,6 x
14
 x
15
 x
16
                           R    
10 Hergün 0,6 x
17
 x
18
                           R    
11 
Sabah 
(Babıalide 
Sabah - 
D. Ve T. 
Sabah) 0,6 x
19
  x
20
                         R 
   
12 Ortadoğu 0,5 x
21
 x
22
 x
23
                         R    
13 Güneş 0,5  x
24
                             R    
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T
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C
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c
u
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h
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%
)*
 
  Newspapers A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
14 Millet 0,5 x
25
 x
26
                            R    
15 Yeni Asya 0,4 x
27
 x
28
 x
29
                        R    
16 Bayrak 0,3 x
30
 x
31
 x
32
                         R    
17 
Bizim 
Anadolu 0,3     x
33
                          R 
   
18 
Türkiye 
(Hakikat) 0,3 x
34
 x
35
 x
36
                       R 
   
19 Yeni Devir 0,1 x
37
 x
38
 x
39
                        R    
20 Haber 0,2                   x
40
             I    
21 
Ekonomi 
Politika 0,8         x
41
 x
42
                     L 
   
22 Yeni Ortam 0,4         x
43
                       L    
23 Vatan 0,4         x
44
 x
45
                     L    
24 Akşam 0,2             x
46
                   L    
25 Aydınlık 0,2         x
47
                       L    
26 Gün 0,8                                     
27 Dünya 0,6                                     
28 Ekspres 0,2                                     
29 Son Saat 0,2                                     
30 Özgür 0,2                                     
31 Hakimiyet 0,2                                     
32 İstiklal 0,1                                     
33 Zaman 0,1                                     
34 
G. A. 
Son Posta 0,1                                  
   
35 Hürses 0,1                                     
36 Ankara 0,1                                     
37 
Aktüel 
Gazete 0,1                                   
   
* Circulation share totals include papers with than 1 percent circulation share as well, 
shown in the lower part of the table. 
 
Two more points deserve attention concerning the press environment of 1970s. The 
first point is that compared to 60s, there seems to be a polarization towards a small 
number of big papers and a great number of small papers. Only seven papers, indeed, 
have circulation shares above 1 percent, compared to 11 in the 60s, when the circulation 
share distribution was more egalitarian; and 31 papers have circulation shares of less than 
1 percent. The total circulation share of small papers, for the first time, exceeds 10 
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percent. The second point is that more of the small circulation papers have known 
political positions. Of the 31 daily newspapers with circulation shares less than 1 percent, 
18 have known political positions. In the 60s, we had political position information on 
only 3 of the 19 papers with less than 1 percent circulation share. It we were talking about 
a party system, it would be fair to characterize that system as both polarized and 
fractionalized. 
4.12. Political Parallelism in 1980s, ANAP Governments (1983-1991) 
Starting with 1980s, not only “left vs. right” stops being a practical way of 
classifying papers, it also becomes increasingly difficult to capture the political conflict 
with bi-polar schemes. Although I use the pro-ANAP vs. anti-ANAP dichotomy to 
describe the press environment of the period, it should be noted that it has its downsides, 
expressed in the great number of papers with “other” positions in Table 4.11. The 
category of "other" for the first time exceeds pro- anti- and mixed positions, at least in 
terms of the number of papers if not in circulation share.  
Table 4.11 - Political Positions of Turkish Newspapers in 1980s 
    
%
 C
ir
c
u
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ti
o
n
 (
1
9
8
4
-9
0
) 
Pro-ANAP Anti-ANAP Impartial Other 
O
v
e
ra
ll 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
T
it
le
s
 
C
ir
c
u
la
ti
o
n
 s
h
a
re
 (
%
)*
 
  Newspapers A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
1 Sabah 6,3 
x
1
   x
2
   x
3
                       P 
Pro-
ANAP 1
/1
0
 
(%
1
0
) 
6
,3
 
2 Günaydın 11,7 
x
4
    x
5
            x
6
     x
7
       PI 
Mixed 
6
/1
0
 
(%
6
0
) 
7
5
,4
 
3 Güneş 6,2 
    x
8
           x
9
               PI 
4 Hürriyet 26,5 
  x
10
     x
11
 x
12
 x
13
   x
14
       x
15
   x
16
   PI 
5 Tercüman 7,6  x
17
     x
18
               x
19
 x
20
 x
21
   PA 
6 Milliyet 11,5 
x
22
   x
23
   x
24
               x
25
   x
26
   PA 
7 Tan 12,0                                   
8 Cumhuriyet 4,6 
        x
27
 x
28
 x
29
           x
30
 x
31
 x
32
   A 
Anti-
ANAP 1
/1
0
 
(%
1
0
) 
4
,6
 
9 
Türkiye  
(Hakikat) 
5,7 
                        x
33
   x
34
   O 
Other 2
/ 1 0
 ( % 2 0
) 1 1
, 1
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  Newspapers A C O L A C O L A C O L A C O L 
10 Bulvar 3,8 
                            x
35
   O 
11 Milli Gazete 0,64                         x
36
       O     
12 Yeni Nesil 0,31                         x
37
       O     
13 Yeni Devir 0,22                         x
38
   x
39
   O     
14 
Son 
Havadis 
0,19 
                        x
40
       O 
  
  
15 Ortadoğu 0,15                             x
41
   O     
16 
Bizim  
Anadolu 
0,13 
                            x
42
   O     
17 Dünya 0,57 
                                      
18 
Yeni  
İstanbul 
0,33 
                                  
  
  
19 
Ayrıntılı  
Haber 
0,28 
                                  
  
  
20 
Aktüel  
Gazete 
0,28 
                                  
  
  
21 Hürses 0,19 
                                      
22 Özgür 0,2                                       
23 Söz 0,16                                       
24 Millet 0,15                                       
25 Son Saat 0,13                                       
26 İstiklal 0,13                                       
27 Son Telgraf 0,06                                       
28 Ekspres 0,06 
                                      
29 Son Posta 0,04                                       
 
That being said, 1980s emerge as the period with the lowest level of political 
parallelism in the Turkish press throughout the Republican and even the pre-Republican 
eras: 6 out of 10 major papers, with a total circulation share of of 75,4 percent, have 
mixed political positions towards the ANAP governments, remaining impartial or 
combining praise with criticism. Only one major paper is associated with a pro-ANAP 
position, and similarly only one with an anti-ANAP position, and two papers are 
associated with positions that are not captured by the pro- and anti-ANAP dichotomy. All 
in all, 4 major newspapers, representing about 22 percent of the circulation share, can be 
said to have clear political positions paralleling the party system. 
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4.13. Political Parallelism in 1990s, Coalition Governments (1991-2002) 
Being the most recent period, the nature of the information we have about the 
political parallelism characteristics of Turkish newspapers in 1990s is different from the 
earlier periods. It is not only that we have a smaller number of press histories covering the 
period, and plenty of academic articles, but also detailed content analyes of newspaper 
coverages on election eves are available. In addition, the period is a truly multi-party one, 
and it is close to impossible to capture the different political positions using dichotomous 
schemes. Hence, Table 4.12 is different from the previous tables in the following ways: 1- 
Proper party names are used instead of general political currents. 2- Evidence for the 
1995, 1999, and 2002 elections are presented separately from other observations on 
political position. 3- When classifying papers, those that took sides in at least one of the 
elections were taken to constitute the parallel part of the press, and those that did not were 
taken to constitute the non-parallel part, and the level of parallelism calculated 
accordingly. Thus, this table is not directly comparable to the previous ones, but it is my 
best shot at a period-long and system-wide measure of parallelism. 
Parallelism in this period is quite high, with 11 of the 15 major newspapers taking 
sides in at least one of the 1995, 1999, and 2002 elections, which, together with minor 
newspapers that did so, accounted for 86,1 % of the newspaper sales during the period. 
Only 4 of the major newspapers did not take sides in these three elections, accounting for 
a mere 9,4 % of the circulation share, and it is noticeable that all four of these papers are 
tabloid titles. Thus, 1990s emerge as one of the periods with the highest levels of political 
parallelism in the Turkish press, together with the turbulent years of WWI and the War of 
Independence.  
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4. 14. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reviewed political parallelism in the Turkish press from a 
historical perspective. The main contribution of the chapter to the literature stems from 
the collection and re-classification of information already contained in the secondary 
literature, not from original research into archives that would introduce new information. 
Also, circulation shares of the daily newspapers from 1960s to the present, taken from the 
archives of Basın İlan Kurumu (BĠK, Press Advertising Institute), were presented, for the 
first time to the best of my knowledge, to identify major papers in each period. For the 
periods for which reliable circulation information is not available, number of author 
mentions were used as the criterion of being a major paper. To limit the universe of 
sources to be coded, attention was restricted to book-length treatments on the history of 
the Turkish press, with articles and works that cover specific periods being left out.    
Four types of information on individual newspapers were collected (author 
evaluations, content, organization, and legal action), and papers in each period were 
classified into parallel (anti- or pro-government or a specific party) and non-parallel 
categories, based upon an overall evaluation of the evidence collected. This classification 
also served as our measure of overall level of parallelism in the system for the period 
under study. 
The first period, from the publication of the first Turkish newspaper, Takvim-i 
Vakayi in 1831 to the adoption of the First Constitution, was examined in more detail for 
this is where the roots of Turkish journalism lie. It was found that papers published in this 
period belonged more to the world of politics, with heavy state involvement, but  that 
commercial motives were also present. After a start with moderate levels, political 
parallelism declined even further during the era of Abdülhamid II, but increased 
significantly with the Second Constitutional Period, and remaind so throughout the WWI, 
War of Independence, and the Eary Republican Period. After moderate levels of 
parallelism from 1930s to 80s, ANAP governments of the 80s saw the lowest level of 
parallelism, and the 90s saw one of the highest levels. 
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An analysis of these overall trends and an evaluation of the explanations offered in 
the literature are provided in Chapter 6, in comparison with the British case. Before that, 
however, Chapter 5 examines history of political parallelism in the British press. 
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CHAPTER 5 
POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN THE BRITISH PRESS 1945 - 2005 
Hacker: Don't tell me about the press, I know exactly who reads the papers: the Daily 
Mirror is read by people who think they run the country; the Guardian is read by people 
who think they ought to run the country; the Times is read by people who actually do run 
the country; the Daily Mail is read by the wives of the people who run the country; the 
Financial Times is read by people who own the country […] 
Sir Humphrey: Prime Minister, what about the people who read The Sun? 
Bernard: Sun readers don't care who runs the country […] 
From “A Conflict of Interest”, a 1987 episode of the BBC drama Yes, Prime Minister 
 
Unlike in the Turkish case, political parallelism in British press is heavily studied.
65
  
A survey of the general histories of British press, with the aim of extracting and 
presenting the information on political positions of the newspapers would thus add less to 
the literature than the survey for the Turkish press history does. Origins of the British 
newspapers also go back further in time, making it more difficult to do justice to all the 
periods covered, if all periods were to be included. Hence, given limitations of time and 
resources, and the small returns expected, the survey of the political positions of British 
newspapers will be limited to post-war Britain. In this chapter, I present a review of the 
literature on the history of political parallelism in the British press since 1945. First, 
however, two sections on the periodization of post-war British political history and on the 
segmented nature of the British national press are in order, to provide some context. 
 
 
                                                 
65
 A two volume study dedicated to the subject is Stephen E. Koss‟s (1981, 1984) The 
Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain. 
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5.1. Periodization 
1945 is not an arbitrary cut-point in time. It represents an important turning point 
for the British society: Post-war Britain was in many respects different from the pre-war 
Britain, not least because of the „consensus‟ on social welfare policies pursued, which 
affected many areas of life from education to work conditions to the health system.  
Besides the policies followed, 1945 was also a significant cut-point for the structure 
of the political system: The current two-party system with strong single party 
governments has its roots in the immediate post-war years. Until the most recent 2010 
elections, as Hazell et. al. observed, “every election in the postwar era bar one has 
returned a majority for either Labour or the Conservatives (8 times each), with the size of 
the majority ranging from 3 to 179”( p.10). It was “only after the Second World War” that 
“single party majority government bec[a]me the norm” (p. 18). Indeed, from 1900 to 
1945, there were more coalition or minority governments than single-party majority 
governments, and they ruled the country for longer periods (Hazell et. al, p. 18). 
1945 can be treated as a natural cut-point for the press system as well, though to a 
lesser degree than is the case for the political system, for it represents the strengthening of 
certain trends which started earlier: World War I marked the beginning of the dominance 
of the national press over the provincial
66
, but the greatest decline in the number of 
provincial papers was recorded in the post-war period.
67
 “The quality-popular distinction 
was sharply drawn by 1945” (p. 32), but the “polarisation between the quality and popular 
press with the disappearance of the middle-market, middlebrow newspapers” (Williams, 
1998, p.213) was a thing of the post-war years.
68
  Seymour-Ure summarizes the trends in 
                                                 
66
 Seymour-Ure observes that “Before the First World War, a London-based metropolitan 
press had coexisted with a vigorous provincial pres, whose luminaries (Yorkshire Post, 
Manchester Guardian, Scotsman and so on) were not completely overshadowed by the 
London papers in either circulation or editorial authority.” (p. 21) 
67
 “They fell one by one, like apples off a tree, but with the largest loss between 1955 and 
1964.” (Seymour-Ure, 1974, p. 43). 
68
 Kevin Williams (1998) summarizes the trends after war as “the slow decline of the 
British newspaper industry”. The specific trends he mentions are as follows: ” the 
national daily newspapers have strengthened their hold over the industry at the expense 
of the Sunday, provincial daily and local weekly press. Within the national press there 
has been a polarisation between the popular and the quality press with the 
disappearance of the middle-market, middlebrow newspapers. The rise of the tabloid 
newspaper […] the development of a new kind of newspaper - the free sheet […] an 
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the British press in the 1945-1990 period as “concentration, conglomeration and 
internationalization […] These features were not new. […] Far more than before, 
however, and far more substantially […] they stand out as dominant features.” 
In histories of British politics, just as in press histories, different periodizations are 
made regarding the post-war Britain. Some treat the whole 45-79 period as the period of 
consensus,
69
 others start the consensus era with different cut points, some at 51 (Pearce 
and Stewart, 1996), some at 64 (Lynch, 2001). Although the cut points of different 
historical periods are not supposed to be a point of contention and are set partially with 
practical considerations in mind, the researcher at least has the responsibility to define 
these limits and defend them with reference to the purposes of the study. In this regard, 
the following is in order. 
1945, 1979 and 1997 are somewhat natural cut points for a political periodization, 
for they represent, respectively, the starting point of a succession of Conservative and 
Labour governments. The argument is mostly over the period from 1945 to 1979, and 
more specifically, on where the Consensus Era starts and ends. 
Consensus may have two meanings: Consensus on the policies followed, and 
consensus on the policies promised to be followed. If the first meaning is taken, it is true 
that every post-war government until 1979 had a significant social welfare component in 
their policies. From the point of the view of the structure of the party system and the 
nature of the competition between the parties, however, it is the second meaning of 
consensus that matters: consensus on the policies promised to be followed. On that 
account, it is the wiser choice to start the consensus era with the 1955: In the 1945, 1950, 
and 1951 elections, the gap between the Conservative and Labour election manifestos was 
considerably large, as measured by the left-right positions of the parties assigned by the 
CMP (Klingemann at. al., 2006). Although the Conservative Party started to move 
towards the left from 1950 onwards, the gap can only be said to be closed in the 1955 
elections. 
The period 1945 to 1955, then, was one of contention not consensus, at least so far 
as election manifestos were concerned. From 1955 to 1979, the distance between the 
                                                                                                                                               
increasingly competitive environment as newspapers fought for a decreasing number of 
readers […] a further concentration of ownership in the national and regional press.” (p. 
213) 
69
 See Krieger (2010). For two studies that similarly start the consensus era with 1945 but 
end it at 1970 and at mid-70s, respectively, see Studlar (2007) and Hauss (2009). 
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Labour and Conservative Party manifestos remained at relatively low levels, with the 
Conservatives moving significantly to the left of their earlier position in 1950s, and the 
Labour moving somewhat to the center in 1960s. Starting with the October 1974 
elections, but more dramatically with the 1979 elections, the distance between the left-
right scores of the two main parties increased again, with both parties reverting back to 
their earlier positions. This was the case until the 1997 elections. In 1997, it was the 
Labour this time that moved significantly to the opposite direction of its earlier position, 
just like the Conservatives did in 1955, even crossing the 0 line that separates left from 
right positions for the first time in its history. The distance between the two parties 
remained low in the 2001 and 2005 elections too. As of the time of this writing, manifesto 
data were not yet available for the 2010 elections.  
5.2. Segmented Nature of the British National Press 
The national press system in the UK is quite sharply divided into the three segments 
of quality, midmarket, and popular papers. The three segments differ, most significantly, 
in the class backgrounds of their readers, and consequently, in the make-up of their 
revenues, which also has implications for the marketing strategies they employ. Table 5.1 
lists the breakdown of the readership of the three segments of papers into binary class, 
gender, and age categories, taken from National Readership Survey data. As we can see in 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1, it is class that differentiates the most between the readers of the 
three segments, although there are gender and age differences too.  
Table 5.1. Readership Profiles of the Quality, Mid-Market, and Popular Papers 
  Class Age Gender 
  abc1 c2de 15-44 45+ Men Women 
Quality 19,5 2,9 9,0 13,4 12,8 9,6 
Mid-market 15,7 9,1 6,3 18,5 12,3 12,5 
Popular 19,3 33,5 27,5 25,3 29,7 23,1 
sum 54,6 45,4 42,8 57,2 54,7 45,3 
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Figure 5.1. Readership Profiles of the Segments by Class, Age, and Gender 
a. Class                                   b. Age                                      c. Gender 
   
Note: Figures and data based upon National Readership Survey, April 9-March 10, 2010, available at 
http://www.nrs.co.uk.  
Quality:  The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Guardian, The Independent, Financial Times; Mid-Market: 
Daily Mail, Daily Express; Popular: The Sun, Daily Mirror/Record, Daily Star           
 
The different class make-up of the readership of the three segments is also reflected 
in the structure of their revenues and their marketing strategies. Around 20 per cent of the 
revenues of the popular papers come from advertising, as opposed to around 60 percent in 
the case of the quality papers (Sparks, 1999, p. 51). This is because, as Colin Sparks 
(1999) puts  it,  
   Paid-for newspapers, like most advertising-supported media commodities, exist in what is called a 
„dual product market‟. There is one market in which the newspaper sells itself to the consumers. 
From this, it raises circulation revenue. There is, however, a second market in which the newspaper 
sells its readership to advertisers wishing to gain the attention of large numbers of particular kinds of 
people. From this it raises advertising revenue. (p. 51) 
The popular press are under market pressure to try to reach the widest possible audiences,  and thus 
must prioritize the kinds of material  that will sell vast quantities. Quality newspapers are much less 
interested in maximizing circulation, and are concerned to prioritize the kinds of material that will 
sell to particular kinds of people. Indeed, for them, maximizing circulation can be counter-
productive. (p. 53) 
The different strategies are also reflected in the cover prices and advertising rates of 
the newspapers. Table 5.2, reproduced from Sparks (1999), shows the cover prices and 
the cost of advertising for reaching 1000 readers of the ten national dailies, as of 1997. 
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Table 5.2. Cover Prices and Cost of Advertising in National Dailies 
Newspaper 
Cover 
price 
Cost of 
advertising 
Sun 0,25 3,40 
Star 0,28 4,52 
Mirror 0,30 4,30 
Mail 0,35 5,08 
Express 0,35 7,24 
The Times 0,35 9,98 
Telegraph 0,40 15,15 
Independent 0,40 16,15 
Guardian 0,45 12,17 
FT 0,70 46,86 
Note: Reproduced from Sparks (1999, p. 52). Both figures are in pound sterlings. Cost of advertising is per 
1000 readers, for black and white pages. 
 
The quality papers can charge higher advertising rates for their small but wealthier 
audiences and earn most of their income from advertising revenues, whereas the popular 
papers, read mostly by the manual workers, charge lower advertising rates, and earn most 
of their income from circulation revenues. Thus, circulation is a bigger concern for the 
popular papers, whereas retaining the upper class make-up of their readership is a bigger 
concern for the quality papers, even at the expense of having lower circulations. This also 
has implications for the different trends observed in political parallelism characteristics of 
the three segments.   
5.3. Endorsement Parallelism 
In this section, I first review the arguments and the controversies about post-war 
trends in content parallelism in the British press, and then present the endorsement data 
for the parliamentary elections from 1945 to 2005, compiled from secondary sources, 
under four headings: 1- Immediate post-war (1945-1955) 2- Consensus era (1955-1979) 
3- Conservative governments (1979-1997) 4- Labour governments (1997-2010). A 
measure of content parallelism is developed based upon the endorsement data, and an 
effort is made to settle some of the controversies in the literature with regards to the post-
war trends in content parallelism. 
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5.1.1. Post-War Trends: The Literature 
Table 5.3 lists the views on post-war trends in content parallelism in the British 
press. Two points of controversy arise in these views. The first is whether there is a 
uniform post-war trend (from more to less parallelism), or a number of ups and downs. 
The second is whether the immediate post-war period is part of the consensus era or a 
distinct period deserving separate treatment. 
The major sides to the first controversy are Stephen Koss with his two volume 
study on political parallelism in the British press (1981, 1984), and James Curran and 
Jean Seaton with their influential book Power Without Responsibility (1997), which 
includes a chapter on British press history. Koss (1982) argues that “By 1947, the party 
attachments of papers […] were effectively abandoned. […[ newspapers grew steadily 
more catholic and less partisan in their ordinary news coverage. ( p. 4, cited in Curran & 
Seaton, 1997, p. 71). Curran and Seaton (1997) confront this argument head on, which 
they see being “echoed by many other accounts of the post-war press” (p.71), and draw a 
more complicated picture with ups and downs, not a single trend. They argue that the 
power of the interventionist press barons, which is a factor making newspapers more 
partisan, continued in the immediate post-war years, waned in the 60s and early 70s, and 
then “re-asserted” from mid 70s onwards. Together with the general political environment 
of the country, the degree of proprietor control, according to Curran and Seaton, explains 
the degree of partisanship of newspapers as well. In 1960s and 70s, “The devolution of 
authority within newspaper organizations, at a time of broad political consensus, 
encouraged a more bipartisan approach to political reporting and commentary.” Increased 
partisanship from 1974 onwards, on the other hand, coincided with “the re-assertion of 
hierarchical control” in 1970s (p. 77). 
Anthony Weymouth (1996) “echoes” Koss by describing a single trend when he 
argues for “progressive depoliticisation of the national press since 1945” (p. 42); and 
Seymour-Ure (1991, 1995), Tunstall (1995), and Deacon et al. (2001) draw complicated 
pictures with ups and downs, like Curran and Seaton (1997) do.  
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Table 5.3 - Views on Trends in Political Parallelism 
 
Immediate post-war 
(roughly 45-55)  
Consensus era 
(roughly 55-74) 
Increasing 
polarization 
(roughly74-95) 
mid-90s 
onwards 
Tunstall (1995) 
 
high (1945-55, p. 
240) 
low (1955-76, p. 
240) 
high (76 
onwards, p. 240) 
 
Curran&Seaton 
(1997) 
high ("immediate 
post-war", p. 72) 
low ("60s and 
early 70s", p. 72-
3) 
high ("74 
onwards", p. 73) 
- 
Deacon, Golding 
& Billig (2001) 
low ("the first decades after the war", 
cited in Brandenburg, 2006, p. 159) 
high ("70s and 
80s", cited in 
Brandenburg, 
2006, p. 159) 
low ("since 
early 1990s",  
cited in 
Brandenburg, 
2006, p. 159) 
Seymour-Ure 
(1991, 1995, 
1998) 
low ("for 30 years after the war", 1991, 
p. 199) 
high ("the 
Thatcher era", 
1991, p. 201) 
low ("since the 
mid 1990s", 
1998, p. 43,  
cited in 
Brandenburg, 
2006, p. 159) 
Koss (1984) 
low ("by 1947", 1984, p. 4, cited in 
Curran&Seaton, 1997, p. 71) 
- - 
Weymouth 
(1996) 
low ("since 1945", p. 42) - 
 
The second point of controversy, or more accurately point of difference, is among 
the latter group who see multiple trends in the post-war period: whether the immediate 
post-war years are part of the consensus era, or a distinct period deserving separate 
treatment. Tunstall (1995) and Curran and Seaton (1997) prefer to treat the immediate 
post war years as a distinct period, Seymour-Ure (1991, 1995) and Deacon et al. (2001) 
treat them together with the following period. Seymour-Ure (1991) argues that “For 30 
years after the war the trend was away from full-blooded party bias” (p. 198). Similarly, 
Deacon et al. (2001) see the period until 70s as one of decreasing political parallelism in 
the press. On the other side of this controversy, Tunstall (1995) argues that the immediate 
post-war period, from 1945 to 55, needs to be treated separately from “the two decades 
from the arrival of Macmillan in 1957 to the departure of Harold Wilson as Prime 
Minister in 1976” during which press partisanship was comparatively lower than 
immediate post-war years. Similarly, to Curran and Seaton (1997), the immediate post-
war period is different from 60s and early 70s, in that the latter was characterized by “a 
more bipartisan approach to political reporting and commentary” (p. 77). 
 
 117 
5.1.2. Post-War Trends: Endorsement Data 
The overall trends in the level of parallelism, based upon the endorsement data for 
the post-war period, do allow us to take sides in the controversies mentioned above. Table 
5.4 lists political parallelism measures for each period (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.2 on 
how these measures were calculated), based upon the endorsement data given in Table 
5.5. 
Table 5.4. Post-War Trends in Content Parallelism in the UK  
 Period I Period II Period III Period IV 
Quality 0,78 0,44 0,65 0,55 
Mid Market 1,00 0,93 0,92 0,75 
Popular 1,00 0,93 0,83 0,83 
All titles 0,93 0,77 0,80 0,71 
 
Figure 5.2. Post-War Trends in Content Parallelism in the UK 
 
Two points deserve mention when we examine Table 5.4 and Figure 5.2. The first 
is that although there does seem to be a trend from more to less parallelism when we 
compare the overall figures for the first period (0.93) with the most recent final period 
(0.71), the trend is not a uniform one; there are ups and downs. The second point is that 
the ups and downs in the overall figures result mostly from the behavior of the quality 
papers, not the mid-market or popular papers which conform to the picture of a uniform 
declining trend. It seems to be the case that the quality papers, which follow politics more 
closely, are more likely to take tactical positions in line with the changes in the political 
 118 
environment; whereas mid-market and popular papers, as a whole, follow a different 
logic: they grew increasingly less partisan over time. As to the first controversy in the 
literature, then, there seems to be evidence to support both sides, with the proviso that 
they apply to different segments of the newspaper market: Higher levels of parallelism 
and uniform declining trend in the mid-market and popular segments, lower levels of 
parallelism and ups and downs in the quality segment. 
As to the second controversy, the evidence is more conclusive: the data support the 
authors that treat the immediate post-war separately from the following consensus period, 
especially with regard to the quality papers. There is a dramatic decline from 0.78 to 0.44 
from Period I (immediate post war years, 1945-55) to Period II (consensus era, 1955-
1974) in the political parallelism of the quality papers. Mid-market and popular papers 
also display less parallelism in the second period compared to the first, although the 
differences are not quite as dramatic (from 1.00 to 0.93).  
Chapter 6 will provide an assessment of the modernization, commercialization and 
party system characteristics explanations based upon these trends and trends observed in 
the Turkish case. 
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CHAPTER 6 
HISTORICAL TRENDS AND EXPLANATIONS 
Chapters 4 and 5 examined history of press-party parallelism in Turkey and in the 
UK. Although they used different time periods, it is possible to make a parallel reading of  
the historical trends in these two cases and their relationship with the explanations offered 
in the literature. In what follows, levels of parallelism and trends over time in the Turkish 
and British cases will be examined,
70
 and the explanations offered in the literature, 
namely the modernization, commercialization, and party system explanations, will be 
evaluated to see how well they fit these two cases. First, however, a brief account of the 
major differences and similarities between press systems in Turkey and in the UK is in 
order, to provide some context for the the parallel reading. 
Differences between Turkish and British press systems are numerous: 
- First English newspapers emerged in 1600s, one of the earliest in the world, 
whereas the first Turkish newspaper was published in 1830s. 
- Newspaper readership has been historically very high in Britain, and is still so, 
whereas comparatively, it is very low in Turkey. 
- The national press system in the UK has been very stable and closed: Most 
newspapers in the list of UK national dailies boast histories dating back to the 19
th
 
century, and consequently I use practically the same list for all periods under study in the 
British case, with minor changes. The most recent entry to the UK national newspaper 
market is Independent, launched in 1986. In Turkey, the oldest newspaper still in 
publication is Cumhuriyet, launched in 1920s. Next comes Hürriyet, launched in 1948, 
                                                 
70
 Direct comparison of levels of parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, however, is 
postponed to Chapter 7, because data presented in Chapters 4 and 5, being of different 
types, do not allow direct comparison of levels of parallelism. What they do allow is the 
comparison of trends in political parallelism, and this is what the present Chapter does.  
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and Milliyet, launched in 1950. Most of the other papers still in publication date back to 
80s or 90s, with the most recent entry into the Turkish national newspaper market being 
Habertürk, launched in 2009. Consequently, devising lists of Turkish national dailies 
published in different periods is a major task in itself, with many titles appearing and 
disappearing each period.  
Major similarities between Turkish and British press systems are the following: 
- In both cases, a vibrant national press dominates the press scene, with weak 
development of local papers, in contrast to systems where local press is more dominant 
(the US), or where both local and national press is strong (France). 
- In both cases, large-circulation tabloid newspapers exist alongside the quality 
papers. 
With these initial considerations in mind, the following is a parallel reading of the 
trends in the two cases in more detail, with a focus on political parallelism characteristics.  
6.1. Overall Level of Parallelism and Trends  
Looking at Figure 6.1, we observe that political parallelism in the Turkish press fell 
below the 50 percent line only once, during the 80s, and in all other periods, it was higher 
than 50 percent, with an overall average of 68.9 percent for all the periods (see Table 2). 
This places Turkey together with countries that have moderate to high levels of political 
parallelism, between the Mediterranean and North European countries in Hallin and 
Mancini‟s classification. It could be misleading, however, to make an evaluation based 
upon overall figures, for there is significant variance over time in the level of parallelism. 
Parallelism starts at quite moderate levels in the pre-1876 and the First 
Constitutional periods, around 50 to 60 percent of the major papers in these periods 
having clear political positions; then there is a big jump with the Second Constitutional 
Period to 80-90 percent levels of parallelism, which continues until the end of the One-
Party Era, a significant decline starting with the transition to democracy in late 1940s up 
to the 1990s; and another big jump in 1990s from around 30 to 80 percent. This picture 
contradicts the declining trend observed in many other places, or any continuous historical 
trend at all. What we have in this picture, rather, is a number of ruptures and changes in 
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both directions that need to be explained with reference to the specific characteristics of 
the concerned periods, not with reference to a meta-historical narrative. 
Figure 6.1 - Levels of Political Parallelism in the Turkish Press 
 
Political parallelism in the UK followed a different trend (see Figure 5.2). Overall, 
there was a significant decrease, from 93 percent in the immediate post-war period (1945-
1955) to 71 percent in the most recent period (1997-2010), with that percent of national 
titles endorsing single parties on election eves. The individual segments, however, 
behaved differently: There was an overall decrease in parallelism of the mid-market and 
popular papers, and ups and downs in the quality segment that are not captured by any 
single trend. The overall picture, then, was one of a significant decline, accounted for by 
declines in the mid-market and popular papers.  
From a normative point of view, the picture is not perfect in Turkey, but not very 
dark either. Except for the turbulent period of 1908-1946 and the 1990s, the level of 
political parallelism is at moderate levels, varying within 20 percentage points of the 50 
percent level. Deviations from the desired norm, on the other hand, mostly took the form 
of higher, not lower parallelism, except for the 1980s when there was a less then desired 
level of parallelism. In sum, the Turkish press historically had a mild problem of over-
parallelism, advocate outlets being more strongly represented in newsstands than common 
carries were, but the situation got worse during the final years of the Empire and the early 
years of the Republic, and more worryingly, in the recent period of 1990s. 
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In the UK, content parallelism was very high, with most papers endorsing single 
parties on election eves, but this is not necessarily bad from a normative point of view, 
because endorsements are in essence opinion pieces written by the editorial managements 
of newspapers. Although an endorsement-based measure of content parallelism is useful 
for observing trends in parallelism, we would need to consider the news contents of the 
papers as well to make a meaningful normative evaluation, which I do in the following 
chapter for the most recent period.  
6.2. Evaluating Explanations 
In this section, sociological (modernization), economic (commercialization), and 
political (party system characteristics) explanations offered in the literature to account for 
variation in levels of political parallelism, detailed in Chapter 2, will be examined to see 
how well they fit the Turkish and British cases. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present some variables 
associated with these explanations in summary form, separately for the Turkish and 
British cases. 
6.2.1. Modernization 
Explanations relating political parallelism to modernization, positing a continuous 
process of the society getting more and more specialized and the functions of 
communication and politics growing more and more separate as a result, meaning a 
decrease in political parallelism over time, do not apply to the Turkish case. This is not 
only because the downward trend from 1950s onwards ends abruptly in 1990s, but also 
because the beginnings of Turkish journalism in 1830s starts with quite moderate levels 
of political parallelism. The high levels of political parallelism observed between 1908 
and 1946, then, needs to be explained, not with reference to these periods being less 
modernized and the following periods more modernized, but with reference to something 
else. The reason probably lies with the fact this time span was a very turbulent period that 
contained the Balkan Wars, World War I, War of Independence, constitutional monarchy 
replacing Abdulhamid II‟s rule, then turning into some sort of a military rule in the hands 
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of CUP strongmen, followed by anarchy during the War of Independence, and the 
foundation of the Republic with a radical reform program that had to overcome much 
resistance. Because the stakes were very high during these years of intense conflict, 
newspapers and journalists probably stopped being cool observers of the events, and 
turned into being active participants in them, taking strong political positions and aligning 
with political parties, and –when parties were not present- with other political forces. This 
line of an explanation would fit the historical reality of the Turkish case better. 
In the British case, we have fewer periods under study to fully evaluate the 
modernization explanation, but the data we do have for the post-war period show that 
there indeed was a decline in endorsement parallelism, from 93 percent in the period 
between immediate post-war years (1945-1955) to 77 percent in the consensus years 
(1955-1979), and after a slight increase during the Thatcher era (1979-1997), to 71 
percent in the most recent period (1997-2010).  
6.2.2. Commercialization 
We have imperfect evidence to evaluate how well the game theory approach to 
explaining parallelism applies to Turkey and the UK, which argues that when the press is 
commercialized there is less parallelism because individual outlets cannot afford to lose 
big segments of their readers and choose balanced reporting instead of aligning with 
political forces which is sure to alienate some readers. Although there are some 
theoretical arguments advanced in the literature against this explanation (see Chapter 2), 
what we are concerned with here is how well it fits the empirical data for the Turkish and 
British cases.  
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The difficulty of evaluating commercialization explanation partly arises because 
commercialization of the press is not easy to measure. We can use circulation numbers 
(higher circulations, higher commercialization), cover prices of newspapers (lower prices, 
higher commercialization), or advertising spending on newspapers as a percentage of 
GDP (higher spending, higher commercialization) as proxy measures of 
commercialization, and they would probably be of use in cross-sectional comparisons. 
For over-time comparisons, however, there is confounding factor of the introduction of 
TV, which caused declines in standardized circulation numbers and advertising shares of 
newspapers. For example, total sales figures are increasing in absolute numbers but 
decreasing as a percentage of the population in both cases, but it is impossible to separate 
the effect of the introduction of television from these figures. In other words, the 
newspapers may have become more, not less, commercialized despite the declining levels 
of newspaper readership. 
What we do have, however, is information about the general character of and 
dominant players in the economies of the two countries in the different historical periods. 
If the newspapers‟ finances can be argued to have been affected by the general character 
of the economy and the economic policies pursued by the governments, then we have an 
indicator, however imperfect, of the level of commercialization in the press: The level of 
state involvement. The press is commercialized to the degree market forces shape the 
economy, and less commercialized when state is the dominant actor shaping the 
economy.  
When we look at the parallelism data in this light (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2), we see 
that on average, parallelism was higher in Turkey in periods when market forces were 
more dominant, which seems to contradict the game theory explanation put forward. 
Although parallelism took the biggest dive (from 51.8 to 31.0, going below the 50 percent 
line for the first time) in the 1980s, which corresponds with the biggest jump from state- 
to market-led economy following the so called 24
th
 of January decisions, it increased to 
80 percent in 1990s, a period still characterized by market forces, not by state 
intervention.
71
 The British case, on the othetr hand, fits the commercialization 
explanation: Although there was a slight increase from 0,77 in Period II (55-79) to 0,80 in 
                                                 
71
 There is also a context-specific explanation for the dive in 1980s: In many accounts, the 
1980s are seen as a period of de-politicization in the society as a whole, following the 
highly politicized environment of 1960s and 1970s and also as a result of a conscious 
effort on the part of the military regime.  
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Period III (79-97), a period of privatization and less state intervention in the economy, 
average parallelism was lower (around 0,75) in market-dominated than in state-dominated 
(around 0,85) periods. Thus, the game theory explanation positing a decline in parallelism 
with commercialization is supported by data from the UK, but it is not supported by data 
from Turkey. In any case, it must be kept in mind that the measure of commercialization I 
used was a rather rudimentary one. 
6.2.3. Party-System Characteristics 
Four party system characteristics will be evaluated to see how well the hypotheses 
that use them fit the Turkish and British cases. The hypotheses are those offered by 
Seymour-Ure (1974), and Hallin and Mancini (2004), relating the number of parties, the 
level of ideological polarization, the type of government (single-party vs. 
coalition/minority), and the strength of cleavage voting to political parallelism. (See 
Chapter 2 for details on these hypotheses.) 
6.2.3.1. Number of parties 
Seymour-Ure expects one-party systems to have the highest level of parallelism, 
followed by multi-party systems, and the two party systems to have the lowest level of 
parallelism. When we look at Table 6.1, we see that this expectation does not fit the 
Turkish case well. The average levels of parallelism for the one-party, multi-party, and 
two-party periods are 89.0, 57.7, and 64.6, respectively. It is true that the one-party 
periods have the highest level of parallelism, but the ordering between multi-party and 
two-party systems is reversed: In the Turkish case, multi-party periods, on average, 
display a lower level of parallelism than the two-party periods.
72
  
In the British case, all four periods are basically two-party periods, however, the 
two-partiness of the system, defined as the total vote share of the largest two parties, 
                                                 
72
 Although it can be argued that the exceptionally low level of parallelism in the 1980s, 
which can be considered to be an outlier, plays an important role in the average being 
lower, the results do not change much when we recalculate the average ignoring the 
1980s: The new average for the multi-party periods then becomes 66,5, which is not 
significantly higher than the figure for the two-party periods. 
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declines over time, from 94 percent in the immediate post-war period, to 70 percent in the 
most recent period (See Table 6.2). The highest level of content parallelism was observed 
in the period when two-partyness of the system was also at its highest, and the lowest 
level of parallelism was observed when the two partyness of the system was also at its 
lowest, just the opposite of what is expected: Seymour-Ure‟s (1974) expectation was that 
two-party systems would have the lowest level of political parallelism. Considering the 
Turkish and British cases together, we can say that the number of parties does not have 
the hypothesized relationship with parallelism in either of the cases. 
6.2.3.2. Ideological polarization 
The expectation that ideological polarization would be associated with higher levels 
of political parallelism is shared by Seymour-Ure (1974) and Hallin and Mancini (2004). 
Looking at Table 6.1, we observe that this indeed is the case in Turkey, with the polarized 
periods of 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s having a higher level of parallelism on average (66.5) 
than the moderate periods of transition to democracy, 1950s, and the 1980s (53.4).
73
  
In the British case, we have a more quantitative measure of polarization, based upon 
the coding of relative emphases placed upon left and right issue areas in party election 
manifestos. Although the most ideologically polarized period, 1979-1997, is not the 
period with the highest level of political parallelism, the least ideologically polarized 
period, 1997-2010, is the period with the lowest level of political parallelism. What is 
more, the direction of change in all periods is the same in both the level of polarization 
and the level of political parallelism: the decreases in ideological polarization from Period 
I to II and from Period III to IV are reflected in the level of political parallelism as well. 
Similarly, the increase in polarization from Period II to III is reflected in the level of 
political parallelism as well. Considering the Turkish and the British cases together, we 
can say that ideological polarization does have the hypothesized relationship with the 
level of political parallelism in press. 
 
                                                 
73
 If we were to include the war years (Second Constitutional Period and War of 
Independence) as polarized periods, the difference would be even larger but I have 
avoided the urge because the hypotheses are couched in party-political terms. 
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6.2.3.3. Government Type 
There is no specific hypothesis linking government type to the level of parallelism, 
but Hallin and Mancini associate majoritarian systems with low levels of parallelism and 
consensus systems with high levels of parallelism, following the classification made by 
Arend Lijphart. Although consensus and majoritarian systems are differentiated over a 
number of variables, like the number of parties, the electoral system, the structure of 
interest groups, etc., one of the most important variables is the type of government. 
Majoritarian systems mostly have single party governments with large majorities in the 
parliament, and consensus systems usually have coalition governments with no single 
party having a large enough majority to form a government by itself.  
Looking at Table 6.1, we can see that this expectation fits the Turkish case as well. 
On average, periods with single party governments have lower levels of parallelism (53.4) 
than periods with coalition governments (65.8). In the British case, single-party majority 
governments were the norm in all periods, with brief interludes of minority or coalition 
governments in Periods II and III.
74
 In Period II, following the February 1974 elections, a 
Labour minority government took office (first minority government in the post-war 
period) which lasted less than a year. Following the October 1974 elections, Labour had a 
lead of 3 seats and formed a majority government, but this lead was lost in 1976, and the  
Labour government was forced to seek the support of the Liberals to survive, which 
resulted in 1977 in the so-called Lib-Lab pact, which is the closest approximation to a 
coalition in the post-war period. Finally, in Period III, the last few months of the Major 
government was a minority government. Thus, as opposed to Periods I and IV, which saw 
only single-party majority governments, brief interludes of minority and coalition 
governments were experienced Periods II and III, more so in the former.  
Periods I and IV, which saw only single party majority governments, have, 
respectively, the highest and the lowest political parallelism levels. Thus, the 
hypothesized relationship between the type of government and level of political 
parallelism, which was observed in the Turkish case, is not observed in the British case. 
Overall, then, our evaluation of the government type hypothesis remains inconclusive. 
                                                 
74
 The following is based upon Hazell & Paun, 2009. 
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6.2.3.4. Cleavage Voting 
Although cleavage voting is related to political parallelism explicitly only in Van 
Kempen‟s study on Sweden, Seymour-Ure‟s and Hallin and Mancini‟s hypotheses about 
„naturally developing parties‟ and „organized pluralism‟ can be studied using the cleavage 
voting variable. Both of these terms refer to a situation in which social groupings and 
political groupings overlap to a significant degree, or from the point of view of the 
individual, membership in social groups is a strong determinant of one‟s political views 
and behavior, which is exactly what the notion of cleavage voting tries to capture.  
Direct measurement of cleavage voting requires survey data. However, in the 
absence of survey data for earlier periods, other measures have also been used in the 
literature as indicators of cleavage voting. Two such indicators are electoral volatility, 
which captures the net swing of votes between parties, and inter-bloc volatility, which 
captures the net swing of votes between party families. The reasoning behind using 
electoral volatility and inter-bloc volatility as indicators of the strength of cleavage voting 
is as follows: If membership in social groups is an important determinant of vote choice, 
then this should have a stabilizing effect upon the vote shares of political parties, for 
membership in social groups is a long term phenomenon that is not subject to short term 
change. If people kept changing their votes while at the same time remaining members of 
the same social groups, then their membership in these social groups was not an important 
determinant of their vote choices. 
In an important contribution to the literature on the relationship between social 
cleavages and electoral volatility, Yasushi Hazama (2003) argues that social cleavages do 
not always have a stabilizing effect:  
Studies on Western democracies have shown that deep-seated social cleavages 
stabilize the electoral behavior and thus reduce electoral volatility. But how do 
social cleavages affect a party system that is undergoing democratic consolidation, 
such as in Turkey? […] The results showed that in the long term, social cleavages 
on the whole have increased volatility rather than reduced it. The cleavage-volatility 
relationship, however, has changed over time. (p. 362) 
It is this relationship between social cleavages and inter-bloc volatilities that we can use 
as a measure of strength of cleavage voting. The strength of cleavage voting column in 
Table 6.1 is prepared based upon Hazama‟s study, and captures the strength of the 
relationship between social cleavages in Turkey -namely the Sunni religiosity, Kurdish 
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ethnicity and Alevi sectarism- and cleavage type inter-bloc volatilities, calculated using 
provincial level data.  
Looking at Table 6.1, we observe that the two periods with strong cleavage voting, 
1960s and 1990s, have higher levels of parallelism, 68.1 and 79.7 respectively, than the 
period with weak cleavage voting, 1970s with a parallelism level of 51.8. The expectation 
of higher parallelism when cleavage voting is strong is met in the Turkish case. 
In the British case, we can use a more direct measure of cleavage voting because 
survey data are available.
75
 Cleavage voting remained constant at 13 percent in Periods II 
and III, and slightly decreased in Period IV to 11 percent. In periods II and III, content 
parallelism also stayed constant at around 80 percent, and decreased in Period IV to 71 
percent. Thus, cleavage voting and content parallelism do seem to be moving together.  
If we were to make an overall evaluation, the following is in order: Explanations 
based upon commercialization and the number of parties do not fit the evidence in either 
of the cases. Modernization explanation fits the British case and not the Turkish one, and 
government type explanation fits the Turkish case and not the British one. Ideological 
polarization and cleavage voting are the only explanations that fit the evidence in both 
cases. In future studies with more countries, this evaluation can serve as a guideline in 
selecting which variables to focus upon and which to leave out. 
Table 6.3 - How Explanations Offered Fit the Turkish and British Cases 
Explanation Turkey UK 
Modernization  -  + 
Commercialization  -  + 
Party System Characteristics   
     Number of Parties  -  - 
     Ideological Polarization  +  + 
     Government Type  +  - 
     Cleavage Voting  +  + 
 
The evaluation, however, is hampered by the fact that historical trends in the two 
cases were not examined using the same methodology. If we were to study political 
                                                 
75
 Although different measures of cleavage voting are available for the British case, I used 
the easy to interpret method of deviations in vote shares, also used to calculate 
readership parallelism. The figures reported in Table 2 are averages of class (Golthorpe 
5-item class scheme), region (England, Scotland and Wales), and religion (no religion, 
Roman Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, Other) cleavages. See Chapter 5 on the details 
this calculation.. 
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parallelism using the same measure in both cases, comparisons would be more 
meaningful and we could potentially rule out more explanations. The following chapter 
offers a content analysis of the newspaper contents in Turkey and in the UK in the most 
recent period, employing the same methodology in both cases.  
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PART III 
Part III focuses on contemporary political parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, using 
content analysis of newspaper coverages prior to recent elections in the two countries.  
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CHAPTER 7 
POLITICAL PARALLELISM IN NEWSPAPER CONTENT: COMMENT IS 
FREE, BUT FACTS ARE SACRED 
A newspaper is of necessity something of a monopoly, and its first duty is to shun the 
temptations of monopoly. Its primary office is the gathering of news. At the peril of its 
soul it must see that the supply is not tainted. Neither in what it gives, nor in what it does 
not give, nor in the mode of presentation must the unclouded face of truth suffer wrong. 
Comment is free, but facts are sacred. "Propaganda", so called, by this means is hateful. 
The voice of opponents no less than that of friends has a right to be heard. Comment also 
is justly subject to a self-imposed restraint. It is well to be frank; it is even better to be 
fair. 
Charles Prestwich Scott (1921) 
 
 
Which part of a newspaper‟s content reflects the paper‟s position? Is it the “news” 
sections of the papers that we should focus on to examine the political position of a paper, 
or the comment (opinion) sections? Or is it only the “editorial” (leading) articles, 
explicitly attributed to the paper, that define the (official) position of a newspaper? From a 
normative point of view, one that is crystallized most famously in an article by Charles 
Prestwich Scott, Manchester Guardian’s editor from 1872 to 1929, and one that can be 
said to be still relevant today, the answer is clear. If newspapers do have a political 
position, they should reflect it in their opinion content, leaving the news content 
“untainted”; what is more, “Comment also is justly subject to a self-imposed restraint. It 
is well to be frank; it is even better to be fair” (Scott, 1921). 
With these normative considerations in mind, this chapter has one overarching aim: 
to apply a model for detecting differential treatment in newspapers, developed by the 
author building upon the work of others (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003; Gentzkow & 
Shapiro, 2007), to newspaper coverage of 2007 Turkish parliamentary elections and to 
2001, 2005, and 2010 UK parliamentary elections. In so doing, I will be digging further 
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into the content aspect of political parallelism, differentiating more coverage from 
positive coverage, and news parallelism from opinion parallelism. 
The ability to treat parallelism in news and opinion contents separately will also 
allow me to evaluate how well national dailies in Turkey and in the UK perform against 
standards set by Scott (1921). If the newspapers are following Scott‟s advice, we would 
not expect much of a parallelism in news content, with differential treatment of parties by 
newspapers being limited to opinion pages, if present at all. 
Also, because a uniform measure of parallelism is being applied in the two cases, I 
will be able to directly compare levels of political parallelism in the British and the 
Turkish cases, something that was not possible based upon the historical data in previous 
chapters. In Chapter 6, I compared the trends in the two cases, because the historical data 
presented in Chapters 4 and 5 were of different types and did not allow direct comparison 
of levels of parallelism in the two cases.  
In what follows, I first briefly discuss what to expect from a direct comparison of 
the levels of parallelism in Turkey and in the UK, and then present data on coverage 
parallelism, word choice parallelism, and issue emphasis parallelism in recent elections in 
the two countries. 
The only study that gives us a hint as to what to expect from a comparison of the 
levels of political parallelism in Turkey and in the UK is Hallin and Mancini‟s (2004) 
landmark study on Comparing Media Systems, where they identify the UK as an 
exceptional case among the countries of the liberal model -which consists of the UK, the 
US, Canada, and Australia- because of its high levels of political parallelism. The liberal 
model, on the whole, has the lowest levels of political parallelism compared to the 
moderate pluralist (Northern and Central European) and polarized pluralist 
(Mediterranean) models, with the exception of the UK, which has an “unusually high” (p. 
213) level of political parallelism. Hallin and Mancini also note that, “It is no coincidence 
that the concept of „press-party parallelism‟ was developed in Britain where […] the press 
has always mirrored the divisions of party politics fairly closely” (p. 208). Thus, we 
should expect the UK to have a level of parallelism that is at least as high as the level of 
parallelism in the Mediterranean countries, among which Turkey can also be included.
76
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 Hallin and Mancini do not include Turkey in their survey of the Mediterranean 
countries, but we do know that the “polarized pluralist model” has a wider applicability, 
not confined to Southern Europe. In a study on Latin America, Mancini and 
Papathanassopoulos (2002) find it to share many characteristics with the Southern 
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Another reason for expecting the level of parallelism in the UK to be higher is the 
practice of endorsements made by British national dailies on election eves. Not only all 
the national dailies take a position regarding the election, whether it be endorsing the 
Conservatives or the Labour or calling for strategic voting so that there are more LibDems 
in the Parliament, they are also proud of their role in the elections, and sometimes boast 
about how influential they were in the outcome: The Sun‟s oft-quoted headline following 
the 1992 elections, “It‟s the Sun wot won it” attests, if not to actual influence, than at least 
to a consciously and publicly embraced political role, which is unthinkable in the Turkish 
press. In the Turkish press, taking sides in a political debate, let alone publicly endorsing 
parties on election eves, is very much looked down upon. “Doğan media vs. Erdoğan 
media”, “CHP  media vs. AKP media”, “yandaş medya vs. malum medya”77 are terms 
frequently used in debates on political positions of the media outlets to score points, and 
they are meant to be insults, not neutral descriptions of reality. Some Turkish columnists 
did declare which parties they will vote for in the 2007 elections and urged their readers 
to follow suit, but even this had news value and was unthinkable in a leading article 
undersigned by the paper itself. Thus, we can state Hypothesis IV also as follows: Given 
the public attitudes against taking political positions among the Turkish newspapers, and 
the opposite practice of open endorsements among the British dailies, the level of political 
parallelism in the Turkish press should be lower than the level of parallelism in the British 
press.  
7.1. Coverage Parallelism in the UK 
One way of giving differential support to preferred parties is giving them more 
coverage. Although it matters to the utmost degree whether this coverage is positive or 
negative, we may still gain some insight into differential treatment only by looking at how 
much more coverage one party receives relative to others, in which newspapers. In their 
study of the coverage of the 2007 parliamentary elections in four Turkish newspapers 
                                                                                                                                               
European media systems. In a study on where Turkey fits in this picture, Uce and De 
Swert (2010) find Turkey to be “a clear example of the Mediterranean or Polarized 
Pluralist Model.” (p. 71). 
77
 Literally meaning “partisan media” and “certain media”, the first of these phrases is 
used exclusively to refer to the pro-AKP and the latter to the anti-AKP media. 
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over a 10 week period, Balkir et al. (2008) find that “AKP or AKP politicians and 
candidates were the most visible actors in newspaper coverage”, however, “strong 
visibility did not provide a positive tone for the AKP; on the contrary, the tone towards 
the AKP and AKP politicians was highly critical and negative” (p. 207). Balkir et al. 
(2008) explain stronger visibility of the AKP with reference to AKP‟s “status as the 
governing party” (p. 207). In his study of the coverage of the 2005 parliamentary 
elections in 7 British newspapers over a 30 day period, Brandenburg (2006) similarly 
finds that “all papers tend to over-represent the Labour party”, which, “By and large, […] 
can be attributed to the fact that Labour is the incumbent party” (p. 166). Brandenburg 
(2006) cites another study on the 2002 Irish elections (Brandenburg, 2005), which also 
found that “both coalition partners, Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats, received 
sizeable over-representations”, to conclude “Incumbency appears to generate coverage 
bias, irrespective of party size or properties of the party system” (p. 166). A further 
conclusion of Brandenburg (2006), however, is that although “systematically and 
massively over-representing the endorsed party or parties and marginalizing opponents” 
was not the case, there were visible differences between newspapers with respect to 
strategic behavior when giving coverage: whereas some papers “deviate[d] moderately 
from the overall pattern in the expected direction (Daily Telegraph, Guardian, 
Independent)”, others “applied coverage bias in more strategic fashion (Sun, Times, Daily 
Mirror, Daily Mail)” (p. 167). 
Table 7.1 shows amount of coverage the three main parties received in the 2001, 
2005, and 2010 parliamentary elections in the UK (see Chapter 3 on how these scores 
were calculated).  
Table 7.1- Amount of Coverage - Party References in British National Dailies on Election 
Eves 
    LibDem Labour Conservative   
   # % # % # % Total 
2
0
0
1
 comment 410 10 1957 49 1597 40 3964 
News 1108 11 4756 48 4038 41 9902 
all 1518 11 6713 48 5635 41 13866 
2
0
0
5
 comment 374 11 1670 51 1242 38 3286 
News 1604 17 4362 46 3504 37 9470 
all 1978 16 6032 47 4746 37 12756 
2
0
1
0
 comment 945 20 1999 42 1828 38 4772 
News 2768 22 5117 40 4955 39 12840 
all 3713 21 7116 40 6783 39 17612 
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Overall, Labour was the party that received the most coverage in British national 
dailies, measured as the number of party references, in all three elections. Thus, our 
expectation that the incumbent party receives the highest amount of coverage, based on 
Brandenburg‟s (2005) and Balkir et al.‟s (2008) previous observations, is met. However, 
Labour‟s lead in the coverage poll, so to speak, is significantly diminished in the 2010 
elections, during which Labour was still the incumbent party. It seems like future 
incumbency, as well as current incumbency, is a factor in determining the amount of 
coverage, given that the Conservative  Party emerged as the leading party from the 2010 
elections. 
Looking at the direction of change in amount of coverage received by individual 
parties, it seems like we could have predicted, with some success, the increase or decrease 
in parties‟ shares of popular vote. The rise in Liberal Democrats‟ share of the popular 
vote, from 18.3 % in 2001, to 22.0 % in 2005 and to 23.0 % in 2010 is also reflected in 
their share of coverage: references to the Liberal Democrats made up only 11 percent of 
all party references in the British national dailies‟ coverage prior to 2001 elections, but it 
made up 16 % prior to 2005 elections, and 21 % prior to 2010 elections. Labour‟s fall in 
2010 is also reflected in the amount of coverage, with a dramatic decrease from 47 % in 
2005 elections to 40 percent in 2010. The rise in Conservative Party‟s share of popular 
vote is reflected in newspaper coverage in 2010, but not in 2005. Overall, in 5 of the 6 
transitions the direction of change in a party‟s coverage followed the direction of change 
in that party‟s vote share: when a party increased its share of the popular vote from one 
election to another, national dailies also increased the space devoted  to covering that 
party, and vice versa.  
The breakdown of these overall results, by individual newspapers, is given in 
Appendix B. Looking at individual titles‟ behaviors, it can be seen that there are 
important differences between newspapers with regards to the amount of coverage 
allocated to the three parties. Although most papers did give the incumbent more 
coverage, inter-paper differences that can be attributed to party choice also existed. For 
example, the Guardian and the Independent, the only two papers to openly endorse the 
Liberal Democrats (see Table 5.5), consistently gave more coverage to Liberal Democrats 
in their news content than did other papers (see Appendix B). Similarly, the news 
coverage of the Financial Times, which endorsed Labour in 2001 and 2005 elections and 
the Conservatives in 2010, closely reflected its endorsements: in 2001 and 2005, Financial 
Times used the word Labour more often than it used the words Conservative or Tory (647 
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to 491 in 2001, and 555 to 451 in 2005), but in 2010 the situation was reversed: the word 
Labour was used 415 times whereas the words Conservative and Tory were used 514 
times. 
 Other instances of overrepresentation may be found by examining Appendix B 
further, but summary statistics would provide us with a general picture easier to interpret. 
If there were no inter-paper differences, we would expect the coverage share of the parties 
to be the same in all newspapers. We cannot expect the coverage to be equally distributed 
between the three parties in allotments of 33.33 percent, but we can expect, for example, 
both the Guardian and the Financial Times to allocate, say, 15 percent of their coverage 
to the Liberal Democrats, and 30 percent to Labour, etc. Thus, the extent to which papers 
differ from each other (not from a pre-set standard like equal shares or shares of the 
popular vote) in terms of coverage allocated to individual parties can serve as a proxy 
measure of coverage parallelism. Table 7.2 reports how much newspapers differ from the 
mean percentage allocated to individual parties. The smaller this figure, the more similar 
newspapers are to each other in terms of coverage percentages. 
Table 7.2- Coverage Parallelism in News and Opinion Content of British National Dailies 
  2001 2005 2010 
  Comment News Comment News Comment News 
Con 8 3 5 3 5 4 
Lab 10 2 7 3 6 4 
Lib 6 3 4 4 4 2 
Average 8 3 5 3 5 4 
Note: Figures are average absolute deviations from mean. Standard deviations also display the same pattern. 
Absolute deviations were preferred because they are easier to interpret. 
 
We are now in a position to evaluate whether the allocation of amount of coverage 
in British national dailies, as a whole, conformed to the normative standards set by C. P. 
Scott (1921) in his famous article. Arguing that “Comment is free, but facts are sacred”,  
Scott expected the newspapers to be fair and balanced in their news coverage, while 
allowing for some element of bias in commentary. If we look at coverage parallelism in 
opinion and news articles, we can see that, of the three periods under study, 2001 election 
eve was the closest approximation to Scott‟s ideal. In 2001, the allocation of news 
coverage to the three main parties was similar across all the newspapers (Labour news 
made up about the same percentage of all news in individual newspapers), whereas the 
papers significantly differed in terms of how frequently they mentioned the names of 
individual parties in their opinion articles (for example, on average, papers gave 10 
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percent more or 10 percent less space to commentary on Labour). Facts were sacred and 
comment was free. In 2005, however, comment also became somewhat sacralized, with 
newspapers starting to devote similar amounts of space to commentary on individual 
parties. The average absolute deviation in opinion articles decreased from 0,08 to 0,05. In 
2010, the news and opinion sections, on the whole, were hardly distinguishable from each 
other in terms of how much the newspapers differed from one another. Coverage 
parallelism in news articles increased from 0,03 to 0,04, whereas coverage parallelism in 
opinion articles remained as 0,05. This time, news became somewhat free. We do not 
have a fixed yardstick for Scott‟s advice, but taking the figures for 2001 as a basis for 
comparison, we can say that on the whole, comment became somewhat sacralized in the 
last decade, and news became somewhat freed: coverage parallelism have decreased in 
opinion articles, and increased in news articles. 
Figures from Turkey would provide us with another yardstick to evaluate coverage 
parallelism in the UK. 
7.2. Coverage Parallelism in Turkey 
Table 7.3 reports the frequency of party names in Turkish newspapers prior to the 
2007 parliamentary elections. In line with the finding of Balkir et al. (2008), which was 
limited to four newspapers only, it can be seen that AKP was the party whose name was 
repeated most frequently in news and opinion content of Turkish national dailies prior to 
the 2007 elections, enjoying the incumbency bonus seen in other contexts as well. 
Compared to the British case (2010 elections), the difference between opinion and 
news content is similarly small, but parallelism is somewhat higher, with Turkish 
newspapers differing from each other -in how they allocate coverage to individual parties- 
to a greater extent than do British newspapers. 
Unlike in the British case, Turkish newspapers do not openly endorse parties on 
election eves, limiting what can be said about the behavior of individual papers. At this 
point, we are not in a position to attribute differences between coverage shares to party 
choice. In the following sections, however, we will have more precise tools that measure 
support more directly, thus enabling us to better interpret the differences between 
coverage amounts.  
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Table 7.3- Amount of Coverage - Party References in Turkish National Dailies Prior to 
2007 Elections 
  Comment News 
  AKP CHP MHP  AKP CHP MHP   
Newspaper # % # % # % total # % # % # % total 
Hürriyet 309 63 106 22 72 15 487 190 50 112 30 76 20 378 
Zaman 234 43 171 31 138 25 543 288 37 272 35 211 27 771 
Sabah 264 56 118 25 93 20 475 112 45 86 35 50 20 248 
Milliyet 228 52 131 30 79 18 438 318 55 165 29 92 16 575 
Vatan 296 56 130 25 104 20 530 305 54 144 25 121 21 570 
Akşam 128 46 90 32 60 22 278 213 46 132 28 121 26 466 
Türkiye 60 57 21 20 24 23 105 103 38 91 34 75 28 269 
Star 114 37 96 31 101 32 311 169 32 195 37 169 32 533 
Yeni Şafak 148 61 71 29 24 10 243 302 37 259 32 250 31 811 
Cumhuriyet 525 64 199 24 99 12 823 833 52 543 34 227 14 1603 
Vakit 189 29 272 41 200 30 661 380 35 338 31 367 34 1085 
Dünya 45 56 27 34 8 10 80 115 45 83 33 57 22 255 
Radikal 178 55 85 26 60 19 323 468 52 258 29 171 19 897 
Posta 48 37 55 42 27 21 130 153 47 118 36 57 17 328 
Takvim 62 44 29 21 49 35 140 38 35 46 43 24 22 108 
Total 2828 51 1601 29 1138 20 5567 3987 45 2842 32 2068 23 8897 
Deviation   9  5  6   7  3  5  
Average 7 5 
 
7.3. Word Choice Parallelism in Turkey 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi) of Turkey wants newspapers, indeed all actors, to use the abbreviation 
“AK Parti” (also meaning “Clean Party” in Turkish), which is the official abbreviation, 
instead of the shorter and less glorifying “AKP”. Indeed, party officials have a number of 
times stated this preference in strongly worded statements. Thus, the degree to which 
newspapers conform with this preference can serve as a proxy measure of how much a 
newspaper supports the Justice and Development Party. 
Table 7.4 reports the frequencies of both versions of the abbreviation, and the ratio 
of the use of “AK Parti” to “AKP” in individual newspapers.  
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Table 7.4- Preference for the Abbreviation “AK Parti” over “AKP” in Turkish 
Newspapers 
Comment News 
Newspaper AK Parti AKP AK Parti/AKP Newspaper AK Parti AKP AK Parti/AKP 
Türkiye 59 0 ∞ Türkiye 97 6 16,17 
Yeni Şafak 115 32 3,59 Yeni Şafak 282 18 15,67 
Vakit 136 53 2,57 Star 154 14 11,00 
Star 74 40 1,85 Zaman 237 45 5,27 
Zaman 125 107 1,17 Vakit 298 78 3,82 
Takvim 30 32 0,94 Sabah 38 71 0,54 
Dünya 18 27 0,67 Dünya 23 92 0,25 
Posta 18 29 0,62 Posta 19 133 0,14 
Radikal 55 111 0,50 Takvim 4 34 0,12 
Sabah 60 204 0,29 Akşam 20 193 0,10 
Akşam 22 102 0,22 Hürriyet 12 176 0,07 
Vatan 11 284 0,04 Radikal 25 443 0,06 
Hürriyet 4 303 0,01 Vatan 6 298 0,02 
Milliyet 1 227 0,00 Cumhuriyet 4 828 0,00 
Cumhuriyet 1 522 0,00 Milliyet 1 317 0,00 
 
As we can see from the table, there is a clear-cut distinction between papers that prefer the 
“AK Parti” abbreviation, and those that prefer “AKP”. The distinction is so sharp, 
especially at the poles, that some newspapers use their preferred abbreviation almost to 
the total exclusion of the other. Türkiye at the “AK Parti” camp, and Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, 
and Vatan at the “AKP” camp seem to be especially rigid in their attitudes. We can safely 
assume that the five papers located at the upper part of Table 7.4 are pro-AKP papers, 
whereas those located at the bottom are anti-AKP ones. 
With this insight now gained, we can interpret individual differences in coverage 
shares better. Milliyet, Vatan and Cumhuriyet are the three papers that devote the largest 
space to AKP news (55, 54, and 52 percent, respectively, see Table 7.3), whereas Vakit, 
Yeni Şafak, Zaman, and Türkiye are among the papers that devote the smallest space (35, 
37, 37 and 38 percent, respectively, see Table 7.3). The reason most probably is that bias 
mostly takes the form of criticizing the party opposed rather than glorifying the party 
supported, a phenomenon observed by Brandenburg (2005) in the British case as well. 
Because papers are more concerned -or more comfortable- with criticizing political 
parties, they show their support by attacking foes, not by praising friends. 
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7.4. Word Choice Parallelism in the UK 
Going back to preferred word choices in referring to the political parties, a similar 
situation exists in the British case as well. Conservative Party spokespeople do not oppose 
the word as strongly as AKP does, but the preference for the word “Tory” as opposed to 
“Conservative” when referring to the Conservative Party does seem to be associated with 
an anti-Conservative Party position. Like in the “AK Parti” example in Turkey, 
Conservative is the official name, but the word Tory is also frequently used in press 
discourse.  When we look at the ratio of the use of these words, reported in Table 7.5, we 
can see that in all three elections, Mirror, the only paper that endorsed Labour in all post-
war elections, was the paper with strongest preference for the word Tory as opposed to 
Conservative in its news content; and the Daily Telegraph, the only paper that endorsed 
Conservatives in all post-war elections, was the paper with the strongest preference for 
the word Conservative over Tory, if we were to leave the Financial Times aside, which in 
some accounts is not considered among the national dailies for its economics-heavy 
content. 
Table 7.5- Ratio of the word Conservative to Tory in British National Dailies 
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Daily Telegraph 311 345 0,90 235 255 0,92 319 326 0,98 
Times 153 287 0,53 243 332 0,73 296 453 0,65 
Guardian 318 481 0,66 245 310 0,79 423 564 0,75 
Financial Times 280 211 1,33 277 174 1,59 246 268 0,92 
Independent 250 423 0,59 141 267 0,53 330 355 0,93 
Daily Express 60 205 0,29 85 141 0,60 165 258 0,64 
Daily Mail 67 162 0,41 122 175 0,70 64 98 0,65 
Daily Mirror 37 185 0,20 56 269 0,21 89 361 0,25 
Sun 48 166 0,29 27 80 0,34 61 220 0,28 
Daily Star 16 33 0,48 31 39 0,79 13 46 0,28 
Conservatives.com*       3630 284 12,8 
Labour.org.uk*             236 322 0,73 
* Counts for the Conservatives.com and Labour.org. uk are the results of a Google search 
conducted on December 25, 2010, and thus reflect content from previous years as well. 
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Looking at Table 7.5, it is obvious that there is also a market segment element in the 
the word choice between Conservative and Tory, with popular papers, on the whole, 
using the word Tory the most, quality papers using it the least, and mid-market papers 
being in the middle. However, the observations we make concerning the Daily Telegraph 
and the Daily Mirror are still valid even when we restrict the comparison to individual 
segments: Among popular papers, Daily Mirror is the one with the strongest preference 
for the word Tory, and among quality papers, Daily Telegraph is the paper with the 
strongest preference for the word Conservative, barring Financial Times.  
7.5. Issue Emphasis Parallelism in Turkey 
Table 7.6 reports the scores received by Turkish newspapers for AKPness vs. 
CHPness on 2007 election eve, based upon the level of overlap between individual 
papers‟ contents and party manifestos, where +1 represents AKP and -1 represents CHP. 
(See Chapter 3 on how these scores were calculated.) 
Table 7.6 – Pro-AKP vs. pro-CHP Positions among Turkish Newspapers 
    Comment News 
   # phrases Score # phrases Score 
Reference Texts 
AKP Manifesto 3,107 1,00 3,107 1,00 
CHP Manifesto 21,774 -1,00 21,774 -1,00 
Virgin Texts 
Vakit 363 0,33 639 0,26 
Yeni Şafak 225 0,25 605 0,50 
Zaman 367 0,21 649 0,10 
Türkiye 171 0,20 213 0,60 
Dünya 154 0,17 409 -0,04 
Takvim 112 0,14 54 0,28 
Star 148 0,14 358 0,25 
Sabah 177 0,08 173 -0,01 
Radikal 222 0,00 571 -0,24 
Akşam 153 -0,09 159 -0,40 
Milliyet 202 -0,11 182 -0,20 
Posta 103 -0,15 103 -0,25 
Vatan 183 -0,22 227 -0,14 
Hürriyet 257 -0,26 616 -0,30 
Cumhuriyet 467 -0,45 792 -0,18 
  Deviation*   0,18   0,25 
*: Average absolute deviation from mean 
Turkish newspapers, in the run up to the 2007 elections, seem to be neatly divided 
into pro-CHP and pro-AKP camps, with around half the papers examined receiving 
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negative scores (indicating positions closer to CHP than AKP), and around half receiving 
positive scores (indicating positions closer to AKP than CHP). This divide closely 
overlaps with the divide observed in the preference for “AK Parti” vs “AKP” abbreviation 
(see  Table 7.4), with all the papers that use the party's preferred abbreviation  (Vakit, Yeni 
Şafak, Zaman, Türkiye, and Star) also receiving positive scores for AKPness in their news 
and opinion contents. The only paper that preferred the abbreviation “AKP” over “AK 
Parti”, but received a positive score in Table 7.6 is Takvim, one of the two papers 
managed at the time by the state agency SDIF. 
If we were to look at the average deviation from mean, reported in the last row of 
the table, and take this figure as an overall measure of political parallelism in the Turkish 
press, a curious feature emerges: there is more parallelism in the news sections of the 
newspapers than in the comment sections, in some cases news contents receiving scores 
as high as 0,50 (Yeni Şafak)  and 0,60 (Türkiye). Compared to the news content, the 
comment sections of the newspapers seem relatively more balanced, with the highest 
score being -0,45 (Cumhuriyet). Overall, parallelism in news articles is 7 percentage 
points higher than parallelism in opinion articles (0,25 compared to 0,18).  
When we examine the behavior of individual newspapers, with a comparative look 
at their news and opinion contents, three types of newspapers can be discerned: a) those 
with balanced news and biased opinion content, b) those with bias in both news and 
opinion content, and c) those with balanced opinion but biased news content.
78
 The first 
of these types is the closest to the ideal expressed by C. P. Scott: to them, facts are sacred 
(or balanced) but comment is free. In Turkey, Dünya and Sabah were the representatives 
of this type in the run-up to the 2007 elections (-0,04 news to 0,17 opinion, and -0,01 
news to 0,08 opinion, respectively) and Zaman (0,10 news to 0,21 opinion) to some 
extent. Most of the Turkish national dailies can be included in the second category, with  
Vakit, Yeni Şafak, Türkiye, Takvim, Star, Posta, Vatan, Hürriyet, and Cumhuriyet having 
(same directional) bias in both of their news and opinion contents. The third category, 
with biased news but curiously balanced opinion content, is exemplified best by the paper 
                                                 
78
 A fourth, theoretical type would be those with balanced coverage in both news and 
opinion content, but the Turkish press scene does not seem to contain such newspapers. 
The paper that came closest to this ideal in the run up to the 2007 elections was Sabah, 
managed at the time by the state agency SDIF because its owners were being tried on 
fraud charges. 
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Radikal (-0,24 news to 0,00 opinion parallelism), but to some extent by  Akşam (-0,40 
news to -0,09 opinion) and Milliyet (-0,20 news and -0,11 opinion) as well.
79
  
If we were to speculate as to the reasons why some papers choose to follow the 
third strategy, we could argue that it has something to do with the fact that bias in opinion 
is easier to detect, and for determined editors, thus easier to eliminate. If you have 3 pro-
CHP columnists and 2 pro-AKP ones, throw in one more pro-AKP columnist, and you are 
pretty much done. Bias in news articles, however, is more difficult to detect, for news 
articles have to be more subtle in making arguments, in part due to the strong normative 
reaction against observed bias in news: “”Propaganda”, so called, by this means is 
hateful” (Scott, 1021). So, balancing editors have less of an incentive to purge their 
reporters (they can legitimately claim to be balanced in news content already), and when 
they do have the incentive, it is not as easy or as straightforward a task as balancing the 
columnists, for unlike columnists, reporters are rarely publicly associated with specific 
political views. 
7.6. Issue Emphasis Parallelism in the UK 
To see if this phenomenon (biased news, balanced opinion) is peculiar to some 
Turkish newspapers only or observed in other press systems as well, we can look at 
political parallelism among British national dailies. Table 7.7 reports the scores received 
by British national dailies in 2001, 2005, and 2010 elections, where 1.00 represents The 
Conservative Party and -1.00 represents the Labour Party. 
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 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time this phenomenon is being observed, 
at least in the academic literature. Observations along these lines were first made by 
Hıncal Uluç, a columnist of the daily Sabah, who accused his own paper of being 
balanced in opinion but biased in news contents, in favor of the ruling AKP. Although 
this observation is contrary to the findings of the present study, for I find Sabah to be 
balanced in news and biased in opinion content, the title of being the first to draw 
attention to the phenomenon belongs to Uluç. 
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Table 7.7- Pro-Conservative vs. pro-Labour Positions among British Newspapers 
    2010 2005 2001 
   Comment News Comment News Comment News 
   
S
c
o
re
 
#
 p
h
ra
s
e
s
 
S
c
o
re
 
#
 p
h
ra
s
e
s
 
S
c
o
re
 
#
 p
h
ra
s
e
s
 
S
c
o
re
 
#
 p
h
ra
s
e
s
 
S
c
o
re
 
#
 p
h
ra
s
e
s
 
S
c
o
re
 
#
 p
h
ra
s
e
s
 
Ref. 
Texts 
Lab Manifesto -1,00 33219 -1,00 33219 -1,00 3671 -1,00 3671 -1,00 5043 -1,00 5043 
Cons Manifesto 1,00 3152 1,00 3152 1,00 843 1,00 843 1,00 14609 1,00 14609 
Virgin 
Texts 
Daily Telegraph 0,12 1866 0,15 259 0,08 528 0,04 1554 -0,01 737 -0,17 1719 
Times 0,10 2072 0,05 3284 0,07 943 0,00 1429 -0,08 105 -0,21 1000 
Guardian 0,01 154 0,03 3999 -0,05 583 0,00 1682 -0,10 483 -0,11 2177 
Financial Times -0,01 505 -0,05 4646 -0,02 469 -0,05 1959 -0,29 327 -0,33 191 
Independent -0,01 175 -0,02 3002 -0,12 344 -0,05 1055 -0,09 727 -0,12 1849 
Daily Express 0,09 115 0,04 1864 0,45 529 0,02 105 0,02 205 -0,18 456 
Daily Mail 0,08 1373 -0,05 1700 0,05 753 0,00 1122 -0,02 516 -0,18 732 
Daily Mirror 0,08 552 -0,09 1638 -0,22 252 0,11 658 -0,11 426 -0,30 367 
Sun 0,14 661 0,20 1662 -0,09 103 0,08 272 0,07 97 0,02 308 
Daily Star 0,50 138 0,34 164 0,48 5 0,20 346 0,13 24 0,19 101 
Average 0,11  0,06  0,06  0,04  -0,05  -0,14  
 
It seems like Labour was most successful in getting its message repeated in press 
coverage in 2001, with almost all of the newspapers receiving negative scores, indicating 
pro-Labour positions. This ability of Labour decreased in 2005, with around half the 
papers now receiving negative scores; and in 2010 the situation was completely reversed, 
with almost all of the newspapers receiving positive scores, indicating a pro-Conservative 
position. Thus, it seems that, overall, the press coverage of the parties shifts with the 
change in political climate from election to election. However, individual differences 
between newspapers remain. Daily Mirror, the only British daily to consistently endorse 
Labour in all post-war elections, is the paper with the highest Labour score in 2010 and 
2005, and only second to Financial Times in 2001. The Daily Telegraph, the only British 
daily to consistently endorse Conservatives in all post-war elections, is the paper with the 
highest Conservative score in 2010 and 2005 elections.  
Because the balance between Labour and the Conservatives in the press discourse 
seems to have been achieved at different points in different  elections, we need to look at 
how much and in what direction newspapers‟ scores differed from the average score, not 
the from the theoretical middle ground of 0.00. Table 7.8 reports these deviations from the 
mean score. 
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Table 7.8- Deviations from Mean Conservative vs. Labour Score 
 2010 2005 2001 
  Comment News Comment News Comment News 
Mean Score 0,11 0,06 0,06 0,04 -0,05 -0,14 
Daily Telegraph 0,01 0,09 0,01 0,00 0,04 -0,03 
Times -0,01 -0,01 0,01 -0,04 -0,03 -0,07 
Guardian -0,10 -0,03 -0,11 -0,04 -0,05 0,03 
Financial Times -0,12 -0,11 -0,09 -0,09 -0,24 -0,19 
Independent -0,12 -0,08 -0,18 -0,08 -0,04 0,02 
Daily Express -0,02 -0,02 0,39 -0,01 0,07 -0,04 
Daily Mail -0,03 -0,11 -0,01 -0,03 0,03 -0,04 
Daily Mirror -0,03 -0,15 -0,29 0,07 -0,06 -0,16 
Sun 0,03 0,14 -0,15 0,04 0,12 0,16 
Daily Star 0,39 0,28 0,42 0,17 0,17 0,33 
Average absolute deviation  0,09 0,10 0,17 0,06 0,08 0,11 
Note: Negative figures represent scores below average, indicating pro-Labour positions, 
and positive figures represent above average scores, indicating pro-Conservative 
positions. 
 
Because we have three elections to consider, and because newspapers seem to have 
displayed varying behavior over time, a straightforward classification of the newspapers 
in terms of their news and opinion parallelism is not possible. In comparison with the 
Turkish case, the following observations are in order. 
Unlike in the Turkish case, where balance in both news and opinion content was 
only a theoretical category, most newspapers in most elections were balanced in the UK 
(had about average scores), in both their news and opinion contents (cells without 
shading, 11 instances out of 30), the Daily Telegraph and the Times being the papers 
representing the category the best. The next most populous category was those dailies 
with bias in both news and opinion content (cells with the darkest shading, 9 instances out 
of 30), Daily Star, Financial Times, and Independent best representing the category. 
Papers where facts were sacred (balanced)  and comment was free (biased) made up the 
third most populous category (cells with the lightest shading, 5 out of 30), represented 
best by Guardian, which was edited by C. P. Scott, the person who came up with the 
motto “facts are sacred”. And finally, papers with balanced comment and biased news, 
represented in the Turkish case by the daily Radikal, also made up 5 out of 30 instances, 
but this seems to be a fairly new phenomenon, with four of the cases being observed in 
2010.  
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Over time, there is a decrease in the number of papers that are balanced in both 
news and opinion contents (6 to 2 from 2001 to 2010), and an increase in the number of 
papers balanced in opinion and biased in news (1 to 4).  
The last row of Table 7.8 reports the average absolute deviation from the mean 
score, which can be used as a measure of overall parallelism.
80
 These figures indicate that 
the highest parallelism was observed in 2005 opinion contents (0,17), and the lowest in 
2005 news contents (0,06). In 2001 and 2010, overall parallelism in news and opinion 
contents were close to each other, with parallelism in news being slightly higher than 
parallelism in opinion. Compared to Turkey, these figures are rather low: prior to 2007 
elections, news parallelism in Turkey was 0,25 and opinion parallelism 0,18. 
7.7. Conclusion 
This chapter, which examined political parallelism in the content of the Turkish and 
British newspapers on election eves, has come up with answers to a number of important 
questions:  
1- How do levels of parallelism compare in Turkey and in the UK?  
British dailies had lower levels of parallelism, at least in the most recent period and 
as far as content parallelism was concerned, a conclusion we could not reach in the 
previous chapters because we were not able to compare levels of parallelism directly, and 
had to be content with comparing trends. Now that we have applied the same 
methodology in both cases, we can say that parallelism in the Turkish press is higher 
(about 0,22 in 2007 elections) than parallelism in the British press (about 0,9 in 2010 
elections).  
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 It should be noted that this is a measure of overall parallelism concerning the Labour 
vs. Conservative dichotomy. A more comprehensive measure of parallelism in the 
system should take Labour vs. LibDem and Conservative vs. LibDem parallelisms into 
account as well. These calculations are not reported here to keep the presentation 
simple, but parallelism concerning the Labour vs. Conservative dichotomy was the 
highest in all three elections, with newspapers being less differentiated with regards to 
the positions in the other two dichotomies. The same applies to the Turkish case: It is 
the AKP vs. CHP dichotomy that differentiates the papers the most, although a more 
comprehensive measure of system parallelism should take AKP vs. MHP and CHP vs. 
MHP dichotomies into account as well. 
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2- Do newspapers in Turkey and the UK generally follow Scott‟s (1921) advice? 
That is to say, do they keep parallelism limited to their opinion pages?  
With regards to keeping opinion where it belongs -in opinion articles- both Turkish 
and British newspapers failed, with British papers performing somewhat better: In 
Turkey, news sections of the papers, overall, were more parallel than the comment 
sections (0,25 to 0,18 in 2007 elections). In the UK, news sections of the newspapers 
were more parallel in the 2001 and 2010 elections, and comment sections in the 2005 
elections (see Table 7.8). It seems that, overall, comment was free but news was even 
freer.  
3- Are there differences between newspapers with regards to the relative level of 
bias in their opinion and news contents? 
Yes, there are. Different newspapers like to serve bias in different amounts, and in 
different cups. Some papers offer balance in news and bias in opinion, whereas others do 
the opposite, offering balance in opinion but bias in news. We could speculate that these 
different mixes probably appeal to different customer niches in the market. 
3- Do incumbent parties in Turkey and the UK enjoy what is called the incumbency 
bonus, and are there differences between the amount of coverage given to political parties 
in different newspapers that can be attributed to political preferences?  
The answer to both of these questions was yes. AKP clearly enjoyed an incumbency 
bonus, with its name being more frequently used in both news and opinion contents of the 
Turkish newspapers prior to the 2007 elections (see Table 7.3). In the UK, Labour 
similarly had a clear lead in terms of how frequently its name was cited in the 2001 
elections, but this lead was diminished somewhat in 2005, and significantly diminished in 
2010 (see Table 7.1). There were significant differences between papers in terms of the 
differential coverage of the parties, and some, not all, of these differences were 
attributable to political preferences on the part of the newspaper managements. 
4- Are there any differences between newspapers with regards to preferred phrases 
when referring to the political parties?  
The answer to this question was an unqualified yes: both in Turkey and in the UK, 
something we can call politics of naming is in place when referring to the political parties, 
more severe in the Turkish case
81
. Some newspapers use the abbreviation AKP much 
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 A similar phenomenon is observed by Bayram (2009) with regards to the coverage of 
turban/headscarf related issues in Turkish dailies, with a huge divide separating those 
 153 
more frequently than the official abbreviation “AK Parti” when referring to the Justice 
and Development Party, and others use “AK Parti” much more frequently (Table 7.4). 
This divide was later found to have an almost perfect overlap with the divide in support 
for AKP vs. CHP (compare Table 7.4 with Table 7.6). A similar situation was also 
observed in the British case with regards to the word Conservative vs. Tory, the former 
being more preferred by the Conservative Party (see Table 7.4). There was, however, also 
a market segment element to the word choice in favor of Conservative vs. Tory, with 
popular papers employing the word Tory more frequently. 
5- One overarching question throughout the chapter was whether we could make 
meaningful content analysis -using quantitative methods- that is able to answer some 
significant questions concerning press-party parallelism. The answer to this question was 
also an unqualified yes: using carefully constructed methodologies, we were indeed able 
to explore political parallelism related issues in some depth.  
                                                                                                                                               
papers that prefer the word turban over headscarf from those that prefer headscarf to 
turban. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the introductory chapter, I stated that his study had three major aims: The 
descriptive aim of the study was to map out the history of parallelism in the Turkish press 
and in the British press, the theoretical aim of the study was to evaluate modernization, 
commercialization and party system explanations, and the methodological aim was to see 
if meaningful content analysis was possible using word counts. The following is an 
account of the degree to which these aims have been accomplished, and their 
implications. 
In Chapter 2, which provided a review of the relevant literature, I first examined 
how the term press-party parallelism was conceived by Seymour-Ure (1974), and later re-
defined as political parallelism by Hallin and Mancini (2004), who focused on parallels 
between media and broad political currents, not individual parties. Then I reviewed the 
literature on media and democracy, starting with the social responsibility theory of the 
press, and proceeding with media in studies of democracy, and democracy in studies on 
media. Information, forum, advocacy, and watchdog functions emerged as shared points 
in these normative writings, and pluralism emerged as a criterion with implications for all. 
From the social responsibility theory of the press, I borrowed the idea of a balance 
between “common carriers” and “advocates”, which implied moderate levels of external 
pluralism in the media, and which was used in the following chapters in evaluating 
observed levels of political parallelism. The second part of this chapter was dedicated to 
reviewing the empirical literature, and the third part to the theoretical explanations offered 
to account for variation in levels of political parallelism. With regards to geographical 
distribution, I have noted a lack of comparative studies on the subject, despite the 
abundance of single country studies examining political parallelism under different 
names. With a parallel reading of the Turkish and British cases, this study provided a 
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multi-country perspective, if not a comparative one in the strict sense of the term. With 
regards to historical trends, I noted that most scholars observe a decline in parallelism 
over time in different contexts, although observations of increase and no change were also 
made. I have examined the explanations offered for the variation in levels of political 
parallelism under the three headings of modernization (the sociological approach), 
commercialization (the economic approach), and party system characteristics (the 
political approach), which were partially evaluated in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 3 provided a review of the different methodologies so far used by 
researchers to study political parallelism, and placed the methods used in this study in 
context, as well as providing justification for their use and noting their limitations. In 
previous studies, use of organizational data was the most preferred method, because of its 
availability and the direct information it provides. With the decline of official ties 
between party organizations and press outlets, however, organizational data ceased being 
as useful and practical as it used to be, and coupled with the rise of survey methodology 
that made analyzing readership patterns in more detail possible, readership surveys came 
to be used very frequently to demonstrate parallelism between newspaper audiences and 
party bases. Content analysis has been present from the beginning, but systematic content 
analyses, in the Turkish case in particular, have been missing except for the most recent 
periods, and were only rarely used in a comparative context. After evaluating the pros and 
cons of the different methods so far employed, I presented the methods used in Chapter 4 
(coding of historical data in books on Turkish press history), Chapter 5 (endosrsement 
data) and Chapter 7 (word-count based content analysis) of this study.   
In Chapter 4, I have reviewed political parallelism in the Turkish press from a 
historical perspective. The main contribution of the chapter to the literature stemmed from 
the collection and re-classification of information already contained in the secondary 
literature, not from original research into archives that would introduce new information. 
Also, circulation shares of the daily newspapers from 1960s to the present, taken from the 
archives of Basın İlan Kurumu (BĠK, Press Advertising Institute), were presented, for the 
first time to the best of my knowledge, to identify major papers in each period. For the 
periods for which reliable circulation information was not available, number of author 
mentions was used as the criterion of being a major paper. To limit the universe of 
sources to be coded, attention was restricted to book-length treatments on the history of 
the Turkish press, with articles and works that cover specific periods being left out. Four 
types of information on individual newspapers were collected (author evaluations, 
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content, organization, and legal action), and papers in each period were classified into 
parallel (anti- or pro-government or a specific party) and non-parallel categories, based 
upon an overall evaluation of the evidence collected. This classification also served as our 
measure of overall level of parallelism in the system for the period under study.  
The first period, from the publication of the first Turkish newspaper, Takvim-i 
Vakayi in 1831 to the adoption of the First Constitution, was examined in more detail for 
this is where the roots of Turkish journalism lie. It was found that papers published in this 
period belonged more to the world of politics, with heavy state involvement, but that 
commercial motives were also present. After a start with moderate levels, political 
parallelism declined even further during the era of Abdülhamid II, but increased 
significantly with the Second Constitutional Period, and remaind high throughout the 
WWI, War of Independence, and the Eary Republican Period. After moderate levels of 
parallelism from 1930s to 1980s, ANAP governments of the 1980s saw the lowest level 
of parallelism, and the 1990s saw one of the highest levels. Overall, levels of parallelism 
in Turkey went below the 50 percent mark only once, during the 1980s, and in other 
periods fluctuated between medium to high levels. There was no discernible overall trend, 
from higher to lower parallelism or otherwise, but a number of ups and downs. Periods of 
war and intense political conflict seem to have contributed to higher levels of parallelism, 
probably because stakes were higher, and periods of relatively muted political conflict, 
like the reign of the Abdulhamid II and Özal governments of 1980s, saw lower levels of 
political parallelism in the press. 
Chapter 5 started out with a review of post-war British political history and the 
segmented nature of the British daily press, to provide some background to the discussion 
that follows. To examine the trends in political parallelism, endorsement data were used, 
which showed a complicated picture with different conclusions for the different segments 
of the British daily press: there were higher levels of parallelism and uniform declining 
trend in the mid-market and popular segments, compared to lower levels of parallelism 
and ups and downs in the quality segment. The parallel reading of the Turkish and British 
cases provided me with a larger number number of more or less homogenized historical 
periods, which were used as a basis for the evaluation of theoretical explanations in 
Chapter 6. 
Chapter 6 provided a partial evaluation of the modernization, commercialization, 
and party system characteristics explanations, which were turned into three hypotheses as 
follows:  
 157 
Hypothesis I (modernization): As we move from the earlier to the more recent 
periods, level of parallelism in Turkey and in the UK will decrease because of the 
modernization effect, which, among other things, means increasing differentiation 
between spheres of life, and in our case, between the functions of communication and 
politics.  
Hypothesis II (commercizalization): In periods when the press can be said to be 
more commercialized, political parallelism will be lower compared to non-
commercialized periods, because in a commercialized environment, papers try to reach 
the widest audience possible, and avoid alienating large chunks of their potential 
readership by presenting politically biased content.  
Hypothesis III (party system characteristics): a) Periods with a higher number of 
parties in the system will also have higher levels of political parallelism. b) Periods with 
higher levels of ideological polarization will also have higher levels of political 
parallelism. c) Periods with minority or coalition governments will have higher levels of 
political parallelism, and periods with single party governments will have lower levels of 
political parallelism. d) Periods with higher levels of cleavage voting will also have 
higher levels of political parallelism.  
Evaluation of these hypotheses in Chapter 6 on the basis of data from the Turkish 
and British cases led to the following findings: --Explanations based upon number of 
parties did not fit the evidence in either of the cases. In both Turkey and the UK, multi-
party periods had lower, not higher levels of political parallelism compared to two party 
periods. --Modernization and commercialization explanations fit -albeit imperfectly- the 
British case but not the Turkish one. There was no decline with modernization in the 
Turkish case, and the commercizlaied periods had actually higher levels of political 
parallelism compared to periods when state was more active in the economy. In the 
British case, on the other hand, there was a decline that accompanied moderniaiton, and 
commerzilaied periods had lower levels of parallelism. --The government type 
explanation fit the Turkish case and not the British one. In Turkey, periods with single 
party governments, as predicted, had lower levels of parallelism compared to periods with 
coalition governments. In the UK, although most post-war British governments were 
single party governments, the few years of coalition-like arrangements and minority 
governments did not result in higher levels of political parallelism. --Ideological 
polarization and cleavage voting were the only explanations that fit the evidence in both 
cases. Periods with high ideological polarization were also periods with high political 
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parallelism in both cases. Similarly, periods with higher levels of cleavage voting saw 
higher levels of political parallelism in both Turkey and the UK. I concluded that in future 
studies with more countries, this evaluation can serve as a guideline in selecting which 
variables to focus upon and which to leave out. 
Chapter 7 provided a first-time attempt at direct comparison of levels of political 
parallelism in Turkey and in the UK through uniform application of the same 
methodology in two cases. More specifically, newspaper contents on recent election eves 
in the two countries under study were examined using a word-count based methodology 
that was designed to make newspapers‟ party-political positions visible. Newspaper 
coverages in the one week leading up to the 2007 general elections in Turkey, and 2001, 
2005 and 2010 general elections in the UK were examined. All articles that contained the 
name or the abbreviation of any political party were collected using word searches, from 
the Lexis-Nexis database in the British case, and from the Interpress media monitoring 
service in the Turkish case. For each election, this selection method turned up around 
2000 articles, news and opinion articles combined. 
Three groups of phrases were used as text features to compare newspaper contents: 
Frequency of party names (to study amount of coverage), preferred words when referring 
to parties (to study overlap with party preferences), and most distinguishing phrases (to 
study overlap with party preferences more systematically). The first of these features 
showed that incumbent parties in both countries (AKP and the Labour Party) enjoyed 
what is called in the literature the incumbency bonus, receiving more coverage than other 
parties in their respective systems. However, the amount of coverage individual 
newspapers gave to parties did not follow their political preferences in the Turkish case, 
with pro-AKP papers giving more coverage to CHP and pro-CHP papers giving more 
coverage to AKP. This observation led me to conclude that papers were giving “negative” 
support to their preferred parties, a phenomenon observed in other national contexts as 
well, attacking the foes instead of praising the friend. This may arise from the wish of the 
newspapers to hide their support, or in other words to provide a more subtle form of 
support so that they can pretend being at equal distance to all, because praise is a more 
easily detectable form of support. 
The second feature showed that Turkish newspapers were sharply divided into two 
camps, one of which used the abbreviation “AK Parti” much more frequently than the 
abbreviation “AKP”, and the other camp doing just the opposite. Because AKP leaders 
repeatedly condemned the use of the latter and stated their preference for the former in 
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strongly worded statements, differences in the use of these two phrases by daily 
newspapers tell a lot about the papers‟ political positions. “AK Party” also means “Clean 
Party” in Turkish, and it is clear why the party leaders prefer this abbreviation. Papers that 
conformed with the party‟s preference most probably did so because they too wanted to 
associate AKP with “cleanliness”, and papers that avoided the phrase “AK Party” most 
probably did so because they did not want to make this association. 
A similar situation was observed in the British case as well, with pro-Labour papers 
usingthe word “Tory” more frequently when referring to the Conservative Party, and pro-
Conservative papers using the word “Conservative”, indicating that what we can call 
politics of naming is not limited to the Turkish case only. Although Conservative leaders, 
to the best of my knowledge, has not stated a preference for either of the words over the 
other, they clearly use the word “Conservative” much more frequently compared to the 
word “Tory”  on their official websites, which reflects their preferences. 
The third feature was based upon the identification of “most differentiating phrases” 
between manifestos of two parties and then comparison of newspaper coverages on the 
basis of these phrases. Manifestos are official party texts issued prior to elections in most 
democratic countires, and they state parties‟ promises and stances on various issues. As 
such, they are the most authoritative sources where we can identify parties‟s positions on 
a wide range of issues.  The divide observed among Turkish newspapers with regards to 
the use of “AK Parti” vs. “AKP” was replicated almost in identical form with regards to 
the use “most differentiating phrases”, an observation that lends credibility to the method 
used and demonstrates its validity. Based upon their bias scores, Vakit, Yeni Şafak, 
Zaman, Türkiye, Dünya, Takvim, Star, and Sabah were the pro-AKP papers in the run-up 
to the 2007 elections, and Radikal, Akşam, Milliyet, Posta, Vatan, Hürriyet, and 
Cumhuriyet were the pro-CHP papers. Practically all Aydın Doğan papers (Hürriyet, 
Milliyet, Vatan
82
, Posta, Radikal) preferred CHP to AKP, as well as Cumhuriyet and 
Mehmet Emin Karamehmet‟s Akşam. Of the pro-AKP papers, Vakit, Yeni Şafak, Zaman 
and Türkiye are known to have religious owners, Sabah and Takvim at the time of the 
election were managed by the SDIF (Savings Deposit Insurance Fund) because their 
owner owed money to the state, and Star, previously owned by Cem Uzan, was owned by 
Ethem Sancak and Ali Özmen Safa. The divide between British newspapers was not as 
                                                 
82 
At the time of the election, Vatan was owned by Bağımsız Gazeteciler Yayıncılık, but 
was later sold to Doğan. 
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sharp, with British dailies, on the whole, having positions more similar to one another 
with regards to using parties‟ “most differentiating phrases”. This Chapter also allowed 
making comparisons between overall levels of parallelism in Turkish and the British 
press. Contrary to our expectation, the level of parallelism was higher in the Turkish press 
than in the British press, which long has a tradition of endorsing political parties on 
election eves.  
Another use of the content analysis data offered in Chapter 7 was that it allowed 
evaluating newspaper contents in terms of how well they conformed with the normative 
criterion of “comment is free, facts are sacred”. Again contrary to our expectation, biased 
content in newspapers was not limited to opinion pages only, with news articles being just 
as biased as, and in some cases even more biased than, the opinion articles. Also, different 
newspapers served bias in different amounts, and in different cups. Some papers offered 
balance in news and bias in opinion, whereas others did the opposite, offering balance in 
opinion but bias in news. 
 A classification of papers in terms of how their biased content was distributed 
resulted in the following observations: Most Turkish newspapers, including Vakit, Yeni 
Şafak, Türkiye, Takvim, Star, Posta, Vatan, Hürriyet, and Cumhuriyet were biased both in 
their news and opinion contents in the run up to the 2007 elections. Dünya, Sabah and 
Zaman were balanced in their news coverage but biased in their opinion content. Radikal, 
Akşam and Milliyet, on the other hand, were biased in their news coverage, but served a 
curiously balanced opinion diet. The category of newspapers balanced in both news and 
opinion was empty.  
The British daily press in the last three elections (2001, 2005, 2010) presented a 
very different picture. The category of balance in both news and opinion, only a 
theoretical category in the Turkish case, was the most populous category in the UK, with 
Daily Telegraph and the Times representing the category the best. The next most 
populous category was bias in both news and opinion content, with Daily Star, Financial 
Times, and Independent best representing the category. Papers where facts were sacred 
(balanced) and comment was free (biased) made up the third most populous category, 
represented best by Guardian. And finally, the phenomenon of balanced comment and 
biased news, represented in the Turkish case by the daily Radikal, was present in the 
British case as well, but it was a fairly new phenomenon, with many of the cases being 
observed in 2010. 
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Going back to the aims of the study stated in the introductory chapter, the following 
is in order: With regards to the descriptive aim, we now have a history of political 
parallelism in the Turkish press both in summary format and in detail, based upon 
evidence pulled out from books on the history of the Turkish press and presented in 
tables. We now know that the level of parallelism in 1990s was very high compared to the 
1980s, but not as high as it was in the Early Republican period or the WWI years. History 
of political parallelism in the British press was already heavily studied. This study did not 
make a claim to have contributed to this area of inquiry, but combined and presented 
tables of post-war election endorsements, which showed that there was an overall decline 
in content parallelism in the UK, a conclusion qualified by the differences in the behavior 
of the different segments of the British press.  
With regards to the theoretical aim, we now have an -albeit partial-evaluation of the 
modernization, commercialization and party system characteristics explanations. The 
modernization and commercialization explanations only imperfectly fit the historical 
trends observed in political parallelism in the Turkish and the British press, whereas some 
of the party system characteristics (polarization and cleavage voting) behaved as expected 
in both of the cases.  
With regards to the methodological aim, the word-count based methodology 
employed in the content analysis chapter of this study has shown that it indeed is possible 
to answer some important questions on political parallelism using a quantitative approach 
that requires no knowledge of the languages spoken in countries under study. Based upon 
a measure of the overlap between party-produced texts and newspaper-produced texts, the 
method was able to group papers in terms of their positions towards the main political 
parties, and then produce an overall measure of political parallelism in the press.  
The study, of course, had a number of limitations, both method- and content-wise. 
The method used in Chapter 4 on the history of political parallelism in the Turkish press 
was limited by what is already contained in books on press history, which means any 
repeated mistakes in this literature, omissions, or other deficiencies were replicated in this 
account as well. Chapter 5 on the history of political parallelism in British press used 
endorsement data, which present valid information in a summary format on the political 
positions of newspapers, but which constitute only a tiny portion of the overall content of 
a newspaper: a couple of lines in a leading article. The content analysis method used in 
Chapter 7, which used a computerized scheme, had no reliability issues but establishing 
validity was a challenge. Also, the method used in that chapter produced a summary 
 162 
measure of the support newspapers gave to individual parties, but provided no other detail 
as to the form and content of that support. 
 
Content-wise, the British press part of the study was limited to the post-war period, 
leaving more than two centuries of press history out. The Turkish press part of the study, 
on the other hand, had the opposite problem: the most recent period of 2000s was studied 
using only content analysis, leaving significant changes observed in the ownership 
structure of the Turkish press out of the analysis. A fuller analysis of press-party 
parallelism in 2000s would need to take these changes into consideration as well.  
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Notes for Table 4.1 
The 8 histories of press that cover this period are those by Selim Nüzhet Gerçek 
(1931), Hasan Refik Ertuğ (1931), Enver Behnan ġapolyo (1971), A. Jeltyakov (1979), 
Hülya Baykal (1990), Nuri Ġnuğur (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz 
(2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following 
notes, in the form of SNG, HRE, EBġ, AJ, HB, NĠ2 (there are two works by Nuri Ġnuğur 
used in this study), HT, and AK, to save from space. 
1- In the “Introduction” to Takvim-i Vakayi, published five days prior to the first issue 
of the newspaper, the aims of the paper were laid out. One of these aims was “to let the 
foreigners learn the official view of the Ottoman government” (Koloğlu, 1981, p. 67, 
quoted in AK, p. 49). This was taken as evidence that there is pro-government content in 
Takvim-i Vakayi. 
2- As many authors note, Takvim-i Vakayi was state-owned, the most outright form of 
organizational connection a newspaper can have. 
3- Four authors, EBġ, AJ, AK, and HB identify Ceride-i Havadis as a pro-government 
paper, although the exact terms they use vary. According to EBġ, Ceride-i Havadis was 
“pro-government instead of being critical of the government‟s actions” (p. 112). AJ 
describes Ceride-i Havadis and its follower, Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis as “pro-
government papers” (p.86). According to AK, Ceride-i Havadis “defended the interests of 
the Ottoman government” (p. 61). Finally, HB argues that “this paper continuously 
supported the actions of the government” (p.56). 
4- All eight authors that cover this period mention that Ceride-i Havadis received a 
monthly payment of 2500 kuruşs from the state. Financial aid is a form of organizational 
connection. 
5- Hakayik-ül Vakayi was founded in 1870 by RüĢtü Bey and Filip Efendi. NĠ2 notes 
that Filip Efendi was called “journalist of the Sultan” by his colleagues (p. 250). Because 
the political views or connections of newspaper owners and editors are considered to be a 
form of organizational connection, Hakayik-ül Vakayi had the organization box filled in 
the table. 
6- According to AJ, Hakayik-ül Vakayi “did not make its political sympathies or 
antipathies clear” (p.88), pointing towards an impartial position. 
7- HT, AJ, SNG, and EBġ mention that Basiret‟s founder Ali Efendi received 300 
golden liras worth of aid from the state when the paper was founded in 1869. Basiret was 
published until 1878. 
8- During Abdulhamid‟s reign, Basiret criticized Hüsnü Pasha‟s behavior, the 
governor of Istanbul (HT, NĠ2, HB, EBġ). Criticism of government or its officials is taken 
as anti-government content.  
9- Because of its criticism of Hüsnü Pasha (see note 8), Basiret‟s owner Ali Efendi 
was jailed for four months (HT, NĠ2, HB, EBġ). Another legal action the paper faced was 
temporary suspension when it re-published an article originally published in Levant 
Herald on the deficit in Ottoman treasury (AJ, p.91-92). Also see note 15. 
10- Basiret had two other identifiable political positions, besides being pro- or anti-
government. One of these was pro-German, the other conservative. Basiret had a pro-
German position regarding the French-German war of the times, as mentioned by all eight 
authors covering the period, and received financial aid and press equipment from 
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Bismarck as a gift once the war was over. According to AJ, Basiret also had 
“conservative tendencies” (p. 86). AJ quotes Gopdlevskiy, who argues Basiret “followed 
a religious-backward line in internal politics” (p.86). 
11- Muhib-bi Vatan, owned by Anton Efendi, was also published under the names 
Hülasat’ül Efkar, Mamalik-i Mahrusa, Türkistan, Efkar, and Mirkat. The paper was, 
according to AJ, “like a well behaved tool in the hands of the government” (p. 91). 
12- Muhib-bi Vatan‟s publication was temporarily suspended (HRE, p.225; SNG). 
13- According to NĠ2 (p. 249), HB (p. 83), and HRE, Sadakat –founded in 1875 and 
owned by Mehmet Efendi- had a pro-Islamic character. 
14- Utarit, owned by Abdullah Bey and Musullu Sami, “joined the oppositional stand 
of Tasvir-i Efkar in 1866”, together with Muhbir and Ayine-i Vatan (NĠ2, p. 204; HB, p. 
64). This increase in the number of oppositional papers provoked the infamous Ali 
Kararname (Decree of Ali) in 1867, which gave the government extraordinary powers “to 
take preventive measures and punitive actions outside the press law in effect” (quoted 
from the Decree of Ali Pasha in HB, p. 65) and resulted in the flight of Young Ottomans 
to Europe. 
15- Following Ali Kararname (see note 14), Muhbir, Ayine-i Vatan, Utarit, İbret, 
Basiret, Hülasat’ül Efkar (Muhib-bi Vatan), and Şark were closed down by the 
government (NĠ2, p. 206). 
16- According to HB and HRE, conflicting ideas were defended on the pages of 
Utarit: “On the one hand, there was talk of the Sultan‟s rights, on the other, articles 
defending a National Parliament were published” (HB, p. 70; for similar observations, see 
HRE, p. 212). This was taken as evidence that there is balanced content in Utarit. 
17- Founded in 1860 by Agah Efendi, Tercüman-ı Ahval is described by AJ as follows: 
“the main organ of the developing bourgeois-liberal opposition” (p. 53). 
18- The government, especially its education policy, was criticized on the pages of 
Tercüman-ı Ahval (HB, AJ, NĠ2, HB, HRE, EBġ). 
19- The founder of Tercüman-ı Ahval, Agah Efendi, was a prominent member of the 
Young Ottomans (AJ, AK, HT, NĠ2, HB, HRE, EBġ). 
20- Tercüman-ı Ahval‟s publication was suspended for two weeks following Ziya 
Pasha‟s articles criticizing the educational policy of the government (EBġ, NĠ2, HRE, 
HT, AJ). Later, Agah Efendi had to go to Europe following his Young Ottoman friends 
(HT, AK, NĠ2, HRE, EBġ). 
21- Tasvir-i Efkar, founded in 1862 and owned by ġinasi, is described as an opposition 
paper by AJ, NĠ2 (p. 204), and HB. AJ argues that “that Tasvir-i Efkar was the organ of 
the political opposition became clear in 1867”, “with the publication of unruly governor 
of Egypt Mustafa Fazıl Pasha‟s letter, in which he asked, speaking in the name of Young 
Ottomans, for political reform” (p. 56). 
22- Tasvir-i Efkar criticized the government on many occasions. Educational policy of 
the government –that natural sciences were not given due attention in schools- and 
government‟s inaction in the face of widespread poverty were among the subjects of 
criticism (AJ, p. 56). For other examples of government criticism on the pages of Tasvir-i 
Efkar, see HT, NĠ2, HB, HRE, and EBġ. 
23- ġinasi and Namık Kemal, editors and managers of Tasvir-i Efkar, as well as its 
prominent columnists, were also members of the Young Ottomans. 
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24- ġinasi and Namık Kemal went to Europe fearing prosecution for their political 
views.  
25- Muhbir, founded in 1866 and owned by Filip Efendi, is described as an opposition 
paper by AJ, NĠ2, and HB. 
26- Ali Suavi and Ziya Pasha criticized the government in their articles published in 
Muhbir (AK, AJ, HT, NĠ2, EBġ). 
27- Ali Suavi, a prominent columnist and manager of Muhbir, was a member of the 
Young Ottomans. 
28- The paper‟s publication was temporarily suspended “for it made a habit of 
criticizing the government” (HT, p.24). Also, Ali Suavi went to Europe in 1867 with other 
Young Ottomans, and published Muhbir in London as an organ of the Young Ottomans. 
29- According to HRE, “the most progressive ideas of the time were published in 
Muhbir” (p. 211). 
30- According to AJ, İbret was “the first example of […] oppositional political press.”  
(p. 89) İbret was founded in 1871 by Aleksandr Sarrafyan and rented by Namık Kemal in 
1872 because Kemal was not able to get a license for himself. 
31- According to HT, AJ, NĠ2, HRE, SNG, EBġ, and HB, many articles criticizing the 
government were published in İbret. AJ mentions articles by Namık Kemal, in which 
political freedom and citizenship rights were defended and Mahmut Nedim Pasha‟s 
government was criticized, and articles attacking the prosecution of newspapers and book 
censure (p.90). 
32- Namık Kemal, responsible manager and leader writer of İbret, was also a member 
of the Young Ottomans. 
33- In April 1873, İbret was closed down by the government, and Namık Kemal sent 
to exile in Cyprus, where he stayed until 1876 (HT, AJ, NĠ2, HRE, SNG, EBġ, HB). 
34- Founded in 1866 by Eğribozlu Mehmet Arif Bey, Ayine-i Vatan was also 
published under the names Vatan, Ruzname-i Ayine-i Vatan, and Istanbul. NĠ2 and HB 
describe Ayine-i Vatan as an opposition paper. See note 14. 
35- According to HRE and HB, Ayine-i Vatan “used to criticize the government and 
support the Young Ottomans” (HRE, p. 212; HB, p. 70). 
36- “The publication of Ayine-i Vatan, Vatan, Istanbul, Muhib, Kevkeb-i Şarki and 
other newspapers was suspended many times following the Ali Kararname of 1867 (AJ, 
p. 85; see note 14 for Ali Kararname). 
37- According to NĠ2 and HB, articles criticizing the government were published on 
the pages of Terakki, founded in 1868 and owned by Ali RaĢit and Filip Efendi. 
38- In 1870 and 1874 Terakki‟s publication was temporarily suspended (NĠ2, HB, AK, 
HRE). 
39- AJ mentions Terakki among the “moderate liberal papers” (p. 87). 
40- “On foreign political issues, Terakki defended pro-French views, and entered into 
polemics with the pro-German Basiret” (AJ, p. 87). 
41- Founded in 1869 by AĢir Efendi, Hadika was rented by Ebuzziya Tevfik in 1872, 
and published many articles criticizing the government, including those on “the reasons 
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for Turkey‟s backwardness” (AJ, p. 58). HRE, NĠ2, and HB also mention that there was 
criticism of government on the pages of Hadika. 
42- For its critical content, the publication of Hadika was temporarily suspended (AJ, 
NĠ2, HB, HRE, SNG) and Ebuzziya Tevfik exiled (NĠ2, HB, HRE, SNG). 
43- Founded by Teodor Kasab in 1875, who also owned satirical titles, İstikbal‟s 
publication was suspended for four months in 1876 (AJ, p. 92). 
44- See note 36. 
45- Founded in 1869 by Mutasarrıf Bursalı ġakir Bey, Vakayi-i Zaptiye had a “semi-
official character” (NĠ2, HB, HRE, SNG). 
46- Owned by an Italian named Bordiyano, Şark published “articles that attacked 
Namık Kemal and his friends”, who represented the opposition to the Sultan (AJ, p.91). 
47- See note 15. 
48- Founded by Mustafa Refik Bey in 1863, Mir’at lasted three issues only and 
published parts of Montesquieu‟s “Reflections on the Causes of the Rise and Fall of the 
Roman Empire”, which, at the time, was “considered to be a criticism of the Ottoman 
political institutions” (AJ, p. 58). 
49- Mustafa Refik Bey, owner of Mir’at, was a member of the Young Ottomans (AJ, 
EBġ). 
50- Founded in 1870 by Ahmet Mithat Efendi and published under the name Bedir 
when it was closed, the paper criticized Ali Kararname (NĠ2, p. 248; see note 14) and 
Mithat Pasha (HB, p. 75). 
51- Devir was closed down the first day it was issued. Its follower, Bedir, was also 
closed down by the government (NĠ2, HRE, HB). 
52- Owned by Ebuzziya Tevfik, Sirac published an article titled “Our government 
cannot live without debt” (AJ, p. 91). 
53- Following the article criticizing the government‟s debts, Sirac was closed down 
(AJ; SNG, p. 62; HB, p.79; EBġ, p. 154). 
54- Published in 1874 by Eğribozlu Mehmet Arif Bey, Medeniyet was closed down by 
the government after publishing a caricature of Sultan Abdülaziz (NĠ2, p. 248). 
55- See note 36. 
Notes for Table 4.2 
The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Enver Behnan ġapolyo 
(1971), A. Jeltyakov (1979), Hülya Baykal (1990), Nuri Ġnuğur (1993), Alpay Kabacalı 
(2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the 
authors in the following notes, in the form of EBġ, AJ, HB, NĠ2 (there are two works by 
Nuri Ġnuğur used in this study), HT, and AK, to save from space. 
1- Tercüman-ı Hakikat and Saadet received monthly financial aid from the state. 
Tercüman-ı Hakikat, founded in 1878 and owned by Ahmet Mithat Efendi, received 
120.000 kuruşs, whereas Saadet received 36.000 (AJ, p. 114; NĠ2). 
2- According to HT, Tercüman-ı Hakikat was a progressive paper (p. 66). 
3- According to NĠ2, Tarık, Ayine-i Vatan (İstanbul), Saadet, and Tercüman-ı Hakikat 
were among the papers that received financial aid from the state. 
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4- Sabah, founded in 1876 and owned by Mihran Efendi, “was a platform for the 
defense of the oppression regime”, according to HB (p. 83). 
5- Sabah’s publication was temporarily suspended for a typographical error: “ġevketlu 
Abdülhamid” (His Majesty Abdulhamid) was misspelled as “Ģu kötü Abdülhamid” (that 
bad Abdülhamid), with the drop of the Arabic letter “lam” (NĠ2, p. 266). 
6- AJ describes Takvim-i Vakayi in this period as a “semi-official paper” (p. 114). 
7- Takvim-i Vakayi was owned and staffed by the state. 
8- “Takvim-i Vakayi was […] among the papers closed down in March 1878, when the 
Ottoman Parliament was disassembled” (AJ, p. 114). According to NĠ2, the reason for 
Takvim-i Vakayi‟s closure was a typographical error.  
9- İkdam‟s owner, Ahmet Cevdet, “formed a close relationship with the Palace, and 
succeeded in keeping this relationship for many years to come” (HT, p. 68). For similar 
observations, see HB (p. 129) and NĠ2 (p. 284). 
10- İkdam‟s publication was suspended several times for typographical errors. In one 
occasion, the phrase “leyle-i mes‟ude” (happy night) was misspelled as “leyle-i mesude” 
(black night) in an article on the anniversary on Abdülhamid‟s enthronement, with the 
drop of the Arabic letter “‟ayn” (HB, p. 127; EBġ, p. 221). 
11- Ali Suavi‟s last article before his failed attempt to overthrow Abdülhamid II was 
published in Basiret (HT, EBġ, NĠ2, AK, AJ). 
12- After the Ali Suavi incident (see note 11), Basiret was closed down by the 
government and its owner, Ali Efendi, was exiled (HT, EBġ, NĠ2, AK, AJ). 
13- Vakit criticized Istanbul‟s police chief Bahri PaĢa (AJ, p. 114). 
14- Following Bahri PaĢa criticism (see note 13), Vakit was closed down (AJ, p. 114; 
HB, p. 82). 
15- According to AJ, Saadet followed an anti-Young Ottoman political line (p. 119). 
16- See note 1. 
17- AJ argues that “the most reactionary social forces who opposed everything that 
was new not only in literature but in all areas of life and defended the preservation of 
feudal-Islamic traditions gathered around Saadet” (p.119). 
18- See note 3. 
19- Tarık was closed down by the government in 1899 (AJ, p. 118). 
20- Malumat‟s owner, Baba Tahir, had a close relationship with the Sultan (NĠ2, p. 
268). 
21- Yunus Nadi, who at the time was a columnist of Malumat, wrote against the Sultan 
in his articles (HT, p.103; NĠ2, p. 339). 
22- Yunus Nadi was exiled to Midilli (Lesvos) in 1901 (HT, p. 103; NĠ2, p. 339). 
Notes for Table 4.3 
The 5 histories of press that cover this period are those by Enver Behnan ġapolyo 
(1971), Hülya Baykal (1990), Nuri Ġnuğur (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı 
Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the 
following notes, in the form of EBġ, HB, NĠ2 (there are two works by Nuri Ġnuğur used 
in this study), HT, and AK, to save from space. 
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1- Tanin, founded in 1908 by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Tevfik Fikret, and Hüseyin 
Kazım, is described as a pro-CUP paper by all five authors covering this period (EBġ, p. 
175; HB, p. 158; HT, p. 83; AK, p. 134; NĠ2, p. 308). 
2- Tanin‟s owner and chief columnist Hüseyin Cahit was a member of the Ottoman 
Assembly of Representatives from Union and Progress Party (HT, NĠ2, AK, HB). In 
1914, the party officially became the owner of the paper (AK, HB, NĠ2). 
3- Tanin‟s building was looted by the mob during the March 31 incident (HT, EBġ, 
HB, NĠ2, AK). 
4- According to NĠ2 (p. 315) and HB (p. 168), Tanin was a pan-Turkist paper. 
5- All five authors agree that Şura-yı Ümmet was a pro-CUP paper (HT, p. 83; NĠ2, p. 
311; HB, p. 158; EBġ, p. 172; AK). 
6- Şura-yı Ümmet was among the papers looted by the mob during the March 31 
incident (HT, N;2, HB, EBġ, AK). 
7- According to EBġ, Tasvir-i Efkar, re-published by Ebuzziya Tevfik and Süleyman 
Nazif in 1908 and having nothing to do with ġinasi‟s Tasvir-i Efkar, was a pro-CUP 
paper. 
8- According to AK, Tasvir-i Efkar‟s owner, Ebuzziya Tevfik, was a supporter of the 
Union and Progress. 
9- EBġ gives the following list of pro-CUP papers in this period: Vakit, Tasvir-i Efkar, 
Millet, İttifak, İttihad, Basiret, Payıtaht, Servet, Ahali, İstiklal, Metin, Saadet, Zaman (p. 
173). 
10- See note 9. 
11- According to EBġ, Sabah and Tercüman-ı Hakikat “seemed to be impartial” (p. 
175). According to NĠ2, “the papers that remained impartial in this period were Sabah and 
Saadet” (p. 307). 
12- According to NĠ2 (p. 281) and EBġ (p. 147) Tercüman-ı Hakikat in this period was 
at first impartial, than became anti-CUP. According to HB, on the other hand, the paper 
was at first pro-CUP, then became impartial, and then turned anti-CUP (p. 124). 
13- See note 12. 
14- HT describes Tercüman-ı Hakikat in this period as “trying to remain impartial” (p. 
84). Also see notes 11 and 12. 
15- Sırat-ı Müstakim had a pro-Islamic political stand (HT, NĠ2, HB, EBġ). 
16- Mizan, owned by the historian Murat Bey, was an anti-CUP paper according to HT 
(p. 83), NĠ2 (p. 310), and EBġ (p. 173). 
17- According to AK, Mizan, İkdam, Osmanlı, and Serbesti at first supported the 
protestors in March 31 incident, but then changed position when the Operation Army 
approached Istanbul (p. 136). 
18- According to AK (p. 136) and HB (p. 174), Mizan‟s owner Murat Bey had anti-
CUP political views. 
19- One of Mizan‟s columnists, Zeki Bey, was assassinated by pro-CUP gunmen (p. 
176). Following the March 31 incident, Mizan was closed down and its owner, Murat 
Bey, was exiled to Rhodes (HB, p. 174). 
 169 
20- NĠ2 (p. 311) and HB (p. 176) describe Volkan, owned by DerviĢ Vahdeti, as an 
anti-CUP paper. 
21- Volkan was the chief propagator of the events known as March 31 incident (AK, 
NĠ2, EBġ, HB). 
22- Volkan was an organ of the association of Ġttihad-ı Muhammedi (NĠ2, p. 311), 
which played a prominent role in the March 31 incident. 
23- DerviĢ Vahdeti, Volkan‟s owner, was sentenced to death penalty after the March 
31 incident and executed (EBġ, p. 172). 
24- HT (p. 84) and NĠ2 (p. 311) describe Volkan as a “reactionary” paper. 
25- HB (p. 158) and EBġ describe Serbesti, owned by Mevlanazade Rıfat, as an anti-
CUP paper. EBġ‟s list of anti-CUP papers also includes Hukuk-u Umumiye, Osmanlı, 
Millet, and Sada-i Millet (p. 172). 
26- See note 17. 
27- In April 1909, the leader writer of Serbesti, Hasan Fehmi, was assassinated by pro-
CUP gunmen (EBġ, HB, HT, NĠ2, AK). 
28- According to HT (p. 83), NĠ2 (p. 310), HB (p. 158), and EBġ (p. 172), Hukuk-u 
Umumiye was an anti-CUP paper. 
29- Hukuk-u Umumiye was closed down after a short publication period by the CUP 
government (NĠ2, p. 310). 
30- HT (p. 83), NĠ2 (p. 310), HB (p. 175), and EBġ (p. 172) classify Sada-i Millet, 
owned by the parliamentarian Kozmidis, among the anti-CUP papers of this period. 
31- Ahmed Samim, leader writer of Sada-i Millet, was also assassinated by pro-CUP 
gunmen (EBġ, HB, HT, NĠ2, AK). 
32- NĠ2 (p. 310) and HB (p. 175) note that Sada-i Millet was an organ of the 
Democratic Party (Fırka-i Ġbad). 
33- NĠ2 (p. 307) and EBġ (p. 175) note that İkdam became a strong anti-CUP paper 
after Ali Kemal was made the leader writer.  
34- HB (p. 130) and NĠ2 (p. 307) note that İkdam published articles criticizing CUP 
policies, especially the censure of the press that the CUP re-introduced after a brief period 
in power. Also see note 17. 
35- NĠ2 (p. 307) and HB (p. 130) argue that İkdam defended the Liberal Party‟s (Ahrar 
Fırkası) views.  
36- See note 25. 
37- Founded by Süleyman Nazif in 1877, Osmanlı published articles criticizing CUP 
policies in this period (HB, p. 175). Also see note 17. 
38- According to HT, NĠ2, and HB, Osmanlı defended the views of the Liberal Party 
(Ahrar Fırkası). 
39- NĠ2 (p. 311) and HB (p. 175) note that articles criticizing CUP policies were 
published in Yeni Gazete, which was owned by Abdullah Zühtü. 
40- AK (p. 135) argues that this paper was a supporter of Sadrazam Kamil Pasha. 
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41- According to NĠ2, the capital for Yeni Gazete was provided by Kamil Pasha‟s son 
Said Pasha (p. 311). Also see note 40.  
42- Founded in 1911 by Refi Cevat Ulunay and Pehlivan Kadri, Alemdar was closed 
down after Mahmut ġevket Pasha was assassinated, and Refi Cevat was exiled first to 
Sinop, then to Çorum and Konya. 
43- HB (p. 184) notes that İştirak, founded in 1910 by Hüseyin Hilmi, was closed 
down by the government in 1912. 
44- HT (p. 95) and HB (p. 183) use the word “leftist” to describe this paper, and NĠ2 
uses “socialist” (p. 327). 
45- NĠ2 (p. 327) notes that İştirak was an organ of the Ottoman Socialist Party. 
ĠĢtirak‟s owner, Hüseyin Hilmi, was also the founder of the party (EBġ; p. 175). 
46- See note 9. 
47- See note 9. 
48- See note 9. 
49- See note 9. 
50- See note 9. 
51- See note 9. 
52- See note 9. 
53- See note 9. 
54- See note 9. 
55- NĠ2 notes that “Servet-i Fünun, started to be published daily by Ahmet Ġhsan, is 
considered to be impartial” (p. 307). 
56- See note 9. 
57- Saadet, published by Mehmet Efendi and his son Fehmi, “remained impartial in 
this period” (NĠ2, p. 307). 
58- AK and NĠ2 (p. 322) note that one of Şehrah‟s columnists, Zeki Bey, was among 
the journalists assassinated by the pro-CUP gunmen.  
59- NĠ2 (p. 325) notes that Şehrah was an organ of the Freedom and Unity Party 
(Hürriyet ve Ġtilaf Fırkası). 
60- Tanzimat‟s owner Lütfü Fkri had, according to NĠ2 (p. 335), an anti-CUP political 
stand. The paper was also published under the names Zühre, Matbuat, Merih, Islahat, 
Meşrik, Tesirat, Takdirat, Teşkilat, Teminat, and İfham. 
61- NĠ2 notes that Tanzimat‟s owner Lütfü Fikri was also the founder of Moderate 
Pro-Freedom Party (Mutedil Hürriyetperver Fırka) (p. 335). 
62- Published also under the names Türkiye, Selamet-i Umumiye, Genç Türk, Yeni Ses, 
and Hür Memleket, Hakimiyet-i Milliye was published by the Democratic Party (EBġ, p. 
175). 
Notes for Table 4.4 
The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Enver Behnan ġapolyo 
(1971), Hülya Baykal (1990), Nuri Ġnuğur (1993), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı 
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(2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the 
authors in the following notes, in the form of EBġ, HB, NĠ2 (there are two works by Nuri 
Ġnuğur used in this study), OK, HT, and AK, to save from space. 
1- Founded in 1919 by Celal Nuri Ġleri and Suphi Nuri Ġleri, Ati is classified as a pro-
National Struggle (NS) paper by HT (p. 98), NĠ2 (p. 337), HB (p. 203), and AK (p. 135). 
HT‟s (p. 98) and NĠ2‟s (p. 337) lists of pro-NS papers also include Yeni Gün, Akşam, and 
Vakit. AK‟s list, which is longer, includes Vakit, Tasvir-i Efkar, Akşam, İkdam, Tecüman-
ı Hakikat, and Tanin (p. 135). HB gives the longest list for pro-NS Istanbul papers, which, 
she argues, except for Alemdar, Peyam-ı Sabah and Türkçe İstanbul, “did not stand 
against the national struggle, and what is more, did their best to support it in the face of 
censure and suppression” (p. 203). These papers were –in addition to İleri- Tasvir-i Efkar, 
İkdam, Sebilürreşat, Vakit, Zaman, Yeni Gün, Akşam, İstikbal, Tarık, İfham, Memleket, 
and Tan. 
2- HT notes that Mustafa Kemal sent the news he wanted published to İleri, and the 
paper published them with different bylines. OK, NĠ2, HB, and EBġ also note that İleri‟s 
coverage was supportive of the NS in Anatolia. 
3- HB notes that İleri “was among the papers financially supported by the Anatolian 
government” (p. 211). One of the owners, Celal Nuri Ġleri was a member of the Ottoman 
Assembly of Representatives, and later of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) 
in its first through fourth terms (OK, p. 13; EBġ, p. 223). 
4- Celal Nuri was among those exiled to Malta in 1920 by the English for their support 
of the NS (HT, p. 102; NĠ2, p. 338). 
5- According to HB (p. 211) and NĠ2 (p. 338), İleri also had an anti-CUP political 
stand in this period. 
6- Founded by Yunus Nadi in 1918 and published in Ankara under the name 
Anadolu’da Yeni Gün, this paper is classified as a pro-NS paper by HT, NĠ2, AK, HB (see 
note 1), and EBġ (p. 198). 
7- Yeni Gün published an interview with Mustafa Kemal on 12 October 1919 (HT, p. 
103). The paper‟s headline before the Battle of Sakarya was as follows: “EskiĢehir kapanı 
Yunan‟ı bekliyor ve içeriye almak üzeredir. Zafer Allah‟la beraber olan bizledir” (“The 
trap of EskiĢehir is waiting for the Greek, and is about to close. Victory is with us, for we 
are with God.”) (OK, p. 27). NĠ2, HB, and EBġ also note that Yeni Gün‟s coverage was 
supportive of the NS. 
8- Yeni Gün‟s owner, Yunus Nadi, was a member of the Ottoman Assembly of 
Representatives (HT, p. 103), and a personal friend of Mustafa Kemal‟s (NĠ2, p. 340). 
9- Yeni Gün was closed down by the occupation forces for its pro-NS line (NĠ2, p. 340; 
HB, p. 214; EBġ, p. 198). 
10- Founded in 1918 by Necmettin Sadak, Kazım ġinasi Dersan, Ali Naci Karacan, 
and Falih Rıfkı Atay, Akşam is classified as a pro-NS paper by HT, NĠ2, AK, HB (see 
note 1), OK (p. 14) and EBġ (p. 225). 
11- “The paper suggested that the readers „trust the power and the devotion of the 
National Forces, who are the saviors of the country.‟ ” (HT, p.101, also see for other 
examples of pro-NS content in Akşam) On September 1921, Akşam‟s headline was as 
follows: “Cenab-ı Hakka hamdolsun, kahraman milli ordumuz düĢmanı tamamıyla 
tarumar etti.” (“Thank God, Our brave national army has completely destroyed the 
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enemy”) (OK, p. 27). EBġ, NĠ2, and HB also note that Akşam‟s coverage was supportive 
of the NS. 
12- Kazım ġinasi, Necmettin Sadak, Falih Rıfkı, and Ali Naci, owners and columnists 
of Akşam, had a strong reputation as pro-NS journalists, so much so that they were 
referred to as “Mustafa Kemal‟s princes” in the Istanbul press (NĠ2, p. 86). 
13- Falih Rıfkı, a columnist of Akşam at the time, was arrested by late Ottoman 
authorities and tried in the War Tribunal called Kürt Mustafa Harp Divanı for supporting 
the NS in Anatolia (NĠ2, p. 339; HB, p. 216). 
14- Founded in 1917 by Ahmet Emin Yalman and Mehmet Asım Us, Vakit is 
classified as a pro-NS paper by HT, NĠ2, AK, HB (see note 1), and EBġ (p. 190). 
15- Vakit had the following headline on October 19, 1919, after Ġzmir‟s occupation by 
the Greek: “Ġzmir Ģehidlerinin ruhuna Fatiha” (“May God forgive the martyrs of Ġzmir”) 
(OK, p. 13). HB (p. 207) and NĠ2 also note that Vakit‟s coverage was supportive of the 
National Forces. 
16- Asım Us, who had a strong reputation as a pro-NS journalist in these days, later 
served in the TGNA from its 3
rd
 through 8
th
 terms (HT, p. 106). 
17- Mehmet Asım Us was tried in the Kürt Mustafa War Tribunal as the leader writer 
of Akşam for supporting the National Forces (NĠ2, p. 361); and Ahmet Emin Yalman, one 
of the owners of the paper, was exiled to Malta by the English (HT, p. 106; NĠ2, p. 341; 
HB, p. 211). 
18- Re-published by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in 1922, Tanin is classified as a pro-NS 
paper by AK (p. 135). 
19- Tanin made its pro-NS position clear by the editorial in its first issue, written by 
Ġsmail MüĢtak Mayokan (HT, p. 117). 
20- Hüsyin Cahit Yalçın, Tanin‟s owner, was among those exiled to Malta by the 
English (AK, p. 135; EBġ, p. 190; NĠ2, HB). 
21- According to HT (p. 98), NĠ2 (p. 347), and HB, Tanin continued to be pro-CUP in 
this period. 
22- Tasvir-i Efkar was classified as a pro-NS paper by AK, HB (see note 1), and OK 
(p. 14). HT describes the political position of the paper in this period as “NS sympathizer” 
(p. 98), different from NS supporters proper. HT‟s list of sympathizers also includes 
İstiklal, İkdam, and Tercüman-ı Hakikat. In a similar account, NĠ2 describes this paper as 
a “sympathizer”, “who sometimes supported one, and sometimes supported the other” (p. 
344). NĠ2‟s list of sympathizers also includes İkdam and Tercüman-ı Hakikat. 
23- Tasvir-i Efkar was the paper that published Mustafa Kemal‟s picture during the 
National Struggle first (HT, p. 116). The paper also published an interview with Mustafa 
Kemal, conducted over the telegraph (HT, p. 116). Following the Greek occupation of 
Bursa, Tasvir-i Efkar‟s headline on 15 July 1920 was as follows: “Fatihlerin Yavuzların 
türbelerini bırakıp gidecek misiniz?” (“Are you going to leave Fatih‟s and Yavuz‟s tombs 
and go?”). NĠ2 (p. 343), HB (p. 203) and EBġ (p. 190) also note the pro-NS content of 
Tasvir-i Efkar. 
24- Founded in 1921 by Sedat Simavi, Payıtaht is described as a pro-NS paper by NĠ2 
(p. 115) Sedat Simavi also published Dersaadet in this period. 
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25- Tercüman-ı Hakikat in this period is classified as a pro-NS paper by AK (see note 
1) and HB (p. 217), and as an NS sympathizer by HT and NĠ2 (see note 22).  
26- NĠ2 (p. 347) and HB (p. 217) note that Tercüman-ı Hakikat‟s coverage was 
supportive of the National Forces. 
27- Mustafa Kemal wrote un-signed editorials for Hakimiyet-i Milliye, laying the 
principles and initial formulations of the National Struggle (NĠ2, HB, EBġ). The paper‟s 
title is translated into English as “National Sovereignty”. 
28- Hakimiyet-i Milliye, published in Ankara, was the organ of the National Struggle, 
owned first by the Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, then by the 
Republican People‟s Party (CHP) (HT, HB, EBġ, NĠ2, OK, AK). 
29- HB includes Sebilürreşat in her list of pro-NS papers (See note 1). NĠ2 also notes 
that the paper supported the national struggle. 
30- Most of the columnists of Sebilürreşat, also published under the names Beyan-ül 
Hak and Sırat-ı Müstakim, had pro-Islamic political views (HT, p. 98; HB, p. 220; NĠ2, p. 
350). EBġ notes that Sebilürreşat was published by the Second Group, the opposition to 
Mustafa Kemal in the first Grand National Assembly (p. 202). 
31- HB and AK include İkdam in their lists of pro-NS papers (see note 1), and HT and 
NĠ2 in their lists of sympathizers (see note 22). 
32- İkdam‟s headline on 14 April 1921 was as follows: “Mustafa Kemal Anadolu‟ya 
hayat vermiĢtir.” (“Mustafa Kemal gave new life to Anatolia.”) (HT, p. 114). HB (p. 205) 
and EBġ also note that the coverage of İkdam was supportive of the NS. 
33- According to NĠ2 (p. 347) and HB (p. 213), İkdam was, in the beginning of the 
National Struggle, “in the middle.”  
34- Mihran Efendi‟s paper Sabah was named Peyam-ı Sabah in 1920 and its 
management was left to Peyam‟s leader writer Ali Kemal. Peyam-ı Sabah is classified as 
an anti NS paper by EBġ (p. 191), HT (p. 98), NĠ2 (p. 276), HB (p. 119), OK (p. 12), and 
AK. HT‟s (p. 98), NĠ2‟s (p. 341), and HB‟s (p. 203) lists of anti-NS papers also include 
Alemdar and Türkçe İstanbul. 
35- According to HB (p. 119), HT (p. 109), EBġ (p. 191), and NĠ2 (p. 344), Peyam-ı 
Sabah‟s content had an anti-NS character. 
36- Ali Kemal, leader writer of Peyam-ı Sabah, served as the Minister of National 
Education and Minister of Internal Affairs (HT, p. 107). 
37- Once the war was over, Mihran Efendi, Peyam-ı Sabah‟s owner, “sold everything 
he had, and fled to Europe” (HT, p. 109; Ni2, p. 278). Leader writer Ali Kemal was 
lynched by a mob when under arrest, due to the negligence of the authorities (HT, OK, 
EBġ, HB, NĠ2). 
38- According to HB (p. 120), Peyam-ı Sabah was an organ of the Freedom and Unity 
Party (Hürriyet ve Ġtilaf Fırkası). 
39- According to HT, NĠ2, HB (see note 34), OK (p. 19), AK, and EBġ (p. 191), 
Alemdar was an anti-NS paper. 
40- HT gives examples from Alemdar showing its anti-NS position, like the following: 
“Bu millet Ġttihatçıları ve Kuvayı Milliye‟yi istemiyor. ĠnĢaallah onların kafasına adalet 
kazmasının indiğini yakında göreceğiz.” (“This nation does not want the CUP men nor 
 174 
the National Forces. We will hopefully see the axe of justice falling on their heads.”) (p. 
112). HB (p. 231) and NĠ2 (p. 342) also note the anti-NS coverage of Alemdar. 
41- Alemdar‟s owner, Refi Cevat Ulunay, was included in the list of 150 personae non 
gratae of Turkey (EBġ, p. 191; HT, p. 112; OK, p. 53; NĠ2, p. 342). 
42- According to NĠ2 (p. 342) and HB (p. 230), Alemdar had an anti-CUP position in 
this period. 
43- See note 40. 
44- According to HT, Alemdar‟s owner, Refi Cevat Ulunay “had two big enemies: 
Union and Progress, and the National Forces” (p. 112). 
45- NĠ2, HB, and HT (see note 34) include Türkçe İstanbul in their lists of anti-NS 
papers. 
46- NĠ2 (p. 341), HB (p. 227), and EBġ (p. 191) note that Türkçe İstanbul‟s coverage 
was anti-NS. 
47- Türkçe İstanbul‟s owner Sait Molla was also included in the list of 150 personae 
non gratae of Turkey (OK, p. 53; HT). 
48- NĠ2 (p. 341) notes that Türkçe İstanbul was a supporter of Freedom and Unity 
Party. 
49- Sait Molla was a member of the Association of Friends of England in Turkey 
(Ġngiliz Muhipleri Cemiyeti), and a supporter of Freedom and Unity Party (HT; HB, p. 
228). 
50- OK notes that Serbesti‟s owner Mevlanazade Rıfat‟s name was included in the list 
of 150 personae non gratae of Turkey.  
51- Mevlanazade Rıfat, Serbesti‟s owner, was a member of the Freedom and Unity 
Party (OK, p. 53). 
52- Published in Ankara in 1921 by Abdülgani Ahmet Bey, Öğüt was described as a 
pro-NS paper by NĠ2 (p. 353), EBġ (p. 200), and HB (p. 260). 
53- HB (p. 261) notes that Öğüt‟s content had a pro-NS character. 
54- Published by Ġsmail Hami DaniĢmend, Hukuk-u Beşer had pro-NS content on its 
pages, the most famous example of which is Osman Nevres‟s (i.e. Hasan Tahsin) articles, 
who is known to have started the armed resistance against the Greek occupation of Ġzmir 
(HT, p. 118; OK, p. 66; NĠ2, p. 352). 
55- See note 55. 
56- Minber contained news on Mustafa Kemal in almost all of its issues, Mustafa 
Kemal wrote unsigned articles for the paper (NĠ2, p. 20), and, as HT notes (p. 117), the 
paper published anti-mandate, pro-NS articles. 
57- Part of the capital for Minber‟s publication was personally provided by Mustafa 
Kemal (HT, p. 117; NĠ2, p. 17). 
58- About the position of Minber towards the CUP, there are two conflicting accounts: 
HT argues that “the paper ran a large scale campaign against the CUP” (p. 117); whereas 
NĠ2 argues that one of the reasons for Minber‟s publication was “to prevent the 
unfounded attacks against the CUP, of which Fethi Bey [official owner of the paper and a 
close friend of Mustafa Kemal‟s] was a former member” (p. 19). In an article devoted to 
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the paper and its position towards the CUP, Tevetoğlu (1988) reaches the conclusion, 
after a close reading of the articles published in the paper, that overall Minber was critical 
of the CUP and its activities (Tevetoğlu, 1988). 
59- NĠ2 notes that Minber was founded to defend the views of Ottoman Pro-Freedom 
People‟s Party (Osmanlı Hürriyetperver Avam Fırkası) (p. 19), which was founded by the 
paper‟s official owner, Ali Fethi Okyar, and which shared offices with the paper (NĠ2, p. 
17). Also see note 58. 
60- Owned by Mehmet Tevfik Efendi, Hadisat published Süleyman Nazif‟s famous 
article “A Black Day” (“Kara Bir Gün”) when Istanbul was occupied (OK) 
61- Süleyman Nazif was exiled to Malta after his article “A Black Day” (See note 60). 
62- HB includes İstiklal in her list of pro-NS papers (see note 1), and HT in his list of 
sympathizers (see note 22). 
63- HT (p. 115) gives a pro-mandate example from this paper: “Amerika Kabul 
etmezse, Ġngiltere‟ye veya baĢka bir memlekete manda teklif edilmelidir.” (“If the US 
refuses, then we should offer mandate to Britain or to another country.”) (Leader writer 
Rauf Ahmed). 
64- See note 1. 
65- See note 1. 
66- Not to be confused with Ali ġükrü Bey‟s Tan in Ankara, this Tan was published in 
Istanbul and is included in HB‟s list of pro-NS Istanbul papers (See note 1). 
67- According to HB (p. 224) Tan defended British mandate for Turkey. 
68- See note 1. 
79- See note 1. 
70- According to HB (p. 225), this paper was an organ of the National Turkish Party 
(Milli Türk Partisi) and defended American mandate. 
71- HT gives the following pro-NS example from Seyyare-i Yeni Dünya, published in 
Ankara: “We are receiving news from all around the country that our soldiers are fighting 
with a great enthusiasm” (p. 136). 
72- HB (p. 284) and EBġ (p. 195) note that Seyyare-i Yeni Dünya was a pro-Çerkes 
Ethem paper, who was a prominent leader of irregular forces in the national struggle, and 
named a traitor when he refused to join the regular army being formed. 
73- Oral (1968, p. 89) notes that under the title of the paper, the following quote from 
the Communist Manifesto regularly appeared: “Workers of the world, unite!” (“Dünyanın 
fıkara-i kasibesi birleĢiniz.”)  
74- The paper‟s owner, Arif Oruç, was known for his pro-communist views (Oral, 
1968, p. 89). 
75- İdrak, founded in 1919 by ĠĢtirakçi Hilmi, was a leftist paper (HT, p. 95). 
76- ĠĢtirakçi Hilmi, owner of the paper, is also the founder of the short lived Turkish 
Socialist Party (Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası) (HT, p. 95). 
77- Published by Mahmut Sadık, Yeni Gazete was a pro-American mandate paper 
(HB, p. 224). 
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78- Emek, published in Ankara, was an organ of the People‟s Socialist Party (Halk 
ĠĢtirakiyyun Fırkası) (HT, p. 48, citing from K Yust, Anatoliskaya Peçat [Anadolu 
Basını], Tiflis, 1922) 
79- Published in Ankara by Salih Hoca, Erzurum representative in the first GNA, 
Şarkın Sesi supported the opposition against Mustafa Kemal in the Parliament (HB, p. 
320; EBġ, p. 202). 
80- Published in Ankara by Ali ġükrü Bey, Trabzon representative in the first GNA, 
Tan (not to be confused with Tan published in Istanbul, see note 66) “supported the 
Second Group, that is to say, the conservatives” (HB, p. 321). 
81- Tan‟s owner, Trabzon representative Ali ġükrü Bey was one of the leaders of the 
Second Group in the first GNA (EBġ, p. 203). 
 Notes for Table 4.5  
The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Fuat Süreyya Oral (1968), 
Enver Behnan ġapolyo (1971), Nuri Ġnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay 
Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials 
of the authors in the following notes, in the form of FSO, EBġ, NĠ, OK, HT, and AK, to 
save from space. 
1- OK (p. 55) and EBġ  (p. 222) describe Vakit as a pro-government paper. 
2- Vakit did not publish the Aga Khan & Emir Ali letter, which was sent by prominent 
Indian Muslim leaders Aga Khan and Emir Ali to Istanbul newspapers in 1923, 
addressing Prime Minister Ġsmet Pasha and asking the caliphate to be retained. The papers 
that did publish the letter were Tanin, İkdam, and Tevhid-i Efkar (HT, p 144; NĠ, p. 46; 
OK, p. 61; EBġ, p. 234). Vatan and Akşam, along with Vakit, did not publish the letter. 
Asked in the trial (see note 17) about their decision not to publish, Akşam and Vakit‟s 
managers said it was because the letter did not fit their political views, whereas Vatan‟s 
manager said that they did not have the letter (HT, p. 145). 
3- Mehmet Asım Us, Vakit‟s leader writer, served in the TGNA from its 3rd through 8th 
terms (OK, p. 71). Other journalists who served in the Parliament in this period included 
Falih Rıfkı Atay (Ulus), Yunus Nadi (Cumhuriyet), Hakkı Tarık Us (Vakit), Mahmut 
Soydan (Milliyet, Politika, İnkılap), and Ahmet Cevdet (İkdam) (OK, p. 71). 
4- FSO (p. 76) and EBġ (p. 225) describe Akşam in this period as a pro-government 
paper. 
5- Akşam, along with Vakit, did not publish the Ağa Han & Emir Ali letter for political 
reasons. See note 2. 
6- Akşam‟s leader writer Necmettin Sadak also served in the TGNA (EBġ, p. 225). 
7- Founded in 1925 by Ataturk‟s directive, with capital from ĠĢbank (NĠ, p. 83) and 
under the management of Mahmut Soydan, Siirt representative in the TGNA, Miiliyet 
“became a semi-official paper of the government” (FSO, p. 79). OK also describes 
Milliyet as a pro-CHP paper. 
8- In 1926, Ataturk‟s memoir was published in Milliyet, with the byline Mahmut and 
Falih Rıfkı, dictated to them by Ataturk in person (EBġ, p. 231). 
9- Milliyet‟s manager, Mahmut Soydan, was a member of the TGNA (NĠ, p. 83; EBġ, 
p. 231; FSO, p. 79; OK, p. 71). 
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10- Cumhuriyet, published in Istanbul by Yunus Nadi, “became the most authoritative 
representative of the Republican regime in Istanbul” (NĠ, p. 69), and “a defender of the 
Turkish reforms” (FSO, p. 77). 
11- Mustafa Kemal chose the name for Yunus Nadi‟s paper himself (NĠ, p. 64; OK, p. 
62; EBġ, p. 228), who was a personal friend of his. 
12- Published from 1925 to 1929 by Selim Ragıp and Ekrem Bey, Son Saat is 
described by OK as “close to the People‟s Party” (p. 63). 
13- Celal Nuri Ġleri, İleri‟s owner, served in the 1st through 5th terms of the TGNA 
(HT, p. 102). 
14- Hakimiyet-i Milliye became the organ of the CHP when the party was founded 
(FSO, p. 74). 
15- See note 3. 
16- İkdam was one of the papers that published the Ağa Han & Emir Ali letter (See 
note 2). 
17- Ahmet Cevdet, İkdam‟s owner, was among the journalists tried in the Istanbul 
Tribunal of Independence, along with Hüseyin Cahit –Tanin‟s leader writer- and Velid 
Ebuzziya –Tevhid-i Efkar‟s leader writer-, which was formed at the request of the Prime 
Minister Ġnönü following the controversy around caliphate in 1923. The journalists were 
all acquitted (HT, p. 145; NĠ, p. 46; EBġ, p. 234; OK, p. 61; HB, p. 126). 
18- EBġ (p. 234) and FSO (p. 120) describe Tanin in this period as an opposition 
paper. FSO‟s list of opposition papers also includes Tevhid-i Efkar and Vatan. 
19- Tanin was among the papers that published the Aga Khan & Emir Ali letter (See 
note 2). Tanin‟s pro-caliphate content in these days also included a letter by Istanbul Bar 
Association‟s President Lütfi Fikri, who was a former member of the Parliament, 
addressed at the Caliph himself and asking him not to resign (HT, p. 144; NĠ, p. 45), and 
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın‟s articles, in one of which he argued “If we let go of the Caliphate, 
Turkey, with its population of 5-10 millions, will become a minor player in the Islamic 
world” (HT, p. 144). Tanin‟s coverage of the Progressive Republican Party‟s 
(Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, TCF) activities –the first opposition party to be 
founded in the history of the Republic- was also sympathetic: It gave the news of police 
investigation in TCF headquarters using a strong language, describing it as a “police raid” 
(HT, p. 149). 
20- Tanin‟s leader writer Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was known for his anti-government 
(EBġ, p. 225) and pro-caliphate (HT, p. 143) political views. 
21- For its pro-opposition stand, Tanin and its owner Hüseyin Cahit Yslçın faced 
prosecution. Yalçın was tried in Istanbul Tribunal of Independence for his pro-caliphate 
views in 1923 (see note 17) and in Ankara Tribunal of Independence in 1925 for his pro-
TCF views (see note 19), where he was sentenced to exile in Çorum, a small Anatolian 
town at the time (NĠ, p. 55). Tanin was closed down following the Law on the 
Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu), passed in 1925, along with Vatan, 
Tevhid-i Efkar, Son Telgraf, İstiklal, Sebilürreşat, Aydınlık, and Orak-Çekiç (HT, p. 148; 
NĠ, p. 53; OK, p. 63). 
22- FSO (see note 18) and EBġ (p. 234) describe Vatan in this period as an opposition 
paper. 
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23- Vatan did not publish the Aga Khan & Emir Ali letter because the letter did not 
reach them (see note 2), but there was pro-caliphate content on the pages of Vatan: A 
speech by Rauf Orbay, Mustafa Kemal‟s friend in the War of Independence and rival 
after the war was won, arguing that caliphate is the best form of government, was 
published in Vatan (HT, p. 144). 
24- Ahmet Amin Yalman, Vatan‟s leader writer, was an opponent of the government 
(EBġ, p. 227) and a supporter of Rauf Orbay (HT, p. 144). 
25- Vatan was among the papers closed down after the Law on the Maintenance of 
Order (see note 21). Ahmet Emin Yalman, Vatan‟s owner, was tried in the Elazığ 
Tribunal of Independence in 1925, along with journalists from Tevhid-i Efkar, Son 
Telgraf, and Sebilürreşad (NĠ, p. 55; HT, p. 152; EBġ, p. 224). 
26- Tevhid-i Efkar is described as an opposition paper by FSO (see note 18), EBġ (p. 
234), and HT (p. 154). HT‟s list also includes Sebilürreşad and Son Telgraf. 
27- Tevhid-i Efkar was among the papers that published the Aga Khan & Emir Ali 
letter (see note 2). Reuf Orbay‟s speech defending caliphate was also published in Tevhid-
i Efkar (see note 23). 
28- Velid Ebuzziya, Tevhid-i Efkar‟s leader writer, was known for his pro-caliphate 
views (HT, p. 143). 
29- Tevhid-i Efkar was among the papers closed down after the Law on the 
Maintenance of Order (see note 21). Velid Ebuzziya was among the journalists tried in 
Istanbul (see note 17) and Elazığ (see note 25) Tribunals of Independence. Velid 
Ebuzziya was not invited to a meeting Ataturk had with major journalists in Ġzmir in 1921 
(HT, p. 146; NĠ, p. 49). 
30- Sebilürreşad is described by EBġ (p. 235) and HT (see note 26) as an opposition 
paper. 
31- EĢref Edip, Sebilürreşad‟s leader writer, was known for his pro-caliphate political 
views (HT, p. 143). 
32- SebilürreĢad was among the papers closed down after the Law on the Maintenance 
of Order (see note 21). Sebilürreşad‟s manager was among the journalists tried in Elazığ 
Tribunal of Independence (see note 25). 
33- Son Telgraf is described as an opposition paper by EBġ (p. 235) and HT (see note 
26). 
34- See note 25. 
35- Yarın, published in 1929 by Arif Oruç, is described as an opposition paper by HT 
(p. 155), NĠ (p. 92), OK (p. 66), and AK (p. 189); as an anti-CHP paper by NĠ (p. 92), and 
as a pro-SCF (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, Free Republican Party) paper by HT (p. 136), 
NĠ (p. 92), and AK (p. 189). 
36- Yarın was protected by Fethi Okyar, EBġ argues (p. 236), who was the leader of 
the SCF. 
37- Yarın was closed down by the government (NĠ, p. 93; AK, p. 189; EBġ, p. 236), its 
columnists were arrested (NĠ, p. 93; AK, p. 189) and then fled to Bulgaria (NĠ, p. 93; 
EBġ, p. 236). 
38- OK describes Yarın as a paper of the left (p. 66). 
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39- Son Posta, founded in 1930 by Zekeriya Sertel, Selim Ragıp Emeç, Ekrem 
UĢaklıgil, and Halil Lütfü Dördüncü, is described as an opposition paper by NĠ (p. 103), 
HT (p. 155), and AK (p. 189); and as a pro-SCF paper by OK (p. 66) and AK (p. 189). 
AK (p. 189) and HT (p. 155) also note that Son Posta‟s and Yarın‟s pro-SCF positions 
resulted in a significant increase in their circulations. 
40- İnkılap, published in 1928 by Ali Naci Karacan in Istanbul –not to be confused 
with İnkılap published in Ankara by Aka Gündüz-, was a self-professed pro-CHP paper: 
In its first issue, the leader column read: “Mustafa Kemal […] founded the People‟s Party. 
We are from that party. We are non-paid, but sincere staff of that party” (NĠ, p. 88). NĠ 
also describes the paper‟s position as anti-SCF (p. 89). 
41- On its first issue, İnkılap published a letter by Ġsmet Ġnönü, the leader of the 
People‟s Party, advising the paper on how to become a successful newspaper, penned at 
the request of Ġnkılap (NĠ, p. 88). 
42- See note 41. 
43- See note 21. 
44- See note 21. 
45- See note 21. 
46- EBġ describes Orak-Çekiç as a paper of the left. 
Notes for Table 4.6 
The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Fuat Süreyya Oral (1968), 
Enver Behnan ġapolyo (1971), Nuri Ġnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay 
Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials 
of the authors in the following notes, in the form of FSO, EBġ, NĠ, OK, HT, and AK, to 
save from space. 
1- Vakit “supported the activities of the government on every occasion” (NĠ, p. 129) 
2- Ataturk wrote leader columns of Vakit from 22 to 26 January 1937, under the 
signature of Asım Us, on the then unresolved issue of Hatay (HT, p. 165; NĠ, 130). 
3- Vakit‟s leader writer Asım Us served in the TGNA (See note 3 for Table 4.5). 
4- Ulus “voiced the views of the government and the CHP” (HT, p. 164) in this period, 
and was “the official organ of the CHP and the state” (OK, p. 71). 
5- Hakimiyet-i Milliye, named Ulus in 1934, was owned by the CHP in this period too. 
6- Re-published in 1943 by Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Tanin is described as a pro-CHP 
paper in this period by HT (p. 180) and AK (p. 203). 
7- NĠ notes that Tanin‟s owner Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was a supporter of the CHP in 
this period (p. 203). 
8- HT describes Tanin in this period as an anti-left paper (p. 180), and OK describes it 
as a pro-Ally paper (p. 81). 
9- Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, Tanin‟s owner, was a defender of anti-German and anti-
Soviet political views during WWII (NĠ, p. 193-194). 
10- İkdam in this period, according to NĠ, was a “defender of Ataturk‟s principles and 
reforms” (p. 151). 
11- HT describes Cumhuriyet in this period as a pro-government paper (p. 162). 
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12- Yunus Nadi, Cumhuriyet‟s owner, was a personal friend of Ataturk‟s, and 
according to Falih Rıfkı Atay, Ataturk considered Cumhuriyet to be his own paper (HT, 
p. 162). 
13- Cumhuriyet‟s publication was suspended in 1934, 1940, and 1941 for 10, 90, and 1 
days for “damaging the general policy of the country” (NĠ, p. 72), a power given to the 
government by the 1931 Press Law. 
14- HT (p. 170), NĠ (p. 169), and OK (p. 81) describe Cumhuriyet‟s position in WWII 
as pro-German. 
15- Nadir Nadi, Yunus Nadi‟s son and one of the columnists of Cumhuriyet, wrote: 
“Today, there is the living reality of German power in Europe, which comes from the 
German unity. […] Trying to destroy the German unity by arguing that it is a threat for 
Europe is like trying to run the history backwards” (HT, p. 170). (“Bugün Avrupa‟da bir 
Alman kudreti yaĢanıyor. Bu, Alman birliğinden gelir. […] Avrupa için bir tehlike 
olacağını ileri sürerek Alman birliğini parçalamaya uğraĢmak, tarihi tersine yürütmek 
gayretine benzer.”) 
16- Akşam‟s leader writer, Necmettin Sadak, served in the TGNA (EBġ, p. 225). 
17- In 1934, Akşam‟s publication was suspended for 10 days, along with Cumhuriyet, 
Son Posta, and Zaman (FSO, p. 122). 
18- HT (p. 180) describes Akşam‟s position in this period as left of center. 
19- HT (p. 180) describes Tasvir-i Efkar in this period as a nationalist paper. OK notes 
the paper had a pro-German position in WWII (p. 81). 
20- NĠ notes that columnists known for their nationalist views wrote in Tasvir (p. 203). 
21- Yeni Sabah, founded by Ġsmail Safa and Cemalettin Saraçoğlu in 1938 had 
Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın as the leader writer, who was known for his anti-German views 
(NĠ, p. 169). 
22- Published by Mahmut Soydan, Milliyet (see note 7 for Table 4.5) was bought by 
Ahmet Emin Yalman, Zekeriye Sertel and Halil Lütfü Dördüncü in 1935, and named Tan. 
In 1938, other partners left due to a conflict over the paper‟s political position (HT, p. 
163; NĠ, p. 125), and Zekeriya Sertel decided the paper‟s line. EBġ (p. 237) and AK (p. 
190) identify Tan under Sertel‟s management as an opposition paper.  
23- HT cites the following from Sertel‟s articles in Tan: “Our last hope could be the 
Grand National Assembly. But it represents the CHP, not the nation, and cannot initiate 
the establishment of real democracy” (p. 179, citing from Zekeriya Sertel, 
Hatırladıklarım, p. 246. Yaylacık Matbaası, Ġstanbul, 1968). 
24- In what is usually referred as the “Tan raid”, Tan headquarters were looted in 1945 
by protestors, most of them students, in some accounts organized by the CHP Istanbul 
branch (HT, p.181-184), along with the press facilities of a left-wing magazine. In 1950, 
Zekeriya Sertel and Sabiha Sertel had to leave the country (HT, p. 181-184; EBġ, p. 237, 
AK, p. 190; FSO, p. 157). 
25- Tan is described by HT (p. 180) and EBġ (p. 237) as a leftist paper; and as pro-
Soviet by HT (p. 182), NĠ (p. 126), and OK (p. 81). 
26- NĠ notes that Tan‟s columnists were known for their socialist tendencies (p. 125). 
27- Re-published in 1930s by Arif Oruç, Yarın was an opposition paper (NĠ, p. 94). 
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28- Yarın was closed down by the government (NĠ, p. 94). 
29- Re-published in 1940 by Ahmet Emin Yalman, Vatan is described as an opposition 
paper by HT (p. 180). 
30- NĠ notes that Ahmet Emin Yalman, Vatan‟s leader writer, was a liberal opponent 
of the government (p. 178). 
31- OK (p. 81) and FSO (p. 145) note that Vatan had a pro-Ally position in WWII. 
32- See note 17. 
33- The paper had a pro-German position in WWII (NĠ, p. 169). 
34- See note 17. 
35- NĠ argues that Bugün, published in 1938 by Ali Naci Karacan was “a defender of 
Ataturk‟s principles and reforms” (p. 150). 
36- Yurt was published by CHP in 1933 as a wall-paper for peasants (EBġ, p. 237). 
37- Published by Ahmet Ağaoğlu in 1933, Akın was a paper Ataturk disliked (HT, p. 
164, citing from Samet Ağaoğlu, Babamın Arkadaşları, p. 175-178; NĠ, p. 132). 
Notes for Table 4.7 
The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Fuat Süreyya Oral (1968), 
Enver Behnan ġapolyo (1971), Nuri Ġnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay 
Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials 
of the authors in the following notes, in the form of FSO, EBġ, NĠ, OK, HT, and AK, to 
save from space. 
1- Vakit is described as a pro-government paper in this period by NĠ (p. 200). 
2- NĠ cites the following from Asım Us, the leader writer of Vakit: “Those who think 
there is a need for a second party besides CHP must not touch CHP‟s foundations, which 
forms the only cement that binds our national unity together in this country, whatever else 
they do” (p. 201). 
3- Asım Us, Vakit‟s leader writer, served in the TGNA (see note 3 for Table 4.5). 
4- HT describes Ulus in this period as a pro-government paper (p. 190). 
5- NĠ notes that the paper‟s party ownership is emphasized by the following phrase 
that appeared under the title of the paper in this period: “CHP Ulus Müessesesi, -Çankırı 
Caddesi, Ankara” (“CHP Ulus Foundation, -Çankırı Street, Ankara”) (p. 208). 
6- NĠ notes that after the 1946 elections, of the three papers that published DP leader 
Celal Bayar‟s allegations of fraud, two were closed down (Yeni Sabah and Gerçek), 
whereas Tanin was not, because it was a pro-government paper (p. 202). 
7- NĠ gives examples of Tanin‟s anti-opposition coverage in this period (p. 195). 
8- NĠ counts Akşam among the pro-government papers of this period (p. 200). 
9- Akşam‟s leader writer Necmettin Sadak served in the TGNA (EBġ, p. 225), and in 
the government as the Foreign Minister from 1948 to 1950, during which time AkĢam 
was published without a leader column (HT, p. 188). 
10- After the Democrat Party (DP) was founded in 1945, a United Office (BirleĢik 
Büro) was founded by Tasvir, Vatan, Yeni Sabah, and Akşam to better follow the news. 
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NĠ argues that this made “the four largest circulation papers of Turkey allies against the 
CHP government”, because the United Office gave pro-DP, anti-CHP news (p. 201). 
11- HT (p. 188) argues that Akşam “remained outside the political controversies” in 
this period. NĠ notes that “polemics against the DP” were not published in Akşam (p. 
222). 
12- NĠ (p. 226) describes Hergün as “a paper that represents the right-wing view”. 
13- HT (p. 213) observes that Tan in this period was “re-published with a new 
understanding, free from left-wing views”. NĠ (p. 229) notes that in 1948, Ali Naci 
Karacan “tried to bring together a new cadre of columnists to make the paper, known until 
then as an organ of extreme left-wing currents, a defender of Ataturk‟s principles and 
reforms”. 
14- See note 10. 
15- See note 6. 
16- NĠ notes that articles that attack both CHP and DP were published in Yeni Sabah, 
as the following quote illustrates: “Real democracy in this country will be established by 
the nation despite the CHP and despite the Democrats” (p. 148-149). 
17- NĠ (p. 149) describes Yeni Sabah as a pro-MP (Nation Party, Millet Partisi) paper. 
18- License holder for the paper is Sadık Aldoğan, one of the MP‟s founders (NĠ, p. 
149). 
19- NĠ describes Hergün as a right-wing paper (p. 226). Published in 1947 by Mehmet 
Faruk Gürtunca, this paper is not to be confused with Vala Nurettin and Nizamettin 
Nazif‟s Hergün, published in 1933. 
20- Founded in 1948 by Sedat Simavi, Hürriyet is described as a pro-DP paper by HT 
(p. 214) and FSO (p. 154). 
21- According to HT, Hürriyet “was published by the principles of independence and 
impartiality in this period of heated party debates” (p. 186-187). 
22- On the right-hand side of Hürriyet‟s first issue, Ġnönü‟s picture and an article by 
Ġnönü were published, and on the left-hand side, Bayar‟s picture and an article by Bayar 
(HT, p. 186; NĠ, p. 232). 
23- Vatan is described as a pro-DP paper by HT (p. 188), FSO (p. 145), and EBġ (p. 
227); and as an anti-CHP paper by FSO (p. 145). 
24- Vatan frequently published articles by DP leaders (HT, p. 188), and criticized 
President Ġnönü (HT, p. 216-217). 
25- According to HT, Vatan‟s chief columnist “acted like an advisor to DP leaders on 
many issues” (p. 188). 
26- According to NĠ (p. 184) and HT (p. 188), Cumhuriyet in this period supported the 
newly founded DP. 
27- Nadir Nadi, leader writer of Cumhuriyet after his father‟s death in 1945, was 
elected to the Parliament as an independent from the DP list (NĠ, p. 185). 
28- Tasvir, according to HT (p. 189), NĠ (p. 201), and EBġ (p. 247), was an anti-CHP, 
pro-DP paper in this period. 
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29- FSO describes Vakit in this period as an anti-communist, pro-democracy paper (p. 
148). 
30- According to HT, Son Posta was “an enthusiastic supporter” of the DP in this 
period (p. 190). 
31- HT (p. 190), FSO (p. 154), and AK (p. 199) describe Zafer, founded in 1949 and 
published in Ankara, as a pro-DP paper. 
33- Re-published in 1948 by Halil Lütfü Dördüncü and Ali Naci Karacan, Tan this 
time did not have a left tendency (HT, p. 213), and became a “supporter of Ataturk‟s 
principles and reforms” (NĠ, p. 229). 
34- Memleket was published by CHP as the Istanbul issue of party paper Ulus (FSO, p. 
149). 
35- Zaman was published by Nusret Safa CoĢkun between 1948-1954 “with CHP‟s 
support” (FSO, p. 154). 
36- Previously published as Kuvvet, Kudret was a pro-DP paper (FSO, p. 151; NĠ, p. 
387; EBġ, p. 254). 
37- In 1949, Kudret‟s publication was suspended and its manager sent to jail (FSO, p. 
151). 
38- When the MP was founded, Kudret became a pro-MP paper (FSO, p. 151). 
39- After MP‟s foundation, Kudret was published by that party (EBġ, p. 254). 
40- FSO describes Yeni Çağ as a pro-DP paper (p. 148). 
41- FSO notes that Yeni Çağ was an anti-communist paper (p. 148). 
42- FSO describes Demokrasi, published in 1946, as a pro-DP paper (p. 158). 
43- Published in 1947, Demirkırat‟s leader writer was Prof. Kenan Öner, president of 
DP‟s Istanbul branch (FSO, p. 151). 
44- FSO describes Gerçek, Beşer, Nuhun Gemisi, Yaprak, and Barış as “the major pro-
communist papers” (p. 169). 
45- See note 6. 
46- Tek Dünya was an organ of the Socialist Party of Turkey (Türkiye Sosyalist 
Partisi), and supported Swedish socialism (FSO, p. 150). 
47- See note 44. 
48- See note 44. 
49- Yurtta Kalkınma was an organ of National Development Party (Milli Kalkınma 
Partisi) (FSO, p. 152). 
50- See note 44. 
51- See note 44. 
Notes for Table 4.8 
The 6 histories of press that cover this period are those by Fuat Süreyya Oral (1968), 
Enver Behnan ġapolyo (1971), Nuri Ġnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay 
Kabacalı (2000), and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). These works will be referred to by the initials 
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of the authors in the following notes, in the form of FSO, EBġ, NĠ, OK, HT, and AK, to 
save from space. 
1- NĠ (p. 240) and EBġ (p. 248) describe Zafer as a pro-DP paper. 
2- Articles by DP leaders and members of parliament were frequently published in 
Zafer (NĠ, p. 241). 
3- Zafer was published by “DP supporters” (HT, p. 224), and received official ads 
disproportionate to its circulation share (HT, p. 203; NĠ, p. 269). 
4- After the 1960 coup, Zafer was closed down and its managers were brought to court 
(EBġ, p. 248; HT, p. 224; NĠ, p. 244). 
5- NĠ describes Son Posta in this period as a pro-DP paper (p. 351). 
6- NĠ gives examples of pro-government content on Son Posta pages (p. 351). 
7- Selim Ragıp Emeç, Son Posta‟s owner, was elected to the TGNA from DP‟s list in 
1950 and in the two following elections (NĠ, p. 351). 
8- Selim Ragıp Emeç, Son Posta‟s owner, was tried in Yassıada along with DP leaders 
and sentenced to jail for four years (NĠ, p. 351). 
9- AK identifies Milliyet in this period as a pro-DP paper (p. 215). 
10- NĠ cites the following from Ali Naci Karacan, Milliyet‟s owner and leader writer: 
“People‟s Party did something very important in this country in 25 years: Reforms. 
Reforms and that was all” (p. 259). 
11- Ali Naci Karacan, Milliyet‟s owner, was a supporter of DP (NĠ, p. 259). 
12- “In 1959 […], with the influence of young columnists, the paper started to lean 
towards the left” (NĠ, p. 321). 
13- “Safa Kılıçlıoğlu, who bought the paper [Yeni Sabah] in 1948 had very close 
relationships with DP leaders, especially with Adnan Menderes” (HT, p. 223). 
14- After 1969, Yeni Sabah was not able to receive any official ads, which form an 
important source of revenue for newspapers, along with Ulus, Yeni Gün, and Dünya (HT, 
p. 203). 
15- Articles attacking both the DP and the CHP were published in Yeni Sabah in this 
period (HT, p. 223). 
16- Falih Rıfkı Atay, Dünya‟s leader writer, formed good relationships with the DP, 
and was criticized harshly for it by the CHP, for he had served as the leader writer of the 
CHP party paper Ulus for many years (HT, p. 221; FSO, p. 178). 
17- In the Pulliam trials, the case against Dünya was dropped by DP leader Menderes‟s 
consent. (HT, p. 206) In Pulliam trials, papers that published American journalist Eugene 
Pulliam‟s articles criticizing the DP government –Dünya, Ulus, Vatan, and Kervan- were 
tried and their managers sentenced to varying jail terms, except for Dünya (HT, p. 206; 
NĠ, p. 348). 
18- HT (p. 220), AK (p. 215), and EBġ (p. 245) describe Dünya as a pro-CHP paper, 
and FSO as an opposition paper (p. 178). 
19- “Falih Rıfkı ruthlessly criticized the DP government in the leader columns he 
wrote for Dünya” (NĠ, p. 277). 
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20- Falih Rıfkı, Dünya‟s leader writer, had served as CHP party paper Ulus‟ leader 
writer for many years (NĠ). 
21- See note 14. 
22- NĠ argues that from 1952 onwards Akşam became an opposition paper (p. 329). 
23- According to HT “Akşam chose to follow an impartial policy after the 1950 
elections” (p. 219). According to NĠ, Akşam was impartial until 1952 (p. 329, also see 
note 22). 
24- Ulus in this period is described as an opposition paper by HT (p. 223) and FSO (p. 
75), and as a pro-CHP paper by EBġ (p. 249). 
25- Ulus was among the papers that published Pulliam‟s articles (see note 17). NĠ 
gives examples of criticism of DP government published on Ulus pages (p. 352). 
26- Ulus was owned by the CHP. 
27- Ulus‟ publication was suspended in the Pulliam trials (see note 17), and the paper 
was not able to receive official ads from the DP government (see note 14). 
28- HT identifies Hürriyet in this period as a pro-CHP paper (p. 214). 
29- Hürriyet criticized the DP government on many occasions, like in its decision to 
send Turkish troops to Korea without due process in the Parliament, and in the 
confiscation of CHP‟s properties (HT, p. 214). NĠ also notes that Hürriyet criticized the 
government in this period (p. 273). 
30- NĠ notes that Sedat Simavi, Hürriyet‟s owner, was the leader of the opposition 
press in its fight with the DP government (p. 273). 
31- Foreign Minister of the DP government sued Hürriyet (HT, p. 214). 
32- In its initial years in government, Hürriyet supported the DP (HT, p. 217). 
33- HT (p. 217), NĠ (p. 286), and AK (p. 220) identify Hürriyet as an opposition paper 
in this period. 
34- Towards the end of the decade, Cumhuriyet‟s editor in chief Ali Ġhsan GöğüĢ was 
elected to the Parliament from CHP (HT, p. 218). Nadir Nadi, Cumhuriyet‟s leader writer 
was no longer a DP supporter (HT, p. 217). 
35- Cumhuriyet‟s editor in chief Ali Ġhsan GöğüĢ was arrested in late 1950s (HT, p. 
218). 
36- In mid 1950s, Cumhuriyet started to lean towards the left, which, HT argues, 
happened with Cevat Fehmi BaĢkurt‟s influence, who served in a managerial position in 
these years (p. 217-218). 
37- A strong supporter of the DP in opposition, Vatan became an opponent of the DP 
in government. HT (p. 214) and FSO (p. 146) identify Vatan in this period as an 
opposition paper. 
38- Vatan was among the papers that published Pulliam‟s articles (see note 17). 
39- Ahmet Emin Yalman, Vatan‟s leader writer, was tried in the Pulliam trials and 
sentenced to jail in his old age (see note 17). 
40- In its initial years in government, Son Telgraf supported the DP (NĠ, p. 143). 
41- After a while, Son Telgraf became an opposition paper (NĠ, p. 143). 
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42- NĠ gives examples of Son Telgraf‟s anti-DP content in these years (p. 143). 
43-Cemil Sait Barlas, Son Havadis‟s owner, was a former CHP minister (HT, p. 244). 
44- Cemil Sait Barlas was arrested before the 1957 elections (HT, p. 244). 
45- Published in Ankara in 1951, Son Havadis was a pro-socialist paper (FSO, p.179). 
HT describes the paper‟s position as “social democrat” (p. 244). 
46- Vakit‟s leader writer Asım Us was a former CHP parliamentarian.  
47- HT (p. 246) and FSO (p. 190) describe Haber, published in Ankara, as a pro-DP 
paper. 
48- “Half of the first page on 6 May 1960 [just three weeks from the coup in May 27] 
was reserved for a large picture of people cheering for Menderes” (NĠ, p. 384). 
49- NĠ gives examples of pro-DP, anti-CHP content on the pages of Büyük Doğu in 
these years. (p. 289) 
50- Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Büyük Doğu‟s owner, was a supporter of DP (NĠ, p. 289), 
and received financial help from the party (NĠ, p. 289; FSO, p. 184). 
51- Necip Fazıl Kısakürek had pro-religious political views (FSO, p. 184). 
52- Published by Cavit Oral, a former CHP minister, Hürses was a pro-CHP paper, but 
changed course after Cavit Oral joined the DP and became minister of agriculture again. 
53- See note 52. 
54- See note 52. 
55- See note 52. 
56- Published in 1955 by Semih Tunca and Tevfik Erol, and bought in 1961 by Kemal 
Ilıcak –not to be confused with Cihat Baban‟s Tercüman, published in 1950-, Tercüman is 
identified as a pro-DP paper by FSO (p. 181). 
57- Published in Ankara by Hikmet Yazıcıoğlu in 1954, Hakimiyet is identified as a 
pro-DP paper by FSO (p. 184). 
58- Published in 1958 by Fuat Süreyya Oral, Bugün was a supporter of the DP (FSO, 
p. 182). 
59- Published by Osman Hamit Tat in 1950, Yeni Cephe was a pro-DP paper (FSO, p. 
177). 
60- Mithat Perin, İstabul Ekspres‟s owner, was a DP supporter. (FSO, p. 178) This was 
the paper that published news of Ataturk‟s house in Salonica being set on fire, which led 
to the 6-7 September incidents in 1955, the looting –by a mob- of workplaces owned by 
Christian minorities in Istanbul (HT, p. 222). 
61- Feyzi Boztepe, a member of the Parliament from DP, published Medeniyet in 
Ankara in 1954 (FSO, p. 184). 
62- Havadis was among the papers that received official ads disproportionate to its 
circulation share (HT, p. 203). 
63- İnkılap was published in Ankara in 1957 by DP Parliamentarian MemiĢ Yazıcı 
(EBġ, p. 254). 
64- Türk Sesi was published by Mükerrem Sarol, a DP Parliamentarian, in 1954 (FSO, 
p. 181). 
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65- Halkçı is identified as a pro-CHP paper by NĠ (p. 293). 
66- Ni gives examples of anti-DP content on the pages of Halkçı (p. 296). 
67- HT (p. 197) and AK (p. 216) note that Halkçı was published by CHP supporters 
when Ulus was closed down. 
68- Halkçı‟s leader writer Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın was sentenced to jail in 24 September 
1954, which strained the relations between the DP government and the press (HT, p. 197). 
69- NĠ gives examples of anti-DP content on the pages of Yeni Gün (p. 337). 
70- Yeni Gün‟s leader writer Cihat Baban was a former DP member who left the party 
in 1956 and joined the Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi) (NĠ, p. 318). 
71- Yeni Gün was published by the supporters of Freedom Party (AK, p. 216; NĠ, p. 
318). 
72- Kudret is identified as an opposition paper by FSO (p. 151). 
73- Kudret was a pro-Nation Party (Millet Partisi) paper (NĠ, p. 387; FSO, p. 151; 
EBġ, p. 254). 
74- Published in 1950 by Cihat Baban and four businessmen (see note 56), 
Tercüman‟s leader writer –Cihat Baban- was a DP Parliamentarian until 1956, when he 
joined the Freedom Party (NĠ, p. 315; AK, p. 216). 
75- See notes 70 and 74. 
76- Pazar Postası was published by former CHP minister Cemil Sait Barlas in 1951 
(FSO, p. 178). 
77- Pazar Postası defended “scientific socialism” (FSO, p. 178). 
78- See note 17. 
Notes for Table 4.9 
The five histories of press that cover this period are as follows: Enver Behnan ġapolyo 
(1971), Nuri Ġnuğur (1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), Hıfzı Topuz 
(2003). These works will be referred to by the initials of the authors in the following 
notes, in the form of EBġ, NĠ, OK, AK, and HT. The following additional sources were 
also used: Oktay (1987), Demir (2007), Özcan (2008, September 15), Cemal (2008, 
September 11), Akkoca (2006, January 2). 
1- Tercüman is described by HT as pro-AP, who argues that it became “a mouthpiece 
of the AP and especially Süleyman Demirel (p. 243).  AK describes the paper as one of 
the “representatives of the rightist view” (p. 22).  
2- NĠ notes that the leading articles signed Tercüman “always targeted CHP and 
contained arguments attacking the managers of that party” (p. 404). 
3- EBġ notes that Tercüman in this period “kept its impartiality” (p. 247). One issue 
that arises with this description is what to do with claims of impartiality that are not 
shared by other authors (only EBġ classifies Tercüman as impartial, against strong 
opposition from a number of authors, compare with note 1). I chose to include Tercüman 
among parallel papers, preferring HT‟s and AK‟s interpretations. A similar issue that 
arises is what happens when there is a contemporaneous conflict between the 
organizational evidence and content evidence, which is the case for AkĢam in this period. 
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See note 18 for this issue. The evidence boxes for both issues are emphasized by thick 
borders. 
4- AK describes Son Havadis and Tercüman as “representatives of the rightist view” 
(p. 22).  
5- NĠ cites pro-AP content from a leading article by Mümtaz Faik Fevik (p. 402), and 
observes that the Son Havadis columnist Orhon Seyfi Orhon, also a literary figure, kept 
criticizing CHP in his columns (p. 427). 
6- EBġ describes Yeni İstanbul as an “AP supporter” (p. 246). 
7- EBġ describes Zafer as “a supporter of AP” (p. 248). 
8- EBġ describes Adalet as “a supporter of AP” (p. 250). 
9- Akkoca (2006, January 2) describes Bugün and Babıalide Sabah as “papers with 
Islamist sentiments”. 
10- See note 8. 
11- EBġ observes that Hürriyet in this period “kept its impartiality” (p. 242). 
12- In the post-coup period, Demir (2007) observes, “Halit Kıvanç penned articles 
making fun of Bayar and other DP leaders” (p. 166).  
13- HT describes Cumhuriyet, Akşam and Milliyet in the post-coup period as “papers 
that supported Ataturk‟s Reforms” (p. 238).  
14- An article titled “The only way out for Turkey: Socialism”, by Sadi Alkılıç under 
the pseudonym Hikmet Alkılıç, was published in Cumhuriyet on December 12th, 1962, as 
part of an article contest the paper organized. The paper was prosecuted for publishing 
this article, with the accusation that it spread “Communist propaganda”, and its editor 
Kayhan Sağlamer was arrested (HT, p. 239; NĠ, p. 383). 
15- HT cites the following from Nadir Nadi, Cumhuriyet‟s owner at the time: “In the 
period preceding March 12
th 
[referring to the military intervention in March 12
th
, 1971] 
Cumhuriyet turned into a paper read by all leftists with a Marxist origin, either 
underground or open. Something novel was happening on Cumhuriyet‟s pages that was 
not seen in its history of 39 years, from its inception to 1962. Cumhuriyet became a paper 
where leftists communicated with each other and through which they conveyed their 
messages to the public. They publicized the magazines and newspapers they published via 
ads on Cumhuriyet‟s pages. We published their engagement, wedding, birth and death 
notices. A meeting they organized, a march, a protest, a conference, a panel, these were 
all advertised on our pages” (p. 240). 
16- See note 13. 
17- See note 12. 
18- HT notes that Akşam‟s owner, Malik Yolaç was elected to the TGNA as an 
independent from AP‟s list (p.241). He also notes that Akşam‟s columnists “had leftist 
tendencies”, and “eventually [paper‟s owner, Malik] Yolaç had to sell Akşam to [the trade 
Union] Türk-ĠĢ in 1971” (p. 241). These pieces of information raises the issue of what 
happens when there is a contemporaneous conflict between the organizational evidence 
and content evidence, in other words, how to classify right-owned papers with left-
writers/managers, which is the case for Akşam. I chose to classify Akşam among the left-
wing papers for eventually what matters is what gets to be published on the pages of the 
newspaper, a better indicator of who controls the paper than ownership. 
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19- NĠ describes Akşam as “the foremost among papers with left tendencies in the 
period 1965 to 1971” (p. 332). HT notes that “Akşam followed a left-leaning policy” 
despite its owner Malik Yolaç.  
20- HT notes that Akşam‟s columnists “had leftist tendencies”, and “eventually 
[paper‟s owner, Malik] Yolaç had to sell Akşam to [the trade Union] Türk-ĠĢ in 1971” (p. 
241). Oktay (1987) argues that in 1960s, left views started to be voiced for the first time 
by columnists writing in mainstream papers, like Çetin Altan, Ġlhan Selçuk, Ġlhami 
Soysal, and Aziz Nesin. The papers these columnists have written in included Akşam, 
Cumhuriyet, Tanin, and Günaydın (p. 63-65).  
21- HT notes that Akşam‟s owner, Malik Yolaç, was “apolitical, not a leftist nor a 
rightist” (p. 241). 
22- See note 12. 
23- Demir (2007), Cem (2008), and Özkan (2008) note that towards the end of the 60s, 
Günaydın had an anti-Demirel character, leader of the AP at the time. Demir quotes 
(2008) Metin Münir as saying that “the campaign Günaydın ran against Demirel was so 
intense and effective that it led to divisions within the AP and to the 1971 military 
intervention” (p. 210). 
24- Oktay (1987) notes that one of the papers where Aziz Nesin, a columnist with left 
views, has written was Günaydın (p. 63).  
25- NĠ observes that Ulus was “a mouthpiece of the CHP” in this period (p. 392). 
26- Ulus was owned in 1960s by Ġsmail RüĢtü Aksel, who became CHP Secretary 
General in 1961 (HT, p. 246; NĠ, p. 391). 
27- Naim Tirali, owner of Vatan from 1962 to 1975, was elected to the TGNA from 
Giresun as a CHP MP (HT, p. 247). 
28- See note 9. 
29- See note 9. 
30- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that Bizim Anadolu‟s owner, Mehmet Emin 
Alpkan was “a follower of the ideal of saving Turks all over the world from bondage and 
giving them back their freedom”. 
31- See note 30. 
32- EBġ notes that Hakimiyet-i Milliye was “a supporter of AP” (p. 250). 
33- NĠ notes that Haber was published with the motto “impartial daily” under its 
banner (p. 385). 
34- NĠ notes that towards the end of 1961, MP leader “Osman BölükbaĢı‟s propaganda 
talks, meetings, visits, and criticisms made up most of the first page of the paper, and 
articles with similar subjects are seen in other pages as well” (p. 388). 
45- EBġ notes that Öncü was “a supporter of the YTP”, a short-lived political party 
founded in 1960s, not to be confused with YTP founded by Ġsmail Cem and Hüsamettin 
Özkan in 2002. 
Notes for Table 4.10 
The four histories of press that cover this period are as follows:  Nuri Ġnuğur (1992), 
Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), Hıfzı Topuz (2003), referred in the notes 
 190 
as NĠ, OK, AK, and HT. The following additional sources were also used: Oktay (1987), 
Sucu (2005), Demir (2007), Akkoca (2006, January 2). 
1- Oktay (1987) refers to Tercüman, Hergün, Bayrak, Ortadoğu, Millet, Son Havadis, 
Yeni Asya, and Milli Gazete as “right wing newspapers” and “the rightist press” (p. 119, 
123). 
2- Oktay (1987) cites examples from Tercüman, Hergün, Bayrak, Ortadoğu, Millet, 
Son Havadis, Yeni Asya, and Milli Gazete, which he refers to as the “right-wing 
newspapers”, concerning their coverage of the so-called “May 1st incidents” of 1977, in 
which 34 people were killed. 
3- NĠ notes that “the leading articles signed Son Havadis usually targeted the CHP, the 
idea of the left of center, Metin Toker, and Abdi Ġpekçi” (p. 428). Also see note 1. 
4- See note 2. 
5- Oktay (1987) counts Hürriyet and Günaydın among “papers with an impartial 
attitude”, as opposed to left-wing and right-wing papers (p.124). 
6- See note 5. 
7- Oktay (1987) describes Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Vatan, and Politika in this period as 
“papers that were supportive of the doctrinaire or social democratic left” (p. 121). 
8- Oktay (1987) cites examples from Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Vatan, and Politika 
concerning their coverage of the so-called “May 1st incidents” of 1977. 
9- See note 7. 
10- See note 8. 
11- A serious fight breaks out within Cumhuriyet following Ġlhan Selçuk‟s arrest in 
1970s, and Nadir Nadi leaves the paper. The fight is mainly between shareholders who 
are not comfortable with the left-wing character of the paper, and those, represented by 
Nadir Nadi, who are. Eventally, paper‟s circulation falls following Nadi‟s leave, and other 
partners feel compelled to call him back (NĠ, p. 424). 
12- NĠ notes that “İstanbul in this period [1979] was an opponent of Ecevit 
government” (p. 440). 
13- NĠ notes that “anti-communism is the general theme in most articles” published in 
the daily İstanbul (p. 440). 
14- NĠ notes that Milli Gazete is published to defend the “National View” movement, 
led by Erbakan (p. 442). OK describes Milli Gazete, along with Orta Doğu, Sabah, Yeni 
Asya, and Yeni Devir in this period as papers of “the religious right” (p. 118) Also see 
note 1. 
15-See note 2. 
16- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that Milli Gazete and Yeni Devir were owned by 
MSP. 
17- OK describes Hergün, Bayrak, Millet and Türkiye as papers of the “nationalist 
right” (p. 118). Oktay (1987) notes that “Hergün, Millet, Bayrak and Ortadoğu were open 
supporters of MHP” (p. 76). Also see note 1. 
18- See note 2. 
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19- Oktay (1987) describes Sabah, Bugün, Yeni Asya, Hakikat, Yeni Devir, and Milli 
Gazete as “the daily papers of the Islamist current” (p. 71). Also see note 14. 
20- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that Sabah was published by a religious group led 
by Hüseyin Hilmi IĢık. 
21- See notes 1, 14, and 17. 
22- See note 2. 
23- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that Ortadoğu was published “with the support of 
Aydınlar Ocağı and nationalist-religious faculty members from universities in Istanbul, by 
a cadre led by Prof. Dr. Erol Güngör”. 
24- NĠ notes that Güneş “published articles that attacked the left, and especially the 
Ecevit government, and defended right-wing views” (p. 447). 
25- See notes 1 and 17. 
26- See note 2. 
27- See notes 1, 14, and 19. 
28- See note 2. 
29- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that Yeni Asya was published “with the great 
efforts of the Risale-i Nur followers”. 
30- See notes 1 and 17. 
31- See note 2. 
32- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that Bayrak was published by Millet Partisi. 
33- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that Bizim Anadolu was owned by Mehmet Emin 
Alpkan, a proprietor with nationalist views. 
34- See note 17. 
35- NĠ notes that Türkiye “was a paper that published ideas representing the nationalist 
and conservative views” (p. 435). 
36- Akkoca (2006, January 2) notes that Türkiye was published by the followers of 
Hüseyin Hilmi IĢık, a religious figure. 
37- See notes 1, 14 and 19. 
38- See note 2. 
39- See note 16. 
40- NĠ notes that Haber was published with the motto “impartial daily” under its 
banner (p. 386). 
41- OK describes Ekonomi Politika, Aydınlık, Demokrat, Yeni Ortam and Vatan in 
1970s as “papers of the left” (p. 118). Also see note 7. 
42- See note 8. 
43- See note 41. 
44- See notes 7 and 41. 
45- See note 8. 
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46- NĠ notes that in 1970s, Akşam was owned by the trade union Türk-ĠĢ for a while 
(p. 332). 
47- Oktay (1987) describes Aydınlık as a paper of the left (p. 57). Also see note 41. 
Notes for Table 4.11 
Sources:  The four histories of press that cover this period are as follows:  Nuri Ġnuğur 
(1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), Hıfzı Topuz (2003), referred to in 
these notes as NĠ, OK, AK, and HT. The following additional sources were also used: 
Oktay (1987), ÇalıĢlar (2006), Demir (2007), Özcan (2008, September 15), Cemal (2008, 
September 11), Sucu (2005), Koz (2007), Finkel (2000), Akkoca (2006, January 2), Tek 
(2006). 
1- Demir (2007) argues that Özal “stopped Sabah‟s opposition by awarding them a 
building contract for 25.000 homes” (p. 189). 
2- See note 1. 
3- See note 1. 
4- ÇalıĢlar (2006) notes that Günaydın in this period “supported Özal in internal 
politics” (p. 42). 
5- Finkel argues that “[Asil] Nadir [owner of Günaydın and Güneş] unquestionably 
acquired his press empire with the encouragement of Turgut Özal to counter the influence 
of a hostile press. One columnist was fired because he had poked fun at Özal” (p. 165). 
Cemal (2008, September 11) argues that “Özal encouraged Asil Nadir to enter the press 
market against Simavi‟s Hürriyet.” 
6- Oktay makes the following observations on Günaydın: “The major aim of the paper 
seems to be increasing sales. Thus, it has no problems with having a leftist content today, 
and a rightist one tomorrow” (p. 140).  
7- ÇalıĢlar (2006) argues that Günaydın “has a tendency towards chauvinism regarding 
Turkish foreign policy” (p. 42). 
8- See note 5. 
9- ÇalıĢlar (2006) makes the following observations on Güneş‟s efforts to be a 
balanced paper: “When it was first published, GüneĢ claimed to offer a democratic 
platform. The big transfers it made also supported this impression. On the one hand, 
Güneri Civaoğlu brought together names like Cüneyt Arcayürek, Çetin Altan, Ġsmail 
Cem, and Bedri Korama [all left intellectuals], and on the other, tried to combine this 
group with the team it brought from Tercüman [a right-wing paper]” (p. 37). 
10- Demir (2007) notes that in an article signed by its owner, Erol Simavi, Hürriyet 
called Özal a dog in May 1988, but made a complete u-turn prior to the referendum in 
1988, asking him in its headlines to “stay, don‟t leave us”. 
11- See note 5. 
12- In a Ph.D. dissertation dedicated to studying political cartoons published in 
Turkish newspapers of the period, Koz (2007) makes the following observations on 
cartoons in Hürriyet: “Unlike Demirel, Özal is drawn as a person who lacks the ability for 
analytical thinking, oppressive, who cannot make rational decisions, who has no 
knowledge of economics or management, and „negative‟” (p. 398). Özcan (2008, 
September 15) notes that one of the most memorable moments of the fight between Özal 
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and Simavi, Hürriyet‟s owner, was the open letter Simavi wrote on April 11, 1988, with 
the headlines reading “Press is the first estate”. Also see note 10. 
13- Demir (2007) quotes the following from Emin ÇölaĢan, then a prominent 
columnist of Hürriyet, on his efforts to end the ANAP government and role in the 
formation of the 1991 coalition between SHP and DYP: “I talked to Uğur Mumcu [a 
prominent columnist writing in Cumhuriyet at the time], and said „Why don‟t we take the 
initiative and have these two (Cindoruk and Çetin) meet, so that they can form a coalition 
and we get rid of ANAP”. Demir (2007) notes that the two eventually met in ÇölaĢan‟s 
house, which was the beginning of the process that led to the formation of the DYP-SHP 
coalition in 1991.  
14- ÇalıĢlar (2006) makes the following observation on Hürriyet: “It is clear that the 
paper was trying to strike a balance between the dominant forces” (p. 41). 
15- Oktay (1987) describes Hürriyet in this period as “a paper with liberal tendencies” 
(p. 140). 
16- ÇalıĢlar (2006) notes that Oktay EkĢi, the leader columnist of Hürriyet at the time, 
was among the founders of SODEP, a left-wing political party founded after the 1980 
coup. 
17- ÇalıĢlar (2006) argues that “There were two distinct tendencies within the paper 
[Tercüman]: the news and opinion pages supported the ANAP government, whereas 
Nazlı Ilıcak and some other columnists supported DYP” (p. 38). Koz (2007) has the 
following to say about the political cartoons published in Tercüman at the time: “Cartoons 
in Tercüman […] construct Özal as a more „positive‟ leader compared to other party 
leaders” (p. 400).  
18- HT makes the following observation on Tercüman: “Between 1983 and 1993, that 
is to say, during the Turgut Özal era, Kemal and Nazlı Ilıcak [owner of Tercüman and a 
columnist of Tercüman, respectively] supported the True Path Party [DYP] and criticized 
Özal on every occasion” (p. 293). 
19- Oktay (1987) argues that “Ilıcak [Tercüman‟s owner] tried to make the paper a 
right-wing daily from the first day onwards” (p. 141). Demir (2007) observes that 
“Tercüman was a prominent right-wing paper of the time” (p. 189). ÇalıĢlar (2006) argues 
that Tercüman had “a pro-religious and anti-communist mission” and cites examples from 
the paper (p. 39). Tek (2006) describes Tercüman as a right-wing paper (p. 168). 
20- Tek (2006) compares news on political violence in Tercüman and Hürriyet, and 
finds that the former mostly reports violence attributed to leftists with few reports on 
incidents attributed to rightists (15 to 1), whereas the latter does the opposite, mostly 
reporting on incidents attributed to rightists and ignoring those attributed to the leftists (19 
to 3) (p. 180). Sucu (2005) notes that following the publication in Hürriyet of an obituary 
on Ġsmail Bilen, leader of the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), Tercüman and Son 
Havadis fiercely criticized Hürriyet. Also see note 19. 
21- Oktay argues in 1987 that Tercüman is “currently managed by an ultra-nationalist 
team” (1987, p. 141).  
22- ÇalıĢlar (2006) argues that “Milliyet under Çetin Emeç‟s management […] 
paralleled the government” (p. 35). 
23- ÇalıĢlar (2006) observes that Mehmet Barlas, the leader columnist of Milliyet at 
the time, “was among the most respectable journalists of the time among government 
 194 
circles. When he got his leg broken in Davos, Prime Minister Özal personally visited him 
and his wife, and the President sent best wishes from thousands of kilometers away” (p. 
34). 
24- Demir (2007) argues that “towards the end of 1980s, the entire Babıali [a reference 
to the daily press] surrendered to Özal, except for Cumhuriyet and to some extent 
Milliyet” (p. 207). 
25- Tek (2006) describes Milliyet‟s position in the aftermath of the 1980 coup as “left-
of-center” (p. 168). Oktay (1987) argues that “Under Abdi Ġpekçi‟s management, Milliyet 
became a platform for the expression of democratic left tendencies” (p. 140). 
26- Oktay (1987) observes that after it was bought by Aydın Doğan, Milliyet 
“combined its previous social democratic tendency with a populist tendency […] two of 
the columnists, Mümtaz Soysal and Teoman Erel kept this democratic left approach 
alive” (p. 140). 
27- ÇalıĢlar (1987) describes Cumhuriyet in this period as “the only paper opposing 
Özal” (p. 44). Also see note 24. 
28- Koz (2007) observes that Özal is drawn in Cumhuriyet‟s cartoons as “a leader who 
is „inconsistent‟, „insincere‟, and who „lacks the ability to make rational decisions‟” (p. 
398).  
29- See note 13. 
30- Oktay (1987) makes the following observation on Cumhuriyet: “It was not the 
organ of any one left party, but tried to reflect, via its columnists, the views of both the 
social democracy and the doctrinaire left” (p. 139). Tek (2006) describes Cumhuriyet in 
this period as a paper “on the left” (p. 168). 
31- See note 20. 
32- HT notes that following “an article by Osman Ulagay after the 1991 elections, 
supporting the formation of a coalition between ANAP and DYP against the SHP”, a fight 
over editorial policy broke out within Cumhuriyet, with eventual victory of Ġlhan Selçuk 
and his friends, who first left the paper and then returned back, ousting the previous 
management (p. 290). 
33- Oktay (1987) describes Türkiye‟s position in this period as “between Islamism and 
nationalism” (p. 101). ÇalıĢlar (2006) argues Türkiye was “addressed to a conservative 
and right-wing audience” (p. 22). 
34- See note 36 for Table 4.10. 
35- NĠ notes that Bulvar had a following among right-wing readers, especially because 
of Nazlı Ilıcak‟s columns (p. 483). 
36- NĠ describes Milli Gazete as “the organ of Welfare Party” (p. 443), and Oktay 
(1987) counts Milli Gazete, together with Yeni Nesil and Yeni Devir, among “the daily 
newspapers of the Islamist current” (p. 73, 78). 
37- See note 36. 
38- See note 36. 
39- Oktay (1987) notes that Ġsmet Özel, “after he joined the Islamist camp […] wrote 
articles for Yeni Devir” (p. 78). Also see note 39 for Table 4.10. 
40- See note 20. 
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41- See note 23 for Table 4.10. 
42- See note 33 for Table 4.10. 
Notes for Table 4.12 
Sources:  The four histories of press that cover this period are as follows:  Nuri Ġnuğur 
(1992), Orhan Koloğlu (1993), Alpay Kabacalı (2000), Hıfzı Topuz (2003), referred to in 
these notes as NĠ, OK, AK, and HT. The following additional sources were also used: 
Oktay (1987), Hortaçsu & Ertürk (2003), Konrad-Adenauer Vakfı (1999), GörmüĢ (2002, 
July 13; September 25; October 9), ÇalıĢlar (2006), Demir (2007),  Arsan & Tunç (2007), 
Özcan (2008, September 15), Cemal (2008, September 11), Sucu (2005), Koz (2007), 
Finkel (2000), Akkoca (2006, January 2), Öksüz (2007), Karalı (2001, February 8), 
Dursun (2006), DağtaĢ and DağtaĢ (2007), Kösebalaban (2004), Yumul and Özkırımlı 
(2000), Gül and Gül (2000). 
1- Demir (2008) notes that prior to the elections in 1995, “the Sabah group strongly 
supported Çiller” (p. 208), leader of the DYP at the time. Finkel (2000) also identifies 
Sabah in this period as a pro-DYP paper (p. 154). Cemal (2008, September 11) notes that 
“Çiller had good relations with Dinç Bilgin [Sabah‟s owner], and had a big fight with 
Aydın Doğan [owner of Hürriyet]”. Karalı (2001, February 8) cites the following from the 
leader column of Sabah on May 11, 1997, signed Sabah, addressed at Çiller: “Sabah, 
which she accuses today, supported her until she formed the Refah-Yol coalition”. 
2- Cemal (2008, September 11) notes that Mesut Yılmaz, ANAP‟s leader, “had good 
relations with Aydın Doğan [Hürriyet‟s owner], and had a big fight with Dinç Bilgin 
[Sabah‟s owner]”. Özcan (2008, September 15) also notes that prior to the 1995 elections, 
there was “a big fight between Sabah and Mesut Yılmaz”. Özcan (2008, September 15) 
cites the following headline from Sabah, published on December 5, 1995: “Mesut 
Yılmaz, accomplice of shariah-followers”. Özcan (2008, September 15) notes that Mesut 
Yılmaz sued Sabah for some of its headlines in the run-up to the 1995 elections, and won 
a 950 million liras worth of compensation. 
3- In a detailed content analysis of the newspaper coverage on the eve of the 1999 
elections, Konrad Adenauer Vakfı (1999) find that Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Yeni Yüzyıl, 
and Cumhuriyet, which they collectively refer to as “the mainstream/liberal media” 
“supported ANAP and DSP, but refrained from supporting the DYP, and FP was the party 
that received the most negative coverage in these newspapers”. Karalı (2001, February 8) 
notes that in May 1997 ġevket Kazan, Minister of Justie at the time, sued the papers 
Sabah, Yeni Yüzyıl, Yeni Asır, Hürriyet, Radikal, Son Havadis, Son Çağrı, and Posta “for 
provoking a coup d'état”. 
4- See note 3. 
5- See note 3. 
6- See note 3. 
7- In their detailed study analyzing the content of the newspapers in the run-up to the 
2002 elections, Tunç and Arsan (2007) observe Hürriyet‟s and Sabah‟s content to be 
positive towards ANAP, and Cumhuriyet, Star, Yeni Şafak, and Akşam to have a negative 
tone towards ANAP, in their cover pages and politics pages. The following positions also 
emerge from the content analysis of cover pages and politics pages reported in this study 
(p. 100): Pro-CHP: Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet. Anti-CHP: Star, Yeni Şafak, Akşam. Pro-AKP: 
Zaman, Türkiye, Yeni Şafak. Anti-AKP: Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet, Sabah, Radikal, Vatan, 
Star, Akşam. Pro-MHP: Türkiye. Pro-GP: Star.  GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) observes 
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that “Sabah seems to be flirting with ANAP”, and cites examples from the paper‟s 
coverage. 
8- In a series of articles published in Zaman prior to the 2002 elections, Alper GörmüĢ 
(2002, September 25) examines the print media‟s coverage of the parties, and cites the 
following from an article signed Sabah: “Yes, Tayip Erdoğan will always feel the sword 
of Law No. 312 over his head. Saying „I have changed‟ is not enough, he should not have 
read that poem”.  Also see note 7. 
9- GörmüĢ (2002, July 13) argues that prior to the 2002 elections, Hürriyet, Milliyet, 
and Sabah “voted for the „new formation‟”, referring to the group that splintered from 
DSP. Also see note 7. 
10- Also see notes 3, 22, 32, and 69. 
11- Finkel (2000, p. 154), GörmüĢ (2002, October 9), Özcan (2008, September 15), 
and Cemal (2008, September 11) describe Hürriyet, together with other Doğan papers, as 
a pro-ANAP paper prior to the 1995 elections. Özcan (2008, September 15) notes a phone 
conversation between Ertuğrul Özkök, Hürriyet‟s editor, and GüneĢ Taner, an ANAP 
minister, where the two speak about a business deal. Also see note 2. 
12- Demir (2007) notes that when Baykal was elected the president of CHP, Hürriyet‟s 
headlines were very supportive: “A leader is born”, “Baykal‟s second victory” (p. 208).  
13- Demir (2007) notes that “Doğan Group‟s support for Çiller came to an end as the 
1995 elections neared”, and cites examples form Hürriyet critizing the DYP. In return, 
Prime Minister Çiller ordered an investigation into DıĢbank‟s sale to Doğan (p. 208). 
Özcan (2008, September 15) also notes that relations between Doğan papers and Çiller, 
once very warm, later cooled down, with Çiller eventually accusing Doğan of extracting 
undue state incentives, and Doğan publicly responding that he would hang himself in the 
Taksim square if any of these accusations were proved to be true. Also see note 1. 
14- See note 3. 
15- See note 3. 
16- GörmüĢ (2002, October 9) cites the following headline from Hürriyet one week 
prior to the elections in 1999: “Çiller‟s lies”. Also see notes 3 and 12. 
17- See note 3. 
18- See note 7. 
19- See notes 7 and 21. 
20- See note 9. 
21- GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) notes that on the ban that prevented Erdoğan from 
running in the 2002 elections, Hürriyet‟s leader columnist Oktay EkĢi and editor Ertuğrul 
Özkök had opposing views, “balancing each other out”. GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) 
also argues that Hürriyet, Milliyet and Vatan followed a policy of supporting CHP against 
AKP prior to the 2002 elections. Öksüz (2007) observes that “prior to the November 3, 
2002 elections, Doğan papers mostly carried negative news on AKP” (p. 75). Also see 
note 7. 
22- Hortaçsu and Ertürk (2003) include Hürriyet in their list of secular, as opposed to 
religious, papers, and describe Hürriyet‟s political position as follows: “supports liberal 
economic values” (p. 2024). Kösebalaban (2004) decribes Hürriyet as a “secular” paper 
(p. 55), and its columnist Oktay EkĢi as “the veteran Kemalist columnist of Hürriyet” (p. 
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54). Demir (2007) quotes from Ergun Babahan the following on Doğan and Bilgin 
papers‟ support for YDH (New Democracy Movement): “The cartel had become so 
powerful that [...] even the headlines started to be written fom a sigle center. You would 
remember that all the major newspapers had the mission to keep YDH in the headlines” 
(p. 203-4). Özcan (2008, September 15) argues that during its fight with Çiller, Hürriyet 
“tried to promote Mehmet Ali Bayar as the new leader candidate”.  Also see notes 3, 32, 
52, 65, and 69. 
23- See note 11. 
24- See note 13. 
25- See note 3. 
26- See note 3. 
27- See note 3. 
28- See note 3. 
29- See note 21. 
30- See note 9. 
31- See note 21. 
32- Dursun (2006) has the following to say about Milliyet‟s political position: “The 
best-selling newspapers (such as Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, etc.) have always had a 
secularist and sometimes Kemalist ideological tendency” (p. 170). Kösebalaban (2004) 
describes Milliyet as “a leading secular newspaper that also hosts a few liberal 
columnists” (p. 53). Milliyet was briefly owned by Korkmaz Yiğit in 1998, an incident 
which, as Demir (2007) quotes from Ġsmet Berkan, was a reflection Prime Minister Mesut 
Yılmaz‟s “efforts to create a media of his own” (p. 213). Also see notes 3, 22 and 69. 
33- Konrad Adenauer Vakfı (1999) find that in the run-up to the 1999 elections, 
“Türkiye, which has a conservative-right policy, but which is also a representative of the 
large-scale media, preferred DYP and MHP” in its election related coverage. 
34- See note 33. 
35- See note 7. 
36- See note 7. 
37- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include Türkiye in their list of “moderate Islamist” 
parties, along with Yeni ġafak and Zaman. DağtaĢ and DağtaĢ (2007) desribe Türkiye as a 
representative of the “nationalist-conservative right” press (p. 77), and Tunç and Arsan 
(2007) as a paper that “has a natinoalist-conservaive line” (p. 102). Also see notes 33 and 
68. 
38- Konrad Adenauer Vakfı (1999) find that in the run-up to the 1999 elections, “the 
Islamist wing of the conservative press (Akit and Zaman) supported FP and MHP.” 
39- See note 38. 
40- GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) notes that the decision banning Erdoğan from 
running in the 2002 elections “was openly criticized by the columnists‟ and other op-ed 
articles in Zaman”. Also see note 7. 
41- Gül and Gül (2000) describe Zaman as “an Islamic newspaper” (p. 7), 
Kösebalaban (2004) as a “conservative” paper (p. 56), Dursun (2006) “the newspaper of 
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the Fethullah Gülen (followers of the Nursi path) religious community” (p. 171), and 
Hortaçsu and Ertürk (2003) as “reflect[ing] the views of the Nur movement” (p. 2024). 
Also see notes 37, 38 and 68. 
42- See note 3. 
43- See note 21. 
44- See note 89. 
45- See note 7. 
46- See note 7. 
47- See note 7. 
48- Star was owned by Cem Uzan, leader of the GP which ran in 2002 elections 
(Demir, 2007, p. 227). GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) observes that Star “was published 
as a propaganda bulletin for the Genç Parti [Young Party]”. 
49- See note 7. 
50- GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) observes that “Akşam, owned by the Karamehmet 
Group, drew attention by its opposition to CHP using IMF-BDDK-Kemal DerviĢ”. Also 
see note 7. 
51- See note 7. 
52- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include Akşam in their list of “extreme nationalist 
right” papers, which also includes Hergün, Son Çağrı, and Ortadoğu (p. 793). Tunç and 
Arsan (2007) describe Akşam, Vatan, and Hürriyet as “papers that have a liberal right 
editorial policy” (p. 102). 
53- See note 3. 
54- See note 3 
55- See note 3 
56- See note 3. 
57- Hortaçsu and Ertürk (2003) include Yeni Yüzyıl in their list of secuar papers, and 
describe its political position as “espousing liberal economy” (p. 2024). Also see notes 3 
and 89. 
58- See note 3. 
59- See note 3 
60- See note 3 
61- See note 3. 
62- See note 7. 
63- GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) observes that concerning the ban that prevented 
Erdoğan from running in the 2002 elections, “Cumhuriyet, as you might have guessed [...] 
was among the papers that did not try to conceal their joy”. Also see note 7. 
64- See note 7.  
65- Kösebalaban (2004) decribes Cumhuriyet as “Turkey‟s most authentically 
Kemalist daily” (p. 56), and DağtaĢ and DağtaĢ (2007) treat it as a representative of the 
“center-left” press (p. 77). Sucu (2005) notes that “Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet published 
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this text [Öcalan‟s get well soon wishes for Musa Anter] in protest against the ban on 
Özgür Gündem‟s publication” (p. 50). Also see note 76. 
66- See note 38. 
67- See note 38. 
68- ÇalıĢlar (2006) describes Akit, Zaman, Yeni Şafak, Türkiye, and Milli Gazete as 
“Isamist papers” (p. 24). Finkel (2000) describes Akit as “one of the most radical of the 
Turkish press” (p. 159). Also see notes 38, 81 and 83. 
69- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include Takvim in their list of “centre-right” papers, 
which also includes Günaydın, Hürriyet, Pazar Postası, Milliyer, Sabah, Son Havadis, 
and Tan. 
70- When Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet published condolences after Musa Anter‟s 
assasination, Sucu (2005) notes that Bugün fiercely criticized the two papers.  
71- See note 3. 
72- Hortaçsu and Ertürk (2003) observe that Mili Gazete, along with Yeni Şafak, 
“supports the major religious political party in Turkey”. 
73- Yumul and Özkırımlı‟s (2000) list of extreme Islamist right papers consists of Milli 
Gazete, Akit, Yeni Asya, and Selam (p. 793).  Also see notes 68 and 72. 
74- See note 3. 
75- GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) cites the following headline from Radikal 
concerning the ban that preveted Erdoğan from running in 2002 elections: “We do not 
have democracy after all”. Also see note 21. 
76- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include Radikal and Cumhuriyet in their list of 
“center-left” papers (p. 793). 
77- Demir (2007) notes that Nazlı Ilıcak, a member of Parliament from FP, was also a 
columnist for the daily Yeni Şafak (p. 224). Also see note 70. 
78- GörmüĢ (2002, September 25) observes that Yeni Şafak was among the papers that 
criticized the ban that prevented Erdoğan from running in the 2002 elections, caling the 
decision “A dynamite to the election”. 
79- See note 7. 
80- See note 7. 
81- Dursun (2006) describes Yeni Şafak and Akit as “Islamist papers” (p. 170), and 
Tunç and Arsan (2007) observe that Yeni Şafak “followed an Islamic line” (p. 102). 
Ksebalaban (2004) describes Yeni Şafak as “Islamist leaning” (p. 54). Also see notes 37, 
68, and 72. 
82- See note 3. 
83- See note 69. 
84- See note 89. 
85- Also see note 69. 
86- Also see note 52. 
87- Also see note 73. 
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88- Also see note 69. 
89- Yumul and Özkırımlı (2000) include Hürses, along with Yeni Yüzyıl, Hürses, 
Global, Ateş, Bizim Gazete, Posta, and Turkish Daily News, in their list of “liberal” papers 
(p. 793). 
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Appendix A 
Literature on Cleavage Voting 
Although the idea that there are social roots to political phenomena existed long 
before Party Systems and Voter Alignments, the notion of cleavage received its most 
authoritative exposition in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan‟s (1967) widely read 
introduction to this volume. In their review of the literature on social cleavages, Jeff 
Manza, Clem Brooks, and Michael Sauder (2005) trace the origins of the notion of 
cleavage to the works of Marx and Weber, where important key terms like class and 
status referred to the conditioning effect of social structures upon political phenomena. 
They observe that empirical works based upon ecological data in the first half of the 20th 
century were followed, in the postwar period, by the works of Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard 
Berelson, and their students in Columbia University (Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 
1948, and Berelford, Lazarsfeld & McPhee, 1954, cited in Manza et al., 2005), which 
later came to be referred to as the Columbia school in voting studies. Lipset and Rokkan‟s 
(1967) work came in the wake of these early studies, and was the most influential in terms 
of drawing attention to social determinants of voting behavior.  
In terms of election studies, or more specifically voting choice studies, the social 
determinants approach was the earliest one to appear, especially as practiced in the work 
of Columbia school. Usually referred to as to the sociological approach (Campbell et al., 
1980; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Jones, 2001, Molina & Perez, 2004), the quest for social 
correlates of voting behavior like religious affiliation, class, and place of residence formed 
the backdrop against which the Michigan school of election studies –which is usually 
referred to as the socio-psychological approach with its emphasis upon individual 
attitudes in addition to social characteristics in predicting the vote choice- set out to define 
the distinctiveness of its theoretical foundations. The two approaches are sometimes 
treated together to make their contrast sharper with a third approach in voting studies 
(Çarkoğlu & Kalaycıoğlu, 2007; Jones, 2001), the so-called rational-choice model or the 
spatial model, associated with the work of Anthony Downs (1957, cited in Lewis-Beck et 
al., 2008), which conceives of the voters as actors trying to minimize the distance between 
their preferred ideological positions and the bundles of positions actually on the offer, 
those of the parties. For the purposes of this study, however, the sociological and socio-
psychological approaches are better left separate. 
What separates the notion of cleavage voting, which can be thought of as the 
embodiment of the sociological approach, from a more general voter characteristics 
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approach is that only those characteristics of the voter that reflect membership in social 
groups are counted. When social group membership is a significant predictor of vote 
choice, we can speak of a cleavage. What separates, in turn, social groups from mere 
demographic groups is that, following Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter 
Mair‟s (1995) definition of cleavage, their members are conscious of their collective 
identity, and they have some form of an organizational presence in the larger society. 
Thus, religious and ethnic groups, as well as class, are easily defined as social groups in 
most cases, whereas the „socialness‟ of gender and age groups is more problematic and 
probably shows more variation from country to country.  
The notion of cleavage also needs to be distinguished from mere political divisions, 
Gallagher, Laver and Mair (1995) warn us. The presence of issues that deeply divide 
society into hostile political camps, like the issue of abortion, is not enough to treat that 
divide as a cleavage. The camps should also, at least to some extent, draw 
disproportionate support from different social groups. In other words, cleavage is what 
results when there is an overlap between social divisions and political divisions. 
Defined as such and treated as a hypothesis to be empirically tested across cases and 
not as a universal theory about the strength of social determinants, the notion of cleavage 
voting gave rise to a huge literature exploring variation across political systems and trends 
over time. Excellent reviews of this empirical literature already exist (Gallagher et al., 
1995; Mair, 1997; Dalton, 2004; Maor, 1997); hence I will only make general 
observations.  
The biggest controversy in the literature seems to be over whether there is a decline 
in cleavage voting, and the biggest concern with the class cleavage, other cleavages 
usually receiving cursory treatment. The reason the question of decline received so much 
attention is probably the so-called freezing hypothesis, set forth in Lipset & Rokkan‟s 
(1967) introduction, which seems to have fascinated multiple generations of political 
scientists. The following quote from Lipset & Rokkan (1967), about freezing, is very 
popular among the academics working on parties and cleavages: “The party systems of 
1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s” 
(p. 50). This quote appears, en bloc, in at least 46 individual books,
 83
 some arguing for 
the continuing relevance of cleavages, others against. 
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 A search for the quote in Google Book Search returned 46 separate titles containing the 
passage. Retrieved 5 November 2008, from  
 203 
The focus on the class cleavage is no less strong than the focus on freezing. Because 
class is a key concept of modern social sciences independent of its implications for 
cleavage voting, this is only to be expected, and many empirical treatments of cleavage 
voting start out with the class (Dalton, 2004; Gallagher et al., 1995). There are even two 
book length treatments on the subject of class voting; the one by Mark N. Franklin 
(1985), The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 
1964-83, which argues for the declining relevance of class as a basis for voting in the UK, 
the other a volume edited by Geoffrey Evans (1999), The End of Class Politics? Class 
Voting in a Comparative Context, which argues that class still is an important determinant 
of vote choice. The focus on class is not a bad thing in itself; however, a singular focus 
upon class cleavage, to the point of equating it with the notion of cleavage as such, may 
lead to erroneous conclusions, especially when conclusions reached about class voting are 
extended to other cleavages without separate evidence. This is another way of saying that 
observed decline in class cleavage is not necessarily an indication of de-alignment, 
meaning a weakened role for social determinants in voting behavior; it may also be the 
indication of a re-alignment, meaning other cleavages may be gaining in strength 
(Gallagher, Laver & Mair, 1995; Katz, 2001). For example, in his study of cleavage 
voting in English speaking democracies, Richard S. Katz (2001) finds that the class 
cleavage declines in the UK from 1964 to 1992, whereas regional, religious, and urban-
rural cleavages gain in strength, becoming stronger predictors of vote choice. In Ausralia, 
on the other hand, from 1967 to 1996, all cleavages decline together. 
A third observation regarding the literature on cleavages is that some of the 
contradictions in empirical claims are due to the different operationalizations of the 
concept of cleavage voting. For the earlier periods for which survey data are not available, 
cleavage voting –or more specifically, change in cleavage voting- is measured indirectly, 
via indicators –usually classic party system characteristics- like volatility, total share of 
established parties, and fragmentation. Of these, volatility receives the heaviest emphasis, 
the reasoning being that if social groups are associated with specific parties, the vote 
shares of parties should not fluctuate widely from election to election. If the vote choices 
of individuals are not based upon constantly changing short term considerations but upon 
membership in social groups, which hardly changes, then there should not be large 
                                                                                                                                               
http://books.google.com/books?lr=&q=the+party+systems+of+the+1960s+%22reflect,+
with+few+but+significant+exceptions%22+the+cleavage+structures+of+the+1920s&n
um=30&as_brr=0&sa=N&start=0 
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fluctuations in the vote shares of individual parties. In an oft-cited article, Pedersen 
(1979/n.d.) uses data showing increased volatility to argue that “even if party systems 
may still reflect the traditional cleavage structure in the society, the significant exceptions 
that Rokkan and Lipset were talking about are no longer few, but constitute a larger and 
growing part of all European party systems” (para. 3). However, using volatility data on 
individual parties as an indicator of cleavage voting has its dangers. 
In a significant contribution to the literature on cleavages, one that parallels Hallin 
and Mancini‟s (2004) contribution to the notion of press-party parallelism –by re-
conceptualizing it as political parallelism- Bartolini and Mair (1990) make the case that 
what matters from the point of view of cleavages is inter-bloc volatility, transfer of votes 
from one bloc to another, rather than intra-bloc volatility, exchange of votes between 
individual parties on the same bloc (cited in Mair, 1997). They then show that there is no 
dramatic increase in inter-bloc volatility figures in Europe as a whole, and argue for the 
continuing validity of the freezing hypothesis of Lipset and Rokkan (1967). What matters 
more for the purposes of this study is not their empirical evaluation, but the conceptual 
improvement they brought by freeing the notion of cleavage from its association with 
individual parties and making it about general political tendencies in the form of party 
blocs. 
For the more recent period for which survey data exist, direct measures of cleavage 
voting are possible. Two direct measures of cleavage voting are the Alford index and 
Franklin‟s (1992) measure based upon explained variances. Alford index, widely used in 
studies of cleavage voting, is named after its developer Robert R. Alford, and refers to the 
difference between the percentage of working class voting for parties of the left, and the 
percentage of other classes voting for the parties of the left. Although it is a very useful 
and simple measure of class voting, and has the ability to be applied to other cleavages, it 
sometimes gives rise to differing measures because of the prior need to classify parties 
into two camps. When parties are classified differently, the resulting measure is also 
different. For example, Katz (2001) classifies the Democratic Labor Party of Australia on 
the right hand of the spectrum, in contrast to Alford (1967, cited in Katz, 2001) who 
classified it as a party of the working class, and their results vary. This creates an 
additional problem for comparative efforts because political systems are likely to vary in 
terms of their parties‟ ability to be unambiguously identified with larger political currents, 
which would make Alford‟s index a tool with varying precision in different contexts. 
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Franklin‟s (1992, cited in van Kempen, 2007) measure based upon the sum of 
explained variances has two merits compared to the Alford index: First, no prior 
classification of parties is required; if there is differential support among the social groups 
for any specific party, it is captured by the measure. By implication, because it is not 
affected by error in the classification of parties, it is more useful in comparative research. 
The second improvement is that it is possible to assess the effects of multiple cleavages 
simultaneously, and separate the effect of a cleavage from the effect of another, partially 
overlapping cleavage. This is an important improvement, especially if we are interested in 
the overall level of cleavage voting, in addition to individual cleavages. For example, if 
we were interested in the level of overall cleavage voting in a country where only class 
and ethnic cleavages exist, and where they partially overlap, adding up the Alford indexes 
for these two cleavages would be a poor measure of overall cleavage voting; it would give 
an inflated result. 
84
  
Links between press-party parallelism and cleavage voting 
Because it is a major variable that appears in all three studies, and because it is 
conceptually close to the notion of press-party parallelism –we can think of cleavage 
voting as social group-party parallelism- the connection between cleavage politics and 
political parallelism deserves further reflection. I have argued in Chapter 2 that there is a 
conceptual affinity between the notions of press-party parallelism and cleavage voting. In 
practice, we can imagine three ways in which the two concepts can be linked. 
First of all, we can think of press-party parallelism as being already contained in the 
notion of cleavage politics. This would mean that our definition of cleavage politics is 
defined wider, requiring congruence not only between social groups and parties, but also 
between social groups and other societal institutions, including media outlets, which 
would actually be the definition of a segmented or pillarized society, best exemplified by 
the Netherlands before 1960s. Although it is possible, as Kris Deschouwer (2001) does, to 
think of pillarization as the extreme case of cleavage politics where divisions run deeper, 
the two concepts are better kept separate, not least because we gain in precision by use of 
                                                 
84
 Franklin‟s index, in turn, is criticized because it uses ordinary least squares regression 
for dichotomous variables (Evans, 1999). Although this is a fair criticism, the problem 
is easy to solve, by using continuous variables like party sympathy scores in cases 
where the data are avaialble, as Van Kempen (2006) does. There is a big debate on the 
proper measure of class and cleavage voting in the literature (Goldthorpe, 1999), and 
many different measures of cleavage voting have already been devised. See the chapter 
on methodology for more on measures of cleavage voting. 
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specialized terms. We could say, however, that both cleavage voting and press-party 
parallelism are features of a pillarized society. 
A second way to conceptualize press-party parallelism in cleavage terms is by 
considering it as yet another cleavage, at the same level with class, religion and gender 
cleavages. In this scheme, audiences of different media outlets would be treated as distinct 
social groups. However, we would run the risk of stretching the notion of social group too 
far if we applied it to audiences. Another reason not to use this terminology is that it could 
blind us to situations where political parallelism in the media is high but cleavages are 
weak, or vice versa.  
Thirdly, we could link the literatures around these concepts, instead of linking the  
concepts themselves, and see if they can benefit from each other. Study of press-party 
parallelism already benefits from the literature on cleavage voting, as is apparent in van 
Kempen‟s (2006; 2007) use of Franklin‟s (1992, cited in van Kempen, 2007) method in 
measuring parallelism. Another way cleavage literature can be of help in studying 
parallelism is by drawing attention to the possibility that individual cleavages may be 
moving in opposite directions, meaning some may be gaining strength while others are 
weakening. The implication of this insight for measures of press-party parallelism is that 
an overall measure of parallelism in the media, however useful in comparative terms, may 
conceal crucial information about the structure of parallelism. For example, we may find 
that media in Country A have a medium level of parallelism, but this knowledge alone is 
not enough to make a substantive evaluation about the implications of parallelism in this 
country. We would also like to know, in addition to the level of overall parallelism, 
whether there are any common carriers in the media environment or whether all media 
outlets are advocates, to use the Hutchins Commission‟s (1947/2004) terminology. When 
the parallelism scores of individual outlets are averaged, we miss this crucial information; 
media systems which contain both strong advocates (high parallelism) and common 
carriers (low parallelism) could receive a similar rating with systems that have only 
moderate advocates (medium parallelism), both being classified as medium parallelism 
cases. We need to use measures that are sensitive to this variation in structure. 
Study of cleavages, in turn, can benefit from the literature on press-party 
parallelism. More specifically, Seymour-Ure‟s (1974) distinction between the three 
manifestations of press-party parallelism (organization, goal loyalty, and supporters) may 
be of use. The focus in the study of cleavages is almost singularly upon the last aspect, 
exploring the differential support of members of different social groups for different 
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political parties. However, it would probably be useful to study social group-party 
parallelism (cleavage politics) as expressed at the organizational level and in the form of 
shared goals too. An example to the organizational expression of cleavages would be the 
Labour Party‟s links to the affiliated unions, who have a say in the governing of the party. 
Such information about formal links between parties and organizations associated with 
social groups is valuable in itself regardless of the percentage of working class voting for 
the Labour Party. So is information about shared goals between social groups and parties 
–which may or may not have organizational links- as expressed in the content of their 
publications and activities. An example from the US would be the shared goals between 
the Democratic Party and the ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now), which is arguably an association for the less well to do in the society
85
, and 
which, despite having no formal links to the party, consistently endorses Democratic 
nominees. Although difficult to quantify, the extent to which civil society organizations, 
especially those associated with major social groups, have shared goals with political 
parties would be a valuable addition to our knowledge about political systems.  
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 On its official web page, ACORN is defined as “the nation's largest grassrots 
community organization of low- and moderate-income people.” (ACORN, n.d., para. 1) 
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Appendix C 
Chi-square and Wordscore Calculations 
  #
  
C
H
P
 (
a
) 
#
  
A
K
P
 (
b
) 
A
K
P
 P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 (
c
) 
"A
K
P
 v
s
 C
H
P
"n
e
s
s
  
(d
) 
#
 N
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r 
X
 (
e
) 
#
 N
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r 
Y
 (
f)
 
 +
 N
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r 
X
 (
g
) 
 +
 N
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r 
Y
 (
h
) 
 +
 C
H
P
 M
a
n
if
e
s
to
 (
i)
 
 +
 A
K
P
 M
a
n
if
e
s
to
 (
j)
 
c
h
i-
s
q
u
a
re
 
ak_parti 0 193 1 1 20 4 20,00 4,00 0,00 193,00 0,0440 
ak_parti_iktidari 0 71 1 1 13 1 13,00 1,00 0,00 71,00 0,0132 
parti_iktidari 0 71 1 1 17 2 17,00 2,00 0,00 71,00 0,0132 
iktidarimiz_doneminde 0 56 1 1 4 10 4,00 10,00 0,00 56,00 0,0102 
onumuzdeki_donemde 0 53 1 1 40 0 40,00 0,00 0,00 53,00 0,0096 
2002_yilinda 0 51 1 1 2 6 2,00 6,00 0,00 51,00 0,0092 
parti_iktidari_doneminde 0 30 1 1 1 4 1,00 4,00 0,00 30,00 0,0053 
devam_edecektir 1 38 0,97 0,95 0 2 0,00 1,90 0,95 36,05 0,0041 
iktidari_doneminde 1 38 0,97 0,95 0 1 0,00 0,95 0,95 36,05 0,0041 
2006_yilinda 2 39 0,95 0,90 3 0 2,71 0,00 1,80 35,20 0,0023 
yurt_disi 6 4 0,40 -0,20 0 3 0,00 -0,60 -1,20 -0,80 0,0338 
hizli_buyume 7 3 0,30 -0,40 1 0 -0,40 0,00 -2,80 -1,20 0,0490 
etkin_olarak 5 2 0,29 -0,43 2 0 -0,86 0,00 -2,14 -0,86 0,0358 
reel_faiz 5 2 0,29 -0,43 4 1 -1,71 -0,43 -2,14 -0,86 0,0358 
yasal_idari 4 1 0,20 -0,60 6 2 -3,60 -1,20 -2,40 -0,60 0,0332 
disi_muteahhitlik_musavirlik 4 1 0,20 -0,60 0 40 0,00 
-
24,00 -2,40 -0,60 0,0332 
dogu_guneydogu 4 1 0,20 -0,60 10 4 -6,00 -2,40 -2,40 -0,60 0,0332 
sabit_sermaye 5 1 0,17 -0,67 2 17 -1,33 
-
11,33 -3,33 -0,67 0,0439 
hedef_alacagiz 18 0 0 -1 1 13 -1,00 
-
13,00 
-
18,00 0,00 0,2027 
chp_iktidarinda 19 0 0 -1 4 20 -4,00 
-
20,00 
-
19,00 0,00 0,2143 
Total 81 655   130 130 80,80 
-
43,12 
-
52,12 626,12   
    Score (11)   0,62 -0,33 -0,64 0,96   
      Transformed Score (12) 0,58 -0,61 -1 1   
 
1. Calculation of Chi Square 
(a)=Frequency of the word in CHP Manifesto. 
(b)=Frequency of the word in AKP Manifesto. 
Chi square=[(a*(655-b))-(b*(81-a))]
2
 / [(a+b)*(a+(81-a))*(b+(655-b))*((81-a)+(655-b))] 
 
2. Calculation of Wordscores 
(c)=(b/(655+81)) / ((a+b)/(655+81))    Probability with which this word is associated with 
AKP Manifesto as opposed to CHP Manifesto. 
(d)=(2*c)-1     “AKP vs CHP”ness where AKP is 1 and CHP is -1 
(e)=Frequency of the word in Newspaper X 
(f)=Frequency of the word in Newspaper Y 
(g)=e*d     Contribution of the word to the “AKP vs. CHP”ness of Newspaper X. 
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(h)=f*d      Contribution of the word to the “AKP vs. CHP”ness of NewspaperY.  
(i)=a*d      Contribution of the word to the “AKP vs. CHP”ness of CHP Manifesto.  
(j)=b*d      Contribution of the word to the “AKP vs. CHP”ness of AKP Manifesto.  
(Kg)=(sum g)/(sum e)    (Kh)=(sum h)/(sum f)    (Ki)=(sum i)/(sum a)     (Kj)=(sum 
j)/(sum b) 
(L)=[((2*(K-(-0,64))) / (0,96-(-0,64))] - 1 
Note 1: Scores reported in the main text are transformed scores, denoted by L in the 
above calculations, also called the MV transformation in Wordscores program.  
Note 2: The sample calculations above assume that the texts contain only these 20 
phrases. In calculating the scores reported in the main text, attention was restricted to 
those phrases that had a chi-square value above 0,00001. 
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